Considerations for the development and implementation of transgender-inclusive gender demographic questions by Haupert, Margaret
CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF 
TRANSGENDER – INCLUSIVE GENDER DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS 
 
 
 
 
Margaret L. Haupert 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted to the faculty of the University Graduate School 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree 
Doctor of Philosophy 
in the Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences,  
Indiana University 
April 2019 
  
ii 
 
Accepted by the Graduate Faculty, Indiana University, in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. 
 
 
Doctoral Committee     
 
 
_____________________________________  
Eliot R. Smith, PhD 
 
 _____________________________________  
Mary C. Murphy, PhD 
 
 _____________________________________  
Julia R. Heiman, PhD 
 
 _____________________________________  
Justin R. Garcia, PhD 
 
 
 
March 26, 2019 
 
 
 
  
iii 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
Thank you to the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues for the Clara Mayo 
Grant, which funded participant payments for Study 1.  
I am extremely grateful to my advisor, Dr. Eliot R. Smith, for allowing me the scholarly 
freedom to conduct this project in the first place. Since my very first phone interview with him, 
he has been quietly supportive and unassumingly kind. I am so grateful for his help in keeping 
my project scope manageable and the big picture clear, his assistance with statistical analyses, 
and his ability to return thoughtfully annotated chapter drafts in a matter of days. He is the most 
diplomatic, constructive critic I have ever had, and I always leave his office feeling better than 
when I went in. 
I am also deeply thankful for my committee members. Dr. Mary Murphy helped me 
sketch out the first designs of the study that (five years later) became Chapter 4, and taught me 
so much about the complex nature of prejudice. Dr. Justin Garcia was a ray of sunshine and 
positive energy in every class and committee meeting, kept me anchored in the world of sex 
science and the Kinsey, and encouraged collaborations that led to two publications. Dr. Julia 
Heiman helped to shape the ideas that eventually become Chapter 7, asked me hard questions, 
and was an invaluable voice reminding me of the practical constraints facing clinicians.  
Several special people helped me feel so much more at home in academia, and without 
their encouragement I would never have finished this dissertation. I am so grateful to Dr. Anna 
Pope, for understanding and believing in me and this project within five minutes of meeting me, 
to Dr. Amanda Gesselman for no-nonsense advice and airport camaraderie, to Stephanie 
Lochbihler for going through the same things at the same times with the best of humor, and to 
Dr. Lisa Thomassen, for realism, good humor, constant check-ins, and positive reinforcement.  
  
iv 
 
Equally essential were my partners, Zim and Julia, who provided constant love and 
support. I am so thankful that they were willing to incessantly discuss survey design and the 
meaning of gender identity for the past six years, and that they agreed to spend that time in 
Indiana with me.  
I am deeply indebted to my parents, Cathy and Dan, for their constant love, and for 
providing me with such strong early role models of compassion, critical thinking, and social 
conscience. They have always encouraged me to test my intellectual limits and choose my own 
life path, and believed in my ability to rise to meet any challenges I might face.  
There are so many other people who helped me with the technical and theoretical aspects 
of this project, and provided support and encouragement throughout this process. Dr. Erick 
Janssen helped to get me involved at the Kinsey, and Dr. Stephanie Sanders’ Gender, Medicine, 
and the Body class helped to clarify my thinking on much of the gender theory in this paper. My 
friend Kristin Brethova helped me schedule invaluable dissertation work days leading up to the 
end of the project. My research assistants Tasha Smith, Ell Thomas, Gwendolyn Evans, Eric 
Budzielek, Jess Mao, Michael Spors, and Madison Kaufman helped me to talk through this 
project, pilot test early survey drafts, and code comments. Countless conversations with students, 
faculty, and conference attendees also contributed to this final product. 
Thank you all! 
  
  
v 
 
Margaret L. Haupert 
 
CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF 
TRANSGENDER – INCLUSIVE GENDER DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS 
Binary gender questions are often criticized for their inability to identify gender 
minorities (i.e. transgender and non-binary people) and their inconsistency with modern 
multidimensional theories of gender. Several inclusive gender questions have been proposed to 
address these problems, but the evidence supporting their use is less conclusive than many 
organizations have claimed, and the existing body of literature is generally lacking in theoretical 
grounding. This dissertation aims to partially address this gap between theory, measure 
development, and measure application.  
Chapter 1 explores previous conceptualizations of gender from a variety of disciplines 
and explains why the binary gender question is theoretically and pragmatically inadequate for 
assessing gender and transgender status, while Chapter 2 reviews existing literature proposing 
alternatives to the binary gender question. Chapters 3 through 5 provide novel empirical 
evidence from two studies about the simplicity, acceptability, and validity of the most-commonly 
recommended gender identity measures. Chapter 6 shifts focus from transgender participants to 
society at large, testing the hypothesis that some gender question formats may cue gender 
essentialism, and that revising them might thus reduce prejudice toward transgender people. 
Finally, Chapter 7 describes an attempt to extend transgender-inclusive questions to the context 
of sexual orientation, a construct which has historically been grounded in a binary view of 
gender.  
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Introduction and Overview 
Gender1 is perhaps the most ubiquitously collected demographic information, requested 
by government officials, physicians, academics, and laypeople alike. Despite the vast array of 
situations in which gender information is requested and the incredibly diverse applications for 
which this information is used, most gender questions look remarkably alike. Indeed, many 
survey designers consider the traditional gender question “Male or Female?” so familiar and self-
explanatory that the options are commonly abbreviated M/F to save space. In recent years, 
however, this ubiquitous “Male or Female?” gender question (hereafter referred to as the binary 
gender question) has come under scrutiny from a variety of independent scholars and 
professional and governmental organizations. Recognizing the theoretical gap between current 
understandings of gender and the ubiquitous use of the binary gender question, the American 
Psychological Association (2009), the Institute of Medicine (2011), the Department of Health 
and Human Services (2013) have each called for human subjects research to routinely include a 
standard set of inclusive gender demographic questions which can identify gender minorities (i.e. 
binary and non-binary transgender people as well as gender non-conforming people).2 However, 
none of these organizations have put forward candidates for such an inclusive gender measure, 
instead calling on researchers to develop one.  
In response, transgender-advocacy organizations such as the Center for Excellence in 
Transgender Health and the Williams Institute, as well as individual researchers, have proposed a 
variety of replacements for the binary gender question (Sausa et al., 2009; Tate et al., 2013; 
                                                 
1 The term “gender” can refer to any of a wide range of constructs, and there is no scientific consensus on a 
definition for the term (Muelenhard & Peterson, 2011). Throughout this paper, I use the term “gender” to refer in a 
general sense to the fluctuating collection of constructs which are currently described as “gendered” in academic 
literature and popular culture (see Hegarty & Pratto, 2010 for rationale). 
2 The political climate has changed substantially since this project began. 
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GenIUSS Group, 2014; Cahill & Makadon, 2014; Reisner et al., 2014). While virtually all of 
these methods would be improvements over the status quo, the evidence supporting any 
particular measure is less conclusive than many organizations have claimed, and the existing 
body of literature is generally lacking in theoretical grounding.  
In this dissertation, I begin by describing the reasons why the binary gender question is 
theoretically and pragmatically inadequate for assessing gender identity and transgender status, 
and providing an overview of existing models of these constructs (Chapter 1). I then identify the 
most promising alternative measures which have already been put forward, and the evidence for 
and against their use based on previous research (Chapter 2).  
The second part of the dissertation (Chapters 3 through 5) explores the simplicity, 
acceptability, and validity of the most-commonly recommended gender identity measures, 
presenting results from different parts of the same two studies (each sampling undergraduates 
and self-identified gender minorities for four total samples). Chapter 3 considers the simplicity of 
these questions. I descriptively compare participants’ responses to the most commonly 
recommended trans-inclusive gender identity questions, and offer practical recommendations to 
researchers for simplifying and analyzing the often-complex data yielded by these inclusive 
questions. Chapter 4 focuses on acceptability, testing the hypothesis that participants (especially 
those who are transgender and/or non-binary) experience identity threat when seeing certain 
types of gender questions, that this identity threat may reduce their liking of researchers and 
willingness to participate in research, and that the threat posed by a given question may differ by 
context. Chapter 5 concerns validity. I present evidence of the substantive validity, 
generalizability, and external validity of the multiple-choice gender identity measure (alongside 
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the transgender identity measure), as Chapters 3 and 4 suggest that it offers the best combination 
of simplicity and acceptability. 
The final section of the dissertation explores two directions for future research. Chapter 6 
shifts focus from transgender and non-binary participants to society at large, testing the 
hypothesis that some gender question formats may cue gender essentialism, a belief that of 
members of a gender category share an underlying natural, innate “essence” (e.g. Haslam, 
Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000). Gender essentialism, especially a belief in a biological gender 
binary, may lead to increased transprejudice and negative stereotyping of transgender and gender 
non-conforming people (Ching & Xu, 2017). Finally, Chapter 7 describes an attempt to extend 
transgender-inclusive questions to the context of sexual orientation, a construct which has 
historically been grounded in a binary view of gender. I present results from a series of studies 
testing a basic trans-inclusive sexual orientation measure, and suggest directions for future study. 
Overall, I argue that a successful gender demographic question is one that balances 
simplicity, acceptability, and validity. That is, a gender demographic question should be easy for 
researchers to use in data collection and analysis, accurately predict the construct(s) of interest, 
and be understandable and inoffensive (perhaps even welcoming) to diverse participants. While 
no question can perfectly satisfy all these requirements, some options are better than others, and I 
put forward a few promising candidates in the hopes of increasing the general quality of gender 
demographic questions used in social science research. 
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Chapter 1: What’s Wrong With the Gender Binary? 
Western culture has traditionally perceived gender as binary, composed of two and only 
two mutually exclusive categories: “male” and “female.” Both laypeople and academics 
frequently subscribe to biological determinism when it comes to gendered psychological and 
social constructs. Perhaps the clearest example of this sort of thinking occurs after the birth of a 
child, when the declaration “It’s a boy!” or “It’s a girl!” follows a physician’s cursory inspection 
of a child’s genitals (Hubbard, 1996). In our cultural imagination, a person’s genitals (but not 
their gonads, hormones, or chromosomes) are viewed as the essential determinant of their gender 
(e.g. Kessler & McKenna, 1978, Bettcher, 2007). Indeed, the belief that genitals are the 
determining sign of gender is so deeply rooted that physicians have justified cosmetic genital 
surgeries on intersex infants with claims that the children will otherwise grow up without a clear 
gender identity3 (e.g. Kessler, 1990; Beh & Diamond, 2000; Blackless et al. 2000). For all its 
complexity, the vast majority of social science research still reflects this unspoken assumption 
that children with penises always grow up to be men, while children with vaginas always grow 
up to be women.  
                                                 
3 This practice was originated by John Money, the same researcher who created the distinction between sex and 
gender. While he believed that gender identity was entirely socially determined, he argued that “a child should look 
like the sex in which he or she is assigned. The child and the parents, to say nothing of relatives and friends, need to 
be able to see that the genitalia do not tell a lie” (Money 1974, p. 216). According to this line of reasoning, genitals 
determine gender identity because the lay public is certain that genitals are the true source of gender identity.  
However, Money also placed great emphasis on a child’s ability to engage in normative heterosexual sex upon 
reaching adulthood, arguing that “in the final analysis the morphology of the external genitals and their surgical and 
endocrine modifiability are the most important criteria. It is useless to condemn a child to grow up in, and to 
differentiate the gender identity of, the sex in which he can never function coitally” (Money 1974, p. 221). This 
assumption of a linkage between gender identity, sexual orientation, and sexual practice, and the concomitant 
emphasis on both heterosexuality and the suitability of genitals for normative heterosexual intercourse continues to 
pervade research and theorizing on the care of intersex and transgender people (e.g. Kessler, 1990; Dreger, 1998; 
Lawrence, 2010; Cohen-Kettenis & Pfafflin, 2010; Drescher, 2010). Many transgender and intersex people have 
reacted strongly against this theoretical approach, and are wary of questions about sexual orientation as a result (e.g. 
Cohen-Kettenis & Pfafflin, 2010; Serano, 2010). While a full consideration of these issues is outside the scope of 
this paper, it is important to be aware of this tension and distrust when deciding what demographic questions to 
include in studies and how to frame them to avoid inadvertently alienating participants. 
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Despite the strong cultural tendency to equate them, the assertion that gender identity and 
genitals are theoretically distinct constructs has appeared in various forms for nearly a century in 
scholarly literature from medicine (e.g. Hirschfeld, 1923; Money et al., 1972), sociology (e.g. 
Garfinkel, 1967; Hines & Sanger, 2010), gender studies (e.g. Butler, 1990; Serano, 2007; Fausto-
Sterling, 2012), developmental psychology (e.g. Egan & Perry, 2001; Diamond et al., 2011), 
clinical psychology (e.g. Singh et al., 2010; Zucker, 2012; Joel et al., 2014), and social 
psychology (e.g. Olson et al., 2015; Tate et al., 2014) among other disciplines, although each 
field has approached this idea somewhat differently. Perhaps most influential was the distinction 
between sex (biological factors) and gender (social factors) introduced by John Money and 
colleagues in 1955. By 1972, they described chromosomal, gonadal, and hormonal sexes as well 
as gender identities and roles (Muehlenhard & Peterson, 2011). Subsequent research has made 
clear that chromosomes, gonads, hormones, genitals, and secondary sex characteristics can each 
take multiple forms (e.g. Blackless, 2000; Fausto-Sterling, 2000; Consortium on the 
Management of Disorders of Sex Development, 2006). While certain combinations are more 
common, the form of any one of these sexed physical characteristics cannot perfectly predict the 
forms of the others.  
Gender identity is no less complex. While binary gender questions presume (and thus 
find “evidence” for) the existence of two and only two genders, other types of questions find 
evidence for multiple genders (e.g. Factor & Rothblum, 2008; Johnson & Wassersug, 2010; 
Kuper et al., 2012) and/or a gender spectrum (e.g. Joel et al., 2014). However, the precise 
constructs signified by gender remain ambiguously defined (and sometimes hotly contested), 
with no scholarly consensus on a definition for the term “gender” (Muehlenhard & Peterson, 
2011) or “gender identity” (Bussey, 2011). Dozens of major theories of gender development 
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have been proposed over the years (e.g. Freud, 1905/1962; Kohlberg, 1966; Kessler & McKenna, 
1978; Eagly, 1987; Buss, 1995), and each approach has described new gender-related constructs 
and produced new measures to study those constructs. Noting that Carole Beere’s 1990 review 
identified over 1,400 gender-related measures, Smiler andEpstein (2010) observed that “the 
sheer volume of measures suggests…that gender is a complex, multidimensional phenomenon” 
(p. 133). Indeed, several scholars have explicitly put forward multidimensional models of gender 
(e.g. Bussey & Bandura, 1999; Egan & Perry, 2001; Fausto-Sterling, 2012; Tate et al., 2014; van 
Anders, 2016). 
In spite of the evidence that both gender and sex are multidimensional (e.g. Diamond et 
al., 2011; Fausto-Sterling, 2012), the culturally omnipresent idea that gender is determined by 
genitals leads most researchers to assume that asking for participants’ genders will tell them 
something about those participants’ genitals and/or other aspects of their physical bodies. That is, 
they continue to behave as though gender and sex are dichotomous and perfectly linked. It is this 
assumption which underlies the ubiquitous generalizations from a person’s assertion that they are 
a man or a woman (i.e. a binary gender question) to scientific claims about their anatomy, 
hormonal status, fertility, appearance, social role, and many other characteristics.  
Given the existence of transgender people, this approach is clearly flawed. By definition, 
transgender people assert gender identities other than the ones presumed to follow from their 
genitals and/or socialization, and often change their bodies and social roles to better reflect their 
gender identities (e.g. Diamond et al., 2011). Crucially, from this perspective gender identity 
trumps both the physical body and socialization, and thus many transgender people will report 
their gender identity rather than their genital status wherever possible (e.g. Balarajan et al., 2011; 
Fenway Institute, 2013; Conron et al., 2014). Regardless of whether the question asks about sex 
  
7 
 
or gender, it is likely that cisgender and transgender women will select “female” while cisgender 
and transgender men will select “male.” When participants and researchers interpret a question 
differently (as is the case here), the validity of any research based on those data may be 
substantially compromised.  
As a result, transgender people are less likely to be subject to inappropriate 
generalizations from a single question in this way (cf. Zucker et al., 2012), as evidenced by the 
fact that information such as sex assigned at birth, transition history, and gender presentation are 
commonly measured alongside gender identity whenever transgender people are studied, and 
reported (or asked about) whenever transgender people’s genders are discussed.4 Many 
researchers (quite reasonably) have concluded that it is not acceptable to generalize from a 
transgender person’s identity as a man or a woman to make scientific claims about their 
anatomy, hormonal status, fertility, appearance, social role, or any other characteristics. 
 Unfortunately, rather than continuing this line of reasoning to conclude that these various 
constructs should be measured separately for all participants (whether transgender or cisgender) 
when they may be relevant to outcomes of interest, many researchers seem to have concluded 
that it is more efficient to measure transgender status (i.e. to distinguish cisgender and 
transgender people). This reasoning supposes that if cisgender people can be assumed to have 
unidimensional genders and sexes (with gender having a perfect relationship to sex), no further 
investigation of multidimensionality is necessary after a person is identified as cisgender. 
Transgender people, in contrast, can then be excluded from the sample altogether (in the service 
                                                 
4
However, it is important to note that transgender people’s genders frequently continue to be described primarily in 
relation to their sex assigned at birth in the psychological literature, regardless of their gender identity, presentation, 
or social role (Ansara & Hegarty, 2012), an approach which is both cissexist (Serano, 2007), and contrary to the 
recommendations of the American Psychological Association’s Task Force on Gender Identity and Gender Variance 
(APA, 2009) and its publication manual (APA 2010, p. 74). 
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of simplicity), or subjected to an extensive list of questions to assess the various dimensions of 
their genders and sexes, all of which must be considered in any analysis of their data. 
Approaches like these are flawed both because of the data they fail to collect from putatively 
cisgender participants, and because of the undue scrutiny they place on transgender participants.  
Binary gender questions do not permit researchers to distinguish transgender participants 
from cisgender participants (categories whose definition is not universally agreed-upon in any 
case). These questions also presume (and thus find “evidence” for) the existence of two and only 
two genders, while other types of questions find evidence for multiple genders (e.g. Factor & 
Rothblum, 2008; Johnson & Wassersug, 2010; Kuper et al., 2012), and and/or a gender spectrum 
(e.g. Joel et al., 2014) among the general population.  In a survey of cisgender people (i.e. who 
self-reported congruent sex assigned at birth and gender identity), 35% identified to some extent 
as both a man and a woman, neither a man nor a woman, or as a gender incongruent with their 
sex assigned at birth, suggesting that gender identity more closely resembles a spectrum between 
identifying as a man or a woman than it does a binary categorization (Joel et al., 2014). 
In addition to providing inaccurate data, binary gender questions are disliked among 
participants who do not identify as men or women (Staples, Bird, Masters, & George, 2018), and 
they may reduce self-esteem and increase negative affect and feelings of threat in these groups. 
Townsend, Markus, and Bergsieker (2009) suggest that mixed-race participants who are required 
to choose only one racial identity on survey questions (and thus are forced to miscategorize 
themselves) may experience categorization threat, resulting in lowered motivation and self-
esteem. To the extent that participants feel they cannot adequately represent their experiences 
and identities when answering a particular question, or that a question is inappropriate or 
invasive, they may feel more negatively toward researchers and believe that researchers feel less 
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positively toward them and toward gender minorities. Indeed, Meier and Labuski (2013) argue 
that transgender people may stop participating in research which they view as exclusionary, and 
may warn the rest of the transgender community to avoid a particular research project or 
researcher.  
Pragmatically, these issues are of greatest concern to public health researchers (who, not 
coincidentally, are perhaps the most vocal and influential opponents of binary gender questions). 
As a community, transgender people (especially people of color) face very serious health 
disparities in the United States (e.g. Grant et al., 2011; Institute of Medicine, 2011) and around 
the world (e.g. Operario et al., 2008; Reisner et al., 2013). Given these growing public health 
concerns, the issue of how to identify this population in the first place looms large; research and 
interventions with transgender people cannot proceed without first identifying who is 
transgender, and binary gender questions make such identification impossible. Developing a 
standard set of gender questions which are capable of identifying transgender people is therefore 
a top priority in improving the health of this community. A report by the Institute of Medicine 
(2011) noted that “one of the greatest challenges to synthesizing scientific knowledge about the 
health of sexual and gender minorities has been the lack of standardized measures in federal 
surveys” (p. 303-304). Similar concerns have been raised by the American Public Health 
Association (1999), American Psychological Association (APA) Task Force on Gender Identity 
and Gender Variance (2009), and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS, 
2013), and each of these organizations has called for a standard set of questions to identify 
transgender people. Demographers Durso and Gates (2013) neatly summarize the rationale in the 
following way:  
“Discussions of civil rights, program evaluation, public health, and the delivery of human 
services must rely on sound facts and analyses that come at least in part from high-quality 
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survey research. Facts about sexual minorities are often not available because specific 
questions pertaining to sexual orientation and gender identity are not routinely included 
on surveys, leaving scholars, policymakers, and the general public to risk falling back on 
stereotypes and myths about the experiences and social situations of LGBT people” 
(p. 21-22). 
 
Clearly, both academics and the transgender community have much to gain from the 
development and implementation of better alternatives to the binary gender question. From a 
public health perspective, research on the health outcomes of transgender people is desperately 
needed, and that research cannot proceed without a basic set of questions capable of identifying 
transgender people.  The advancement of theories of gender development and difference is 
likewise hampered if researchers exclude or overlook transgender experiences, or routinely 
collect imprecise or incomplete data. Without theory-driven specificity in their measurement of 
gender, researchers cannot say which gendered constructs are driving any observed gender 
differences, which severely limits their ability to understand the causes, correlates, and outcomes 
of these effects. For all of these reasons, it is crucial to develop inclusive alternatives to the 
binary gender question.  
What information should these alternative measures collect?  A full consideration of all 
the gender-related constructs that might be significant to any researcher in any field would be 
virtually impossible to give (Smiler & Epstein, 2010). The more general point to take away is 
that any measure of gender or sex can be effective only if it actually asks about the information 
that is most pertinent to the topic under investigation. While the relevant information may vary 
dramatically over time and between researchers and disciplines, it is essential for every 
researcher to take the time to carefully consider what information they really need and for what 
purpose. As I am a social psychologist, I focus on identifying successful measures of gender 
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identity, a dimension of gender with special relevance for social psychology, and transgender 
status, an understudied intersecting identity. 
Theoretical Perspectives on Gender Identity  
Gender identity as a distinct construct has mostly been described in relation to children, 
intersex people, and transgender people to distinguish the subjective sense of one’s own gender 
membership from the gender membership socially assumed to follow from one’s genitals. 
Authors from various disciplines have produced often conflicting descriptions of gender identity 
as innate or socially constructed, unchanging or malleable, each based in different (and often 
nearly unfalsifiable) assumptions about the nature of an identity more generally. Of course, these 
various definitions usually lead to the same conclusions about the gender identities of the 
majority population of adult cisgender people, and until very recently, theories of gender identity 
development have attempted to explain only the development of a cisgender identity (e.g. 
Kohlberg, 1966; Martin & Halverson, 1981), leaving the development of transgender identities 
under the purview of clinical psychology (e.g. Zucker, 2005; deVries et al., 2014). While a few 
authors have proposed unifying theories of gender identity development (e.g. Diamond et al., 
2011; Fausto-Sterling, 2012), their theories have not yet generated much change in the study of 
gender identity. For this reason, even scholars of gender development have frequently presumed 
that the distinction between genitals and gender identity is mostly theoretical, and that given 
enough time, particular genital configurations almost invariably lead to a sense of oneself as a 
man or woman.  
Empirically, most psychologists (e.g. Kohlberg, 1966; Martin & Halverson, 1981) have 
defined gender identity as the ability to label oneself and others as a boy or girl. This ability has 
nearly always been described as based in either innate or social knowledge of one’s “biological 
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sex,” and presumes the existence of two mutually exclusive gender categories. For instance, 
Spence and Buckner (1995) argued that “children’s recognition of their biological sex is almost 
invariably accompanied by the development of what has been called gender identity, a basic 
existential sense and acceptance of themselves as male or female” (p. 115).  Other authors (e.g. 
Money, 1955) have argued that gender identity is merely a product of assignment to a category.  
In this view, simply being told that one is a boy or a girl is sufficient to produce a gender identity 
as a boy or a girl.   
Obviously, these theories (e.g. Kohlberg, 1966; Martin & Halverson, 1981) explain only the 
development of a binary cisgender5 identity, failing to explain how or why transgender children 
develop a gender identity that is incongruent with their assigned sex at birth, or how some people 
develop non-binary6 gender identities. Many gender theorists and social scientists (e.g. Kessler & 
McKenna, 1978; Butler, 1990; Bornstein, 1994, Califia, 1997; Diamond, 2000; Fausto-Sterling, 
2012) have strongly critiqued this tendency to equate gender identity (in the sense of category 
membership) with genitals. Citing the experiences of transgender people, these authors argue that 
a person’s sense of their gender is not determined by their physical body or by the socialization 
they receive from others.  Rather, they argue that gender’s essence lies in a separate inborn 
knowledge of self, which may mean feeling like a man, a woman, or something else entirely. 
Crucially, this perspective asserts that gender identity trumps both the physical body and 
socialization, observing that transgender people assert gender identities other than the ones 
                                                 
5 I define cisgender as “a person whose gender identity is congruent with the one socially expected based on their 
sex assigned at birth.” In Chapter 3, I problematize this term, asking whether intersex people, non-binary people, 
agender people, and so forth should be considered “cisgender” or “transgender” and exploring the consequences of 
each choice. 
6 I define non-binary gender identities as “gender identities which are not male or female” (e.g. Factor & Rothblum, 
2008; Johnson & Wassersug, 2010; Kuper et al., 2012). 
  
13 
 
presumed to follow from their genitals and/or socialization, and often change their bodies and 
social roles to better reflect their gender identities (e.g. Diamond et al., 2011).  
Other authors concerned specifically with the development of transgender identities have 
argued variously that gender identity in transgender people is an essential, innate, unchanging 
characteristic (e.g. Ehrensahft, 2012), that gender identity is an unstable characteristic 
predisposed by biology and influenced by social factors (e.g. Zucker et al., 2012), or even that 
“there is no gender identity behind the expressions of gender; that identity is performatively 
constituted by the very ‘expressions’ that are said to be its results” (Butler 1990, p. 25).  
Unfortunately, these perspectives also fail to explain why a particular person develops a 
particular identity. Given that virtually all children are born with genitals and are socially 
assigned to a male or female category, why do some children develop along cisgender 
trajectories while others develop along transgender ones? No substantive answer to that question 
has yet been found, but accumulating research does make clear that multiple factors influence 
gender identity (deVries et al., 2014).  
One important recent insight is that individuals play active roles in constructing their own 
gender identities over the course of their lives (Bussey & Bandura, 1999; Diamond et al., 2011; 
Fausto-Sterling, 2012). That is, a person’s gender identity may shape the environment around 
them even as it is shaped by that environment. This reciprocal relationship between personal, 
social, and environmental factors is at the core of two of the most recent models of gender 
identity development, both of which attempt to integrate our knowledge about transgender 
identity with theories of cisgender development to produce a theory which can explain both 
identity trajectories. 
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 One early model of gender identity in cisgender people was proposed by Bussey and 
Bandura (1999), who argued that gender has multiple determinants, (including personal, social, 
behavioral, and environmental factors) which reciprocally influence one another to produce what 
we describe as gender. They further asserted that people are agents who actively contribute to 
their own social development (for instance, by seeking out particular social or environmental 
contexts), rather than merely the passive products of external influences.  
A similar argument was later advanced to describe gender identity in transgender people.  
Although transgender identity development has often been conceptualized as a clear, linear 
process of bringing one’s physical body into alignment with an already-existing gender identity 
(e.g. Devor, 2004), Diamond et al. (2011) argue lucidly that this trajectory does not describe all 
transgender experiences. Rather, they draw on dynamical systems theory to suggest that gender 
identity development may for some be a recursive process that changes over time, with no clear 
endpoint. They also reject the view that gender identity is an innate, unchanging characteristic of 
an individual, arguing that it is instead “a hard-fought achievement, a truly novel creation forged 
out of the individual’s entire history of gender experience and his/her creative explorations of 
new forms of gendered self-expression” (p. 638). This argument highlights the possibility that a 
given person’s gender identity may change and evolve over time in response to social, 
individual, and contextual factors.   
Anne Fausto-Sterling (2012) takes a similar view of gender identity in both transgender and 
cisgender people, arguing that gender identity should be viewed as a dynamical system, or a 
collection of systems changing over time. Like Diamond et al. (2011), she argues that gender 
identity can never be fixed but only stable, and that all people must go through a process of 
developing a gender identity. Critiquing simplistic views of biology as a mere catalyst or a 
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unidirectional force shaping gender, she asserts that the body is “not the foundation of all things, 
but rather is in the middle - sustained within the world, responding to it, but also reshaping it” (p. 
404). She further notes the importance of cultural context and intersectionality, recognizing that 
the exact factors which influence gender identity development will differ across contexts.  
In sum, several contemporary theorists suggest that gender identity forms through the 
reciprocal influence of a variety of factors, and that it develops over time in both cisgender and 
transgender people. Rather than having an essential, unchanging core, gender identity is best 
viewed as a complex system which may be stable or change over time.  
Multidimensional and Integrative Measures of Gender Identity 
 The literature on gender identity’s origins strongly suggests that it is a complex 
phenomenon, but very few researchers have attempted to measure gender identity in any detail. 
Indeed, as described at the beginning of this paper, the vast majority of researchers persist in 
asking about gender as a single construct, so it is hardly surprising that gender identity has 
received less attention. However, a few researchers have developed multidimensional gender 
measures, and I review them here.  
Egan and Perry (2001) designed a multidimensional gender measure explicitly for use 
with children. Their scale had five dimensions: knowledge of which gender category one belongs 
to, feelings of typicality for that gender and contentedness with that gender assignment, felt 
pressure to behave according to gender stereotypes, and bias toward one’s own gender group. 
Children’s self-esteem and peer acceptance were affected by each of these dimensions, though 
the dimensions themselves are not highly correlated. This measure is not without flaws, 
however; it groups children by their sex assigned at birth, and aims to determine whether a given 
child is “typical” of children with the same sex assigned at birth. It further fails to acknowledge 
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the possibility of non-cisgender gender outcomes. In their model, there are only conforming and 
non-conforming members of binary, pre-determined assigned sex at birth categories.  
 Tate et al. (2014) both build on and critique the work done by Egan and Perry (2001) 
with their own “gender bundle” multidimensional model of gender identity. While their five 
dimensions (birth assigned gender category, current gender identity, gender roles and 
expectations, gender social presentation, and gender evaluations) differ slightly from those of 
previous authors, there are enough similarities that Tate et al. (2014) explicitly compare their 
model to that of Egan and Perry (2001) point-by-point. However, Tate et al. take a decidedly 
different perspective on the appropriate point of comparison for a gender identity question to 
work from. Rather than using sex assigned at birth as a reference point, they group participants 
by gender identity, pointing out that there is “no evidence of asymmetry across transgender and 
cisgender actors” with respect to gender development. That is, there is no evidence to support the 
notion that transgender people’s gender identities are any less predictive of outcome variables 
than are the gender identities of cisgender people (Tate et al., 2014). When the topic of study is 
social psychological variables, it therefore seems illogical to combine participants on the basis of 
their assigned sex rather than their shared sense of themselves as members of a particular gender 
category. Instead, transgender people might be more accurately and parsimoniously combined 
with the conforming members of the other assigned sex on the basis of their shared gender 
identity than labeled as highly non-conforming members of a category based on assigned sex at 
birth. The deliberate erasure of transgender identities in Egan and Perry’s measure is thus both 
theoretically inadequate and ethically dubious, as it perpetuates cisgenderism.7 
                                                 
7 Cisgenderism in psychology causes transgender people’s gender identities to be viewed as invisible, delusional, or 
pathological, resulting in numerous theories of gender development and expression which implicitly assume a 
cisgender outcome and discount transgender people’s descriptions of themselves (e.g. Bauer et al., 2009; Ansara & 
Hegarty, 2012). 
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Tate et al. (2014) suggest several reasons why psychologists might have skewed 
perceptions of transgender people’s gender self-categorization. For instance, the frequent use of 
terms such as “male to female” or “MTF” put excessive emphasis on a presumed former gender 
category. However, there is no evidence that transgender children’s gender identities were ever 
congruent with their sex assigned at birth, and substantial anecdotal and empirical evidence in 
support of the idea that transgender children’s gender identities are often present and stable early 
on in development. Thus, while a child’s development will certainly be influenced by the 
assumptions others make about their genders, those external assumptions are not the same as an 
identity.  A second reason for inaccurate assumptions about transgender people’s self-
categorization may be the tendency for transgender narratives to be ignored, dismissed, or 
contested. Despite the wealth of personal stories written by transgender people (e.g. Morris, 
1974; Bornstein, 1994), psychologists have tended to dispute or ignore these subjective 
experiences by dismissing them as the products of a psychological disorder. With all individuals 
who report experiences of gender which differ from the expected model thus pathologized, all 
data points which might otherwise change the model are disregarded (e.g. Bauer et al., 2009).  
One recent paper has provided some additional empirical evidence to support Tate et al.’s 
argument that cisgender and transgender people’s gender identities are the same construct. Olson 
et al. (2015) carried out another comparative study of cisgender and transgender people in an 
attempt to refute claims that transgender children are merely pretending to be their expressed 
gender or are simply being oppositional. They gave both explicit (gender identity, gender peer 
preferences, and object preference) and implicit (a gender-identity and gender-preference IAT) 
measures of gender identity to 32 prepubescent transgender children (aged 5-12), all of whom 
were highly conforming to their gender identity and were perceived as their gender identity in 
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daily life. The same measures were given to their siblings, and control participants matched for 
gender identity and major demographic characteristics. Transgender children consistently 
identified with their gender identities on both explicit and implicit measures, and in this respect 
were not significantly different from cisgender children with the same gender identities. These 
findings suggest that the gender identities of transgender people are as deeply-held and 
empirically predictive as those of cisgender people.  
I define gender identity as the relationship a person perceives between the self and the 
gender groups commonly recognized within their culture. While its precise origins are not well 
understood, the best available evidence suggests that gender identity is a complex dynamical 
system reciprocally influenced by biological and psychological characteristics of the individual 
and by social and environmental factors. Thus, gender identity may be stable or may change over 
time (e.g. Diamond et al., 2011; Fausto-Sterling, 2012). A person’s gender identity is not 
necessarily the same as external observers’ perceptions of their gender group membership (e.g. 
Tate et al., 2014). Rather, I argue that like other social identities, it is quintessentially based in 
self-categorization, a subjective sense of membership or lack of membership in a given gender 
group (e.g. Turner, 1982). This is consistent with previous conceptualizations of gender identity 
as a sense of one’s own relationship to existing gender groups (e.g. Egan & Perry, 2001; Tate et 
al., 2014). In hopes of countering the cisgenderist trend in previous research and advancing the 
integrative study of cisgender and transgender people’s gender identities, I also explicitly view 
gender identity as the same construct for transgender and cisgender people, as well as for people 
with binary gender identities and non-binary gender identities (e.g. Diamond et al., 2011; Fausto-
Sterling, 2012; Tate et al., 2014; Olson et al., 2015). 
Defining and Measuring Transgender Status 
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While developing theoretically precise measures of gender identity that accommodate 
both cisgender and transgender participants is an important goal for social scientists, it is equally 
important to develop theories and measures of transgender status that can capture the distinct life 
experiences of cisgender and transgender people. However, it is far from straightforward to 
operationally define “transgender.” As with gender identity, transgender experience has multiple 
dimensions which are emphasized to varying degrees by different researchers and by transgender 
people themselves. The following section describes four common ways that researchers have 
defined the category “transgender,” and the benefits and limitations of each approach. 
Measuring gender identity and sex assigned at birth.  
As discussed earlier, incongruence between sex assigned at birth and gender identity is 
widely accepted by psychologists as the defining characteristic of transgender people (e.g. 
American Psychological Association, 2009; American Psychiatric Association, 2013; Institute of 
Medicine, 2011). Cisgender people are those whose sex assigned at birth is the same as their 
current gender identity, and transgender people are those whose sex assigned at birth differs from 
their current gender identity. 
Many researchers seem to feel that asking participants for their sex assigned at birth will 
provide information about their physical bodies. However, as several qualitative studies have 
revealed, participants interpret the question to mean “whether the doctor decided you were a boy 
or a girl when you were born,” (e.g. Lombardi et al., 2013), which is almost entirely determined 
by the appearance of an infant’s external genitalia at birth (e.g. Hubbard, 1996). Contrary to 
popular assumption, then, asking about “sex assigned at birth” does not consistently elicit 
accurate information about participants’ physical bodies at birth, their current physical bodies, or 
the sex listed on their birth certificate.  
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Sex assigned at birth is not equivalent to a person’s physical body at birth; even 
obviously intersex babies are assigned male or female at birth in most countries (e.g. Consortium 
on the Management of Disorders of Sex Development, 2006). It is likewise not equivalent to a 
person’s current physical body, as many people change aspects of their anatomy and hormonal 
makeup in their lifetimes as a result of ordinary aging processes or medical intervention. Thus, 
asking only about sex assigned at birth clearly does not provide sufficiently detailed information 
about a person’s physical body for use in medical or public health research. For this reason, 
WPATH (Deutsch et al., 2013) recommended the use of an “anatomical inventory” (i.e. a 
multiple-choice list of organs that a person might have) to provide doctors with sufficiently 
specific information for the provision of basic medical care to transgender patients. 
Sex assigned at birth also does not reliably provide information about the sex listed on a 
person’s birth certificate, as that information can be legally changed in many U.S. states (e.g. 
Grant et al., 2011). There are several components of legal sex, including the sex listed on a 
person’s birth certificate, drivers’ license, passport, social security card, and various insurance 
policies, and for many transgender people these components do not match (e.g. Grant et al., 
2011). Asking about sex assigned at birth cannot provide accurate information about each of 
these components of legal sex. Given that consistency of documentation can have substantial 
effects on a person’s access to housing, transportation, employment, and health care, measuring 
those components of legal sex separately may be crucial to fully understanding their situation. 
Measuring history of transition. 
 Another possible definition of “transgender” is “having a history of transition.” Early 
studies of transgender people were conducted almost exclusively through gender clinics 
providing medical transition services (e.g. Lawrence, 2010; Meier & Labuski, 2013), and this 
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view of the category “transgender” has in some cases persisted into the present. For example, 
Lombardi (2009) asked participants to disclose whether they were currently using hormones or 
had undergone top or bottom surgery, among other questions. Xavier et al. (2007) also defined 
transgender participants (among other criteria) as those who had or wished to physically modify 
their bodies to match their identities.  
This definition of “transgender” is perhaps the most physically centered. While the 
wording used in each question varies, it often implicitly or explicitly focuses on physical aspects 
of transition (e.g. hormones, surgeries) rather than self-identity. As such, this question may feel 
invasive to participants who are uncomfortable disclosing physical information about 
themselves. It may also (depending on the wording) omit participants who wish to undergo 
transition but have not yet, those who have undergone some but not other aspects of transition 
(as there are a wide variety of possible interventions to choose from; e.g. Coleman et al., 2012), 
and those who have undergone transition but conceptualize it in different terms (e.g. gender 
affirmation surgery as opposed to gender reassignment surgery have different implications about 
the source of a person’s gender). Its benefits include the ability to include people who may not 
identify themselves as transgender (see the following section). It may also be appropriate for 
medical contexts because of its focus on biological rather than social factors.  
Measuring transgender identity. 
Some researchers studying transgender people have been primarily interested in whether 
a person self-defines as a member of the social category “transgender.”  Many local and national 
transgender needs assessments have used this sort of definition (e.g. Grant et al., 2011, Conron et 
al., 2012, Conron et al., 2014). For example, the National Transgender Discrimination Survey 
(Grant et al., 2011) used self-definition as a transgender person as their sole exclusion criterion. 
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Likewise, Conron et al. (2012) asked whether their participants think of themselves as 
transgender. This type of question also bears a striking similarity to the single-item measure of 
social identification proposed by Postmes, Haslam, and Jans (2013) for general use in assessing 
self-categorization.  
While an identity-based approach may appear to be the most inclusive way to define 
“transgender,” it seems likely that a question about transgender identity alone will overlook 
people who have a history of transition but do not identify as transgender. For instance, noting 
that qualitative research about transgender identities has frequently distinguished between openly 
transgender people and people who do not disclose their history of transition (i.e. “stealth” 
transgender people), Tate et al. (2013) suggest that openly transgender people may select options 
with the word “transgender” in them (e.g. “transgender woman”), while “stealth” transgender 
people may prefer to select an option without the “transgender” modifier (e.g. “woman”). This 
general premise is consistent with the idea that some people with a history of transition may not 
identify as transgender. In addition, people who self-describe as “transgender” may have 
qualitatively different experiences of life than those who do not self-describe in this way (e.g. 
different levels of concealment of a history of transition).  
Measuring gender presentation. 
Gender presentation, or the degree of one’s conformity to stereotypical behaviors and 
appearances for socially recognized gender categories, is another way to operationally define 
transgender identity. This view emphasizes a person’s social conformity to a gender group over 
self-identity or the person’s physical body, and tends to include a broader array of gender non-
conforming, non-transitioning, cisgender-identified people. Researchers taking this approach 
have largely used a measure of socially assigned gender nonconformity developed by Wylie et 
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al. (2010), which includes questions about the femininity and masculinity of a person’s 
appearance and mannerisms. Where a person’s developmental history is of interest, or where 
converging evidence from close family members is desired, some researchers have also used the 
Recalled Childhood Gender Identity/Gender Role Questionnaire (Zucker et al., 2006), which 
asks a series of questions about the various gendered activities, behaviors, and relationships that 
the person engaged in as a child. Both scales ultimately compare this information to a person’s 
sex assigned at birth.  
Several studies have found that gender nonconformity seems to predict experiences of 
discrimination regardless of sexual orientation or transgender status, although LGBT people are 
at higher risk (e.g. Horn, 2007; Blashill & Powlishta, 2009; Stotzer, 2009). Wylie et al. (2010) 
further observe that this relationship may be U-shaped, as transgender people who are highly 
nonconforming relative to their birth sex are more likely to pass as the gender with which they 
identify (and thus to escape discrimination). Thus, the inclusion of this measure with other 
measures of gender-related constructs may help researchers to distinguish subgroups of 
transgender people who are particularly at risk for discrimination. 
However, this type of measure should also only be included if researchers have a clearly 
defined theoretical reason to request it. In cognitive testing, Lombardi et al. (2013) found that a 
majority of both cisgender and transgender participants indicated conformity to their gender 
identity, limiting its usefulness in distinguishing subgroups. They also noted that this type of 
question may cause distress for gender minority participants, who often recall unpleasant 
experiences associated with not “passing” as cisgender members of their gender identity.  It also 
seems likely that the inclusion of this measure will create feelings of pressure for transgender 
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participants to “prove” their identities by conforming highly to stereotypes for their gender 
identity.  
Conclusion 
 Binary gender questions are widely used but have been criticized for their inability to 
identify gender minorities (transgender and gender non-conforming people) and their 
inconsistency with modern multidimensional theories of gender. While substantial research 
suggests that gender is multidimensional (e.g. Diamond et al., 2011; Fausto-Sterling, 2012), very 
few validated gender measures incorporate this insight. Many current theories and measures of 
gender also typically overlook transgender and non-binary people, limiting the ability of 
researchers to learn about these populations or to develop robust models of gender development 
and difference. 
I propose that researchers should ask about gender identity and transgender status 
separately, and should use precise definitions of each construct they measure. Distinguishing 
between sex assigned at birth, having a history of transition, and identifying as transgender may 
enable researchers to learn more about subgroups within the transgender community and develop 
a more sophisticated understanding of transgender people’s lives. Membership in these each of 
these categories may predict outcome variables differently. In any event, awareness of the 
distinction between these concepts will help researchers more accurately assess how the data 
from particular types of questions can be appropriately generalized.  
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Chapter 2: Alternatives to the Binary Gender Question 
The inadequacies of the binary gender question have been recognized for at least a 
decade, and numerous researchers and organizations have produced their own novel gender 
questions. The vast majority of existing research on alternatives to binary gender questions has 
been conducted by population-level, public health, and medical researchers with the explicit goal 
of identifying transgender people and/or distinguishing transgender people from cisgender 
people. These researchers have therefore generally drawn a strong distinction between physical 
and psychological aspects of gender, as a “mismatch” between these two is widely accepted as 
the defining characteristic of transgender people (e.g. APA, 2009; Institute of Medicine, 2011). 
The result of this focus has been a two-question method, which asks about gender identity and 
transgender status separately. By far the most commonly used of these methods is one which  
asks about current gender identity and sex assigned at birth in order to classify participants as 
cisgender (if sex assigned at birth is the same as current gender identity) or transgender (if sex 
assigned at birth differs from current gender identity).  
This pair of questions (gender identity + sex assigned at birth) has seen relatively wide 
acceptance, having been recommended for use in clinical settings and electronic health records 
(Sausa et al., 2009; Deutsch et al. 2013; Fenway Institute, 2013; Cahill & Makadon, 2014), 
population-level public health and demographic surveys (GenIUSS Group, 2014; Reisner et al., 
2014), and general research (Tate et al., 2013). This measure is a substantial improvement over 
the binary gender question in that it recognizes a distinction between physical body and identity, 
and allows researchers to distinguish transgender and cisgender participants. In addition, certain 
formulations of the question enable researchers to identify participants who identify as 
something other than men or women. These improvements have the potential to dramatically 
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improve the quality and availability of research about transgender communities and about gender 
variance more generally, and for the reasons previously explained, these changes are sorely 
needed.  
However, the development of this measure (and most other inclusive gender questions) 
has proceeded mostly without the benefit of a clear theoretical rationale. Most questions have 
instead reflected the (largely unsupported) preconceptions of their creators (e.g. Sausa et al., 
2009), sometimes modified to accommodate the opinions of focus groups of transgender and 
cisgender respondents (e.g. Balarajan et al., 2011; Lombardi et al., 2013; Conron et al., 2014). 
Perhaps as a result, the precise wording of the questions and response options vary (sometimes 
dramatically) between organizations and researchers, often with little justification. In 
combination, these factors mean that careful examination of the wording used by each researcher 
is necessary to draw conclusions about the efficacy of each method. This is the aim of the 
following sections. Please refer to Table 1 for the full text of each question. 
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Table 1 
Full Text of Previously-Published Gender Identity and Sex Assigned at Birth Measures (“Two-
Question Methods”) 
 Sex Assigned at Birth Question Gender Identity Question 
Kenagy (2005) 
 
What was your physical sex at birth? What is your gender identity? 
Male 
Female 
Intersex 
Male to female transsexual 
Female to male transsexual 
Transman 
Transwoman 
Passing butch 
Transvestite 
Intersexed 
Drag king 
Drag queen 
Cross dresser 
Male 
Female 
Transgendered 
Transgenderist 
Other [free-text] 
Boston Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgender Health Access Project  
(GLBT HAP; Sperber, Landers, & Lawrence, 2005) 
 
What is your sex or gender? 
What is your transsexual/transgender 
identity? 
Transgender 
Transsexual 
Male 
Female 
Other [free-text] 
Male to Female 
Female to Male 
Trans 
Male 
Female 
Other [free-text] 
Center of Excellence for Transgender Health (Sausa et al., 2009) 
 
What sex were you assigned at birth? 
(Check one) 
What is your sex or gender?  
(Check all that apply) 
Male 
Female 
Unknown or Question Not Asked  
Decline to State 
Male 
Female 
Transgender Male/Transman  
Transgender Female/Transwoman  
Genderqueer 
Additional Sex or Gender [free-text] 
Unknown or Question Not Asked  
Decline to State 
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 Sex Assigned at Birth Question Gender Identity Question 
National Transgender Discrimination Survey (Grant et al., 2011) 
 What sex were you assigned at birth, on 
your original birth certificate? What is your primary gender identity today? 
Male 
Female 
Male/Man 
Female/Woman 
Part time as one gender, part time as another 
A gender not listed here, please specify [free-
text] 
Equality and Human Rights Commission (Balarajan et al., 2012) 
 
At birth, were you described as…. 
(Please tick one option) 
Which of the following describes how you 
think of yourself? 
(Please tick one option) 
Male 
Female 
Intersex 
I prefer not to say 
Male 
Female 
In another way [free-text] 
National Center for Health Statistics (Redford & Van Wagenen, 2012) 
 
What was your sex at birth? 
Do you consider yourself to be male or 
female? 
Male 
Female 
Intersex/Ambiguous 
Male 
Female 
Lombardi et al. (2013) 
 What sex were you assigned at birth on 
your original birth certificate? (Check 
one) 
What is your sex or gender? (Check ALL that 
apply)  
Male 
Female 
Unknown or Question Not Asked  
Decline to State 
Male 
Female 
Other: Please specify [free-text] 
The Fenway Institute (2013) 
 What sex were you assigned at birth on 
your original birth certificate? (Check 
one) 
What is your current gender identity? 
(Check all that apply) 
Male 
Female 
Decline to Answer, please explain why 
 
Male 
Female 
Female-to-Male (FTM)/Transgender 
Male/Trans Man 
Male-to-Female (MTF)/Transgender 
Female/Trans Woman 
Genderqueer, neither exclusively male nor 
female 
Additional Gender Category/(or Other), 
please specify 
  
29 
 
Decline to Answer, please explain why 
 
 Sex Assigned at Birth Question Gender Identity Question 
Tate et al. (2013) 
 
What gender were you assigned at 
birth? 
What is your current gender identity? 
Female 
Male 
Intersex 
Female 
Male 
Transgender 
Genderqueer 
Intersex 
The Massachusetts Gender Measures Project (Conron et al., 2014) 
 
What is your sex?  What is your gender? 
Male 
Female 
Male 
Female 
Transgender 
Reisner et al. (2014) 
 
What sex were you assigned at birth, on 
your original birth certificate? (check 
one)  
How do you describe yourself? 
 
Female 
Male 
  
Female 
Male 
Transgender 
Do not identify as female, male, or 
transgender 
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Previously Proposed Inclusive Gender Questions 
Most of the first inclusive gender questions were developed by groups of transgender 
activists. For instance, one of the earliest versions was developed in 1997 by a Philadelphia 
transgender health advocacy group (Kenagy, 2005), and was then used in several other regional 
studies (Xavier, 2000; Xavier et al., 2007). In 2009, a modified version of this method was 
recommended by UCSF’s Center of Excellence for Transgender Health (Sausa et al., 2009), and 
due to its status as a major transgender health advocacy organization, this general design was 
subsequently adopted by other researchers and organizations with an interest in transgender 
health (e.g. Institute of Medicine, 2011; Deutsch et al. 2013; Fenway Institute, 2013; Cahill & 
Makadon, 2014; GenIUSS Group, 2014; Reisner et al., 2014). 
Preliminary Validity Evidence: Lombardi et al. (2013), Tate, Ledbetter, & Youseff 
(2013), and Fenway Institute (2013). 
Among the first U.S.-based researchers to study the validity of a two-question method 
were Lombardi et al. (2013), who carried out cognitive testing on a slightly simplified version of 
the two-question measure recommended by Sausa et al. (2009) with a Midwest convenience 
sample of 25 cisgender and 25 transgender/gender-nonconforming individuals. While Lombardi 
et al. (2013) argue that their question pair was “easy to use and understood by both gender 
minority and majority populations” (p. 21), they also report that many gender minority 
participants found the question “What is your sex or gender?” confusing. The vast majority of 
participants regarded sex and gender as two separate categories, with “sex” being biological and 
“gender” being social/psychological. This led many transgender participants to select two 
options for the first question; one to reflect biological characteristics and the other to reflect 
identity. For these reasons, Lombardi et al. recommend that in future research the first question 
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should ask only “What is your gender?” rather than asking about both sex and gender. This 
modified question wording is also reflected in recent recommendations published by the Fenway 
Institute (2013), the World Professional Association for Transgender Health (Deutsch et al., 
2013), and by various independent medical researchers (e.g. Cahill & Makadon, 2014); however, 
none of these authors cite Lombardi et al. when making this change, so their rationale for doing 
so remains unclear.  
Although they seem to have developed their questions independently, Tate et al. (2013) 
carried out another test of a two-question method which closely resembles the modified version 
eventually recommended by Lombardi et al. (2013). As scholars in San Francisco, Tate and 
colleagues noticed that many local researchers attempted to identify transgender participants 
with a single gender identity question using “male,” “female,” “transgender,” and “other” 
options.  However, Tate et al. reasoned that a two-question method might be preferable to the 
single-question method because it enables researchers to identify genderqueer and intersex 
people as well as transgender people, and because it reliably distinguishes cisgender and 
transgender people in a way that a single question cannot (i.e. because most transgender people 
identify as men or women). To determine which question was more effective, Tate et al. 
compared the missing and valid data rates across the two measures in seven samples of 
undergraduate students and community members from the San Francisco area. They found that 
the number of valid “transgender” and “other” responses was smaller than the missing data rate 
for the single question measure. However, when using this question pair in a different sample 
from the same undergraduate population, they found twice as many transgender responses and 
had virtually no missing data.  
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Despite the partial inconsistency of these findings, Tate et al. (2013) recommended their 
question pair to distinguish cisgender and transgender people for the purposes of health care and 
basic research. Their work has since been cited as conclusive evidence of the two-question 
method’s effectiveness by several high-profile organizations (e.g. Deutsch et al. 2013, p. 701; 
GenIUSS Group 2014, p. 9). Indeed, on the basis of Tate et al.’s research alone, the Fenway 
Institute (2013) stated that “research has indicated that the two-step gender identity and birth sex 
question design performs extremely well” (p. 10). Yet at best, Tate et al.’s results show only that 
the two-question method results in a lower rate of missing data and higher rate of transgender 
spectrum responses than the single-question method.  
The only evidence Tate et al. provide for the validity of their classifications comes from 
Study 2b (Sample 5; N = 130). Noting that three students in this undergraduate human sexuality 
course had publicly identified themselves as transgender during a group activity earlier in the 
semester, they argue that “the fact that exactly three individuals from this sample were 
determined to be on the transgender spectrum of gender identity using the two-question method 
(at a later date in this anonymous survey) demonstrates the predictive validity of the method” 
(Tate et al. 2013, p. 772). While this is better than nothing, it is far from a rigorous validation. 
The matching number does not mean they were necessarily the same three people. In addition, 
the class may have contained other transgender students who were both unwilling to disclose 
their transgender status publicly and unwilling to disclose their sex assigned at birth to a 
researcher. 
However, some of the Fenway Institute’s own research on this question pair suggests that 
a substantial number of transgender people have concerns about answering questions about their 
sex assigned at birth when posed by a medical provider. The Fenway Institute researchers 
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assessed reactions to this question pair by administering a short survey to a gender-diverse 
sample of 251 patients at four community health centers in the Boston, MA area. Consistent with 
previous research, they found that 97% of participants answered both of the questions and that a 
majority of participants understood what the questions were asking. However, a substantial 
portion (17%) of transgender respondents indicated that they wanted to change the gender 
identity questions. Many others (14% of trans men and 29% of trans women) stated that they 
were unsure about answering or would not answer the sex assigned at birth question if it were 
asked at registration, citing the sensitivity of the information. When asked if this information was 
important for health providers to know, 20% of trans men and 26% of trans women disagreed. It 
seems from these results that a substantial minority of transgender people consider sex assigned 
at birth too sensitive to disclose to their medical providers, and do not see clear reasons for their 
providers to need that information. The Fenway Institute researchers downplay these potential 
limitations of the method they propose, instead arguing for the method’s widespread adoption by 
other health care organizations.   
Despite numerous claims to the contrary, then, research by Tate et al. (2013), Lombardi 
et al. (2013), and the Fenway Institute (2013) sheds only minimal light on the efficacy of a two-
question pair asking about gender identity and sex assigned at birth. Each of these researchers 
bases their support for this method primarily on the fact that most participants will answer both 
questions instead of skipping them. Although both Lombardi et al. (2013) and the Fenway 
Institute (2013) report that some participants were uncomfortable with the sex assigned at birth 
questions, neither considers the possibility that some groups of participants are 
disproportionately likely to skip certain questions or to provide inaccurate information.  
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Conflicting Evidence: Conron, Lombardi, and Reisner (2014),and Reisner et al. 
(2014) 
 More conclusive evidence of this method’s limitations comes from the Massachusetts 
Gender Measures Project, which tested several gender-related measures through formative focus 
groups, cognitive testing, and pilot testing with attendees at a transgender youth conference 
(Conron et al., 2014). Participants completed a modified measure of gender identity and sex, and 
a measure of transgender status as well as measures of parental gender pressure, bullying, current 
gender expression and recalled childhood gender nonconformity. By aggregating this 
information with qualitative notes taken from focus groups, cognitive testing, or personal 
communications with the participants, the authors generated a “gold standard classification of 
transgender status” (Conron et al., 2014, p. 971) against which they assessed the classification 
accuracy of each individual measure.  
They report that  
…21.9% of transgender youths (7 of 32) did not provide a valid response to the sex item 
(four skipped it, another selected both male and female, and two chose responses that 
were inconsistent with their assigned sex at birth). Thus two-item classification 
approaches that rely on responses to a common sex measure may not accurately 
discriminate between trans- and cisgender youths (Conron et al., 2014, pp. 971-972). 
 
In total, Conron et al. (2014) found that nearly 30% of their transgender participants were 
misclassified when only the questions about gender identity and sex were used, prompting them 
to call for the development of a valid measure of sex. These findings suggest that at least some 
formulations of this method may be less valid than researchers have hoped, perhaps leading to 
the collection of excessive missing and/or inaccurate data.  
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In stark contrast to these findings, Reisner et al. (2014) report unambiguously positive 
conclusions about the method on the basis of cognitive testing with a subsample of respondents 
from the Growing Up Today Study (GUTS). Every two years since 1996, this national 
longitudinal study has assessed the health of the roughly 16,000 children of female registered 
nurses participating in the Nurses’ Health Study II. Because of the longitudinal nature of the 
study, the researchers had access to the participants’ assigned sex at birth as reported by their 
mothers at the beginning of the study in 1996, which they compared to participants’ self-reported 
gender identity on a 2010 survey. Compared to cisgender participants, participants who were 
identified as gender minorities (0.33%) had higher levels of recalled childhood gender 
nonconformity and socially assigned gender nonconformity, providing evidence for the two-
question measure’s construct validity. In cognitive testing with a subsample of gender minority 
participants, all participants self-reported an assigned sex at birth concordant with their maternal-
reported assigned sex. While these results may seem promising, the participants in Reisner et al. 
(2014) are highly unusual, as they and their immediate families have been the subjects of 
repeated study for most of their lives. It seems plausible that these participants are therefore more 
comfortable discussing intimate matters with researchers (or at least more resigned to the 
experience) than the average transgender person might be. Additionally, these participants may 
have been aware (or could have guessed) that their sex assigned at birth had already been 
documented by their mothers and was therefore already available to the researchers, diminishing 
the potential benefits of choosing not to disclose a transgender identity. 
Among U.S. researchers, only Conron et al. (2014) and Reisner et al. (2014) have directly 
tested ability of questions about gender identity and sex assigned at birth to identify transgender 
participants, and they reach contradictory conclusions. While Reisner et al. (2014) found that this 
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method correctly classified all transgender participants, Conron et al. (2014) find that it 
miscategorized nearly 30% of transgender participants. Their studies differ in both question 
wording (Conron et al. asked participants “What is your sex?” while Reisner et al. asked “What 
is your sex assigned at birth?”) and sample (Conron et al. recruited transgender youth conference 
attendees while Reisner et al. recruited the children of nurses who had already been participating 
in a longitudinal study for most of their lives). It is possible that Conron et al. obtained such poor 
categorization rates because the wording “What is your sex?” does not acknowledge the coercive 
nature of sex assignment, a common theme raised by transgender participants in several 
cognitive interviews on this subject (e.g. Balarajan et al., 2011; Lombardi et al., 2013). 
Alternatively, Reisner et al. may have obtained perfect categorization only because their 
participants were well aware that their personal histories were already known to researchers.  
Resolving Discrepancies: Balarajan, Gray, and Mitchell (2011). 
Fortunately, the discrepancy between the conclusions reached by Conron et al. and 
Reisner et al. can be at least partially resolved by considering a multi-part report published two 
years earlier by the UK-based Equality and Human Rights Commission (Balarajan, Gray, and 
Mitchell, 2011; Glen & Hurrell, 2012). After reviewing the available literature, Balarajan et al. 
(2011) developed a list of requirements for a truly inclusive gender question. Finding that no 
existing questions met their previously established criteria, they drafted a new set of questions 
which they predicted would be more successful. After revising the questions on the basis of 
feedback from focus groups of cisgender and transgender participants, the questions went 
through two rounds of cognitive interviewing (again with both cisgender and transgender 
participants) and were revised again to produce a final set of five recommended questions. Glen 
and Hurrell (2012) then gave these exact questions to an online sample of over 10,000 
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participants who had previously completed the “standard” binary gender question as part of their 
initial recruitment. This design enabled the researchers to compare participants’ responses to the 
two types of questions while minimizing the likelihood of order effects.  
Comparing responses to gender identity and sex assigned at birth questions alone, Glen 
and Hurrell identified 0.6% of their sample as gender minorities. However, by analyzing a third 
question about transition history in addition to these questions, the proportion of gender minority 
participants more than doubled, to 1.4%. Notably, 1% of participants indicated having a history 
of transition, and 83% of those participants had identified themselves as only male or only 
female in the previous method (meaning they would have been categorized as cisgender if 
questions about gender identity and sex assigned at birth were used alone). On the basis of these 
findings, Glen and Hurrell concluded that  
“there was relatively little overlap between different minority groups, which suggests 
that, to maximise the opportunities for respondents to choose minority identities, 
questions 1-3 [sex assigned at birth, gender identity, and transition history] all need to be 
asked. Relying on only some of those questions would miss some groups of respondents” 
(p. 9). 
 
Glen and Hurrell’s participants were recruited from the general population of the UK and 
their question referenced “sex assigned at birth,” reducing concerns that their results were merely 
an artifact of an atypical sample or an objectionably-worded question. Nonetheless, these 
researchers still found little overlap between the groups of transgender participants identified by 
this method and the transgender participants identified by the question about a history of 
transition. On this basis they concluded that asking about gender identity and sex assigned at 
birth alone would miss a substantial number of transgender respondents, and that it was therefore 
crucial to use all three questions.  
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This work is among the most systematic and theoretically-grounded research on inclusive 
gender demographic questions to date, but despite its rigor and scope, Balarajan et al. (2011) and 
Glen and Hurrell (2012) do not seem to have been cited by any gender researchers or 
organizations working in the United States. As a result, instead of using their theories, designs, 
and findings to scaffold new research, most U.S.–based researchers have spent the last few years 
working independently to solve the same problem from scratch, usually with far less institutional 
support and limited funding. While further research is clearly necessary to fully resolve this 
issue, the best available evidence at this point suggests that questions about gender identity and 
sex assigned at birth alone are inadequate for distinguishing transgender participants, contrary to 
the conclusions of several large organizations.   
Identifying Questions for Further Study 
 Having reviewed alternatives to the binary gender question which have previously been 
proposed, I then selected several of the most promising inclusive measures for further 
comparison testing (see Chapters 3, 4, and 5 for results). Three of these questions ask about 
gender identity alone. As gender identity is an integral part of each measure of this type, a 
primary question is to determine which response options best optimize for simplicity, validity, 
and acceptability. The binary gender question is included as a baseline, and is compared to the 
binary question with an “Other” option and to a multiple-choice gender identity question that 
includes several more options. I also added two types of free text question (small and large box), 
as participants in my pilot study expressed strong interest in such a measure. While I do not 
expect to recommend binary or free text questions, they are included to serve as floor and ceiling 
measures of simplicity and acceptability. That is, previous research suggests that binary 
questions maximize simplicity of analysis and minimize acceptability to gender minorities, while 
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free text questions minimize simplicity of analysis and maximize acceptability to gender 
minorities. Finally, I included several two-question methods. These combine the same multiple-
choice gender identity question with one of three different measures of transgender status (sex 
assigned at birth, transgender identity, or transition history).  
I used the “best-case scenario” version of each question type based on previous research. 
In all cases, the first question was “What is your gender identity?” both to minimize differences 
between questions and because the term “gender identity” may cue acceptance of transgender 
people in a way that “gender” does not. I also consistently used the terms “man” and “woman” as 
options when asking about gender identity, and the terms “male” and “female” only when asking 
about sex assigned at birth, as requested by participants in a pilot version of this study. Finally, 
all questions except the Binary plus Other included “Do not know” and “Choose not to answer” 
options, following previous research which suggests that this reduces the rate of missing data and 
makes it easier to tell why people are not answering the question (Redford & Van Wagenen, 
2012).  In all cases, participants could choose only one option for each question (i.e. questions 
are single select). 
The following sections provide the exact text of the questions used in Study 1 and Study 
2 (see Chapters 3, 4, and 5 for methods and results). For each question, I include subheadings 
indicating the simplicity of analysis, validity, and acceptability of each measure to participants.  
Measures of Gender Identity. 
Binary. 
Figure 1. Binary gender identity question used in Studies 1 and 2. 
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The binary question is included in this study as a sort of control, the status quo against 
which the other inclusive gender questions can be compared.   
Simplicity of analysis: As the status quo, this question is by far the most commonly used 
gender question. It is familiar to participants, very simple to answer, and very simple to analyze. 
Validity: The binary question lacks validity for most research and practical applications.8  
Acceptability to participants: While this question may not pose much problem for 
transgender people who identify as men or women, it excludes individuals who do not identify as 
male or female, forcing people with non-binary gender identities to select one of two inaccurate 
options. This may induce identity threat for non-binary people (see Chapter 4).  
Binary plus Other. 
 
 
Figure 2. Binary plus Other gender identity question used in Studies 1 and 2. 
 
This question makes only a slight modification to the binary gender question, but in 
theory it includes participants with any gender identity. It is included in this study as a sort of 
control, as it is perhaps the simplest possible inclusive gender question (i.e. it enables both binary 
and non-binary people to indicate their genders). It is also becoming more familiar and widely-
used in a variety of academic research and by large organizations (e.g. Google asks this 
questions of users when they set up a Gmail account).  
                                                 
8 For a detailed explanation of the problems with the binary method, refer to Chapter 1. 
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Simplicity: This question is more complex to analyze than the binary question because it 
includes a free-text box whose contents must be hand-coded. However, given that most people 
identify as men or women, there are likely to be relatively few of these responses in most 
samples. This question is also easy for participants to understand, as participants who do identify 
as men or women can simply ignore the “Other” option.  
Validity: In theory, this question could be a valid measure of gender identity, because 
participants can write in any response that is not already provided. However, participants may be 
uncertain about what researchers mean by “Other,” and so may provide less useful responses. 
For example, binary transgender people may not select “Man” or “Woman” despite identifying 
as men or women. Other people may view a free-text box as an opportunity to share sexual 
orientation, satisfaction with gender identity, or even political views (see Chapter 3) rather than 
gender identity itself. In practice, validity will be determined more by the coding scheme 
developed by each researcher to organize the free-text responses than by the question itself.  
 Acceptability: Previous research suggests that binary transgender people may feel 
identity threat when seeing this question if they imagine that the researcher “expects” them to 
choose the “other” option because they are transgender (e.g. Pope and Warner, 2016). While this 
question does allow participants to indicate non-binary genders, it does not explicitly include 
non-binary people, and so does not provide any cues to indicate how much knowledge the 
researchers have about non-binary identities.  
Multiple-Choice. 
 
This multiple-choice gender identity question is adapted from one used by the Fenway 
Institute (2013), which has several features that improve upon the binary + other measure. 
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Figure 3. Multiple-choice gender identity question used in Study 1. 
 
Including the term “genderqueer” as its own option was intended to serve as a cue to 
participants that the researchers who created this question recognize and are interested in 
genderqueer people. As genderqueer participants make up a substantial proportion of people who 
do not identify as men or women, including this option may also reduce use of the free-text box 
and thus the number of responses that need to be coded. The “Decline to answer” option is included 
to reduce missing data, as many participants who do not wish to reveal this information will 
otherwise simply skip the question, leaving researchers with no way to know why the 
information is missing. It is also consistently requested in cognitive interviews with gender 
minority participants (Balarajan et al., 2011). 
My adaptation of this question also incorporates the following changes from the version 
used by the Fenway Institute (2013): 
 To simplify data analysis and maintain consistency across questions, this question is 
single-select (does not permit multiple selections). 
 I omitted the separate options for “trans men” and “trans women” given that these 
respondents by definition identify as men or women, and because including a separate 
“transgender” option alongside “man” and “woman” suggests that researchers do not 
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perceive transgender people as men or women, producing identity threat for these 
respondents (Pope and Warner, 2016).  
 Changing the labeling of the free-text box from “Additional Gender Category/Other” 
to “Another gender identity not listed” avoids literally “othering” participants who 
select that option. Instead, it places responsibility on the researcher for not including 
an option for that participant, and implicitly signals that the researcher is aware that 
other identities exist. 
 I added a “Do not know” option to capture participants who are questioning their 
gender or who do not understand the question, following the recommendation of 
Redford and van Wagener (2012). 
On the basis of participant feedback from Study 1, I slightly revised the question used in Study 2.  
 
Figure 4. Multiple-choice gender identity question used in Study 2. 
 
A large number of participants who chose the “Another identity not listed” option in 
Study 1 wrote in “non-binary” or “agender,” so these were added as options in the version of this 
question used in Study 2. This new design also better matches the suggestion by Tate, Youssef, 
and Bettergarcia (2014) that gender identity can be summarized in relation to the dominant 
cultural categories of man and woman as man, woman, both, or neither. The revised version 
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replaces the term “genderqueer” with “non-binary,” which emerged as a commonly used 
umbrella term for a variety of gender identities that are not “man” or “woman.” To capture 
additional diversity within this umbrella category, I added an optional free-text box to the “non-
binary” option.  
Simplicity: While it is slightly longer than the Binary + Other question, the Multiple-
Choice question may be easier to analyze, as it includes more selection options to reduce the 
number of free-text responses that must be hand-coded. 
Validity: In theory, this could be a valid measure of gender identity. It includes options 
for most major categories of gender identity (Tate et al., 2013).  
Acceptability: This measure includes options for most common gender identity 
categories, signalizing researchers’ awareness of and concern about these categories. This likely 
increases acceptability of this measure to gender minorities. However, it is possible that the 
inclusion of more than the two most common options may increase participant dissatisfaction if 
their identity is not specifically included. Cisgender participants may be confused by the number 
of additional options, although listing the familiar “Man” and “Woman” first may reduce this. 
Free Text Box 
Many gender minority participants left comments in my pilot study requesting a free-text 
box in which to report their gender identities, so I included it for comparison in Studies 1 and 2.  
 
 
Figure 5. Short free-text gender identity question used in Studies 1 and 2. 
 
This question gives participants complete control over what information to disclose about 
their genders. They are free to frame their identities exactly as they choose, and to disclose or 
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withhold any information at their discretion.  This question makes no assumptions about gender 
identity, and thus appears perfectly inclusive. Data produced by this question require hand-
coding before they are useable for statistical purposes, which places a substantial analytic burden 
on researchers. In addition, it requires researchers to determine how to group participants’ 
responses rather than allowing them to group themselves. As the wording of the question does 
not give participants any information about the researchers’ understandings of gender, 
participants are left to guess what level of disclosure will be appropriate. Thus, ironically, this 
apparently maximally inclusive question in practice gives participants very little agency over 
how their data are ultimately interpreted by researchers.   
 For further comparison, I also included a long version of the free-text question in Study 
1. The paragraph-sized text box and the slight rewording of the prompt “Please describe your 
gender identity” normalizes the idea that gender identities are messy and require narratives rather 
than simple labels to understand.  
 
Figure 6. Long free-text gender identity question used in Study 1. 
 
 Simplicity: While free-text questions are visually simple, all responses require coding, 
making analysis of this question the most complex. 
Validity: Like the Binary + Other question, this could theoretically be a valid measure of 
gender identity, because participants can write in any conceivable response. In practice, validity 
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will be determined more by the coding scheme developed by each researcher to organize the 
free-text responses than by the question itself. 
 Acceptability: As gender minority participants consistently request this specific measure, 
it seems to have very high acceptability. However, the size of the free text box and the slight 
rewording of the prompt relative to the short free text box question may make participants more 
aware that researchers are scrutinizing their genders, which may lead some participants to feel 
obligated to provide “proof,” a process which might induce feelings of identity threat. Cisgender 
people are unlikely to become confused by this question, as it does not include any unfamiliar 
terminology.  
Measures of Gender Identity and Transgender Status 
 Measures of gender identity alone cannot assess transgender status, as it is a separate 
construct. Therefore, a gender identity question must be combined with a second question 
measuring transgender status. For consistency, within each study, each measure used the same 
multiple-choice gender identity question paired with one of three different transgender status 
questions.  
Multiple-Choice + Sex Assigned at Birth. 
This measure (i.e. a question about gender identity paired with a question about sex 
assigned at birth) was originally developed for public health and demographic research, and a 
growing body of evidence supports its use in that context (e.g. Sausa et al., 2009; Equality and 
Human Rights Commission, 2012; Redford & Van Wagenen, 2012; Tate et al., 2013; Fenway 
Institute, 2013; Conron et al., 2014). While the recommended wording for the gender identity 
options varies substantially by author, the sex assigned at birth question options are fairly 
consistent.  
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Figure 7. Multiple-choice gender identity question and sex assigned at birth question used in 
Study 1. 
 
I used a slightly simplified version of the question wording recommended by the Fenway 
Institute (2013), and the options recommended by Tate et al. (2013), modified to add “Do not 
know” and “Choose not to Answer” options as recommended by Redford and Van Wagenen 
(2012). I wished to include an option for Intersex people as done by Tate et al. (2013), as several 
participants in my pilot study commented on the absence of such an option, but the Fenway 
Institute question wording no longer made sense with those options as a child cannot be assigned 
Intersex on a birth certificate in most parts of the world. Based on participant feedback from 
Study 1, however, I made further revisions to the question options to better acknowledge the fact 
that until very recently babies could not be assigned intersex at birth in the United States (Scutti, 
2017).  
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Figure 8. Multiple-choice gender identity question and sex assigned at birth question used in 
Study 2. 
 
 Simplicity: This measure is complex to analyze. People whose gender identity is the 
same as their sex assigned at birth are classified as cisgender, and people with other 
combinations of gender identity and sex assigned at birth are classified as transgender. 
Responses to the two questions must therefore be compared in a separate variable in order to 
classify participants as transgender or cisgender. In addition, it is unclear where to classify non-
binary and agender participants (see Chapter 3). 
Validity: Conron et al. (2014) suggest that some transgender participants may be 
misclassified as cisgender using this method, as they may report a sex assigned at birth that 
matches their gender identity, presumably to avoid the risk of being misgendered by researchers. 
Thus, the data produced by this question may not always be as valid as it appears. 
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Acceptability: As noted by Balarajan et al. (2011), cognitive interviewing suggests that 
some transgender people consider it offensive to be asked about their sex assigned at birth, even 
in health care contexts. This potential discomfort may be an acceptable trade-off in health care 
contexts, where a person’s body may be of as much interest as their identity and the need for 
invasive questions is clear to the participant. In the context of psychological research, however, 
the need for this information is not always clear, and other less-invasive questions may be 
equally useful and better-liked by participants. 
Multiple-Choice + Transgender Identity 
Many local and national transgender needs assessments have used this sort of question 
(e.g. Grant et al., 2011, Conron et al., 2012, Conron et al., 2014). For example, the National 
Transgender Discrimination Survey (Grant et al., 2011) used self-definition as a transgender 
person as their sole exclusion criterion, and I opted to use their question (with the addition of “do 
not know” and “choose not to answer” options) here.   
 
Figure 9. Multiple-choice gender identity question and transgender identity question used in 
Study 1. 
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Based on participant feedback in Study 1, I removed the term “gender non-conforming” from the 
question stem, in order to ask a slightly narrower question about transgender identity in specific. 
 
 
Figure 10. Multiple-choice gender identity question and transgender identity question used in 
Study 2. 
 
Simplicity: This measure is easier to analyze than the sex assigned at birth question, as 
transgender status can be determined with reference to a single question. 
Validity: This question may overlook people who are not openly transgender or those 
who have a history of gender transition but do not identify as transgender (e.g. Tate et al., 2013).  
In contexts where a participant’s physical body is of interest (e.g. health care settings), this 
question may not gather the necessary information.  
Acceptability: Unlike the Sex Assigned at Birth question, this question emphasizes self-
identification over designations made by others, which may increase gender minority 
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participants’ comfort and willingness to answer. However, cisgender people may be made 
uncomfortable or confused by being asked to consider whether they are transgender. 
Multiple-Choice + Transition History 
This measure assesses transgender status by asking about transition history. This method 
was developed by Balarajan et al. (2011), who suggest that it identifies a distinct subset of 
participants whom researchers may consider transgender but who are unlikely to be identified as 
such by other question types. 
 
Figure 11. Multiple-choice gender identity question and transition history question used in Study 
1. 
 
Simplicity: Like the transgender identity measure, this measure is relatively simple to 
analyze because transgender status is determined by responses to single question. 
Validity: This question can identify participants who have gone through gender transition 
but no longer identify as transgender. For some purposes, it may also identify a broader selection 
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of people as transgender than is desired by researchers, because its definition includes even 
thoughts about transition as sufficient to identify a person as transgender.  
Acceptability: This question may be perceived as unnecessarily invasive in some 
contexts, as transition history is likely to be very private information for many gender minorities 
(Fenway Institute, 2013).  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have reviewed previous attempts to develop inclusive measures of 
gender identity and transgender status, and identified several gaps in the evidence for the validity 
and acceptability of these existing measures. Based on the best available evidence, I then 
identified a few of the most promising measures which appear suitable for use in with both 
cisgender and transgender people and with people who have non-binary gender identities. For 
each of the measures, I identified a “best-case scenario” wording based on the insights of other 
researchers and comments from participants in several iterations of empirical testing. As no one 
measure can perfectly address all needs, I also briefly noted how simple each question is to 
analyze, how face valid it is as a measure of gender identity/transgender status, and how 
acceptable it is to gender minority and cisgender participants. In the next three chapters, I 
describe the results of two studies which present novel experimental evidence for the relative 
validity and acceptability of each of these questions.  
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Chapter 3: Simplicity of Inclusive Gender Identity and Transgender Status Measures 
I have just argued that researchers in social and health sciences should adapt their work to 
incorporate the now well-established idea that gender is multidimensional, and described 
previous attempts to create survey measures of gender identity and transgender status that meet 
this need. This chapter and the two that follow present two studies I conducted to identify the 
trans-inclusive gender question that best balances needs for simplicity of administration and 
analysis (Chapter 3), acceptability to participants (Chapter 4), and validity (Chapter 5). 
To maximize the chances that a new measure will be adopted, it must be short and easy to 
administer and interpret. Binary gender questions are among the simplest possible survey 
questions to administer and interpret, so alternative measures will necessarily be more complex. 
However, complexity exists on a spectrum; questions which require extensive hand-coding (e.g. 
free-text questions) are more complex to analyze than those which require only programmatic 
comparison between two different questions to yield the needed information (e.g. the multiple-
choice gender identity question and sex assigned at birth). By detailing the process I used to 
clean and organize the data from these two studies (including alternatives that I attempted but 
abandoned), I attempt to showcase the relative difficulty of using each method while also 
providing usage guidelines for future researchers who use these measures.  
I also address in this chapter two components of validity; the need for a question to be 
content valid and generally usable. A measure which lacks content validity misses crucial 
information about the construct it is measuring, making the measure less sensitive or inaccurate. 
As this is the core criticism leveled against binary gender questions, I address it first. 
Additionally, I examine generalizability in this chapter because measures which are only useable 
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in a narrow context or which are not reliable are harder for researchers to use and less likely to 
be adopted. A simple measure should be usable across many contexts and participants.  
Overall, my goal in this chapter is to identify the simplest question format which is still 
inclusive of transgender and non-binary people and to clearly describe a plan for using the data 
which it produces. 
Assessing a Measure’s Content Validity 
 A measure of gender identity which has content validity does not omit any important 
facets of the construct of gender identity, nor include any extraneous elements (John & Benet-
Martinez, 2000). To determine whether this is true, we need a precise theoretical definition of the 
construct(s) being measured.  I define gender identity as the relationship a person perceives 
between the self and the gender groups commonly recognized within their culture (see 
Chapter 1 for more detail). I further propose that gender identity is the same construct for 
transgender and cisgender people, as well as for people with binary gender identities and non-
binary gender identities (e.g. Tate, Youssef, & Bettergarcia, 2014); Joel et al., 2014; Olson et al., 
2015). 
A person’s gender identity is not necessarily the same as external observers’ perceptions 
of their gender group membership (e.g. Tate, Youssef, & Bettergarcia, 2014); rather, like other 
social identities, it is quintessentially based in self-categorization, a subjective sense of 
membership or lack of membership in a given gender group (e.g. Turner, 1982).  According to 
social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), self-categorization in a group results from 
assignment to that group. As established previously, due to definitional discrepancy between the 
gender group to which transgender people are assigned (their sex at birth) and their self-
categorization, this view of the causes of self-categorization cannot account for or shed light on 
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the transgender experience. Therefore, I have moved away from social identity theory’s 
conflation of self-categorization with assignment to a group, instead explicitly focusing on self-
categorization as subjective membership.  
Evidence for content validity can come partially from content experts (e.g. researchers 
with expertise in gender and transgender studies), who have designed measures to correspond to 
theoretical definitions of gender identity and transgender status. As the measures being tested 
here were already designed by such content experts, and often have gone through multiple 
iterations of such review, there is already some evidence for their content validity. To provide 
further evidence, I also chose to include in my studies two additional gender self-categorization 
measures designed to answer theoretical questions about the nature of binary and non-binary 
gender identities, and about the potential for overlapping gender identities.  
Tate, Youssef, and Bettergarcia (2014) suggest that gender identity, in the sense of self-
categorization, can be viewed as the extent of a person’s identification with each of the available 
gender categories in their culture. Because gender in the United States is still largely understood 
as binary, the gender identity of a person in this culture can then be understood as the degree to 
which they perceive their identity as overlapping the category “men” and the category “women.”  
Tate, Youssef, and Bettergarcia (2014) suggest that non-binary gender identities may either 
integrate both male and female identity (which they call genderblended) or reject/transcend male 
and female (which they call postgender). To assess this theory, in Study 1, I measured self-
categorization among gender minority participants with a single item adapted from Joel et al. 
(2014), which reads as follows: Currently, I think of myself as: (A man/A woman/Both a man and 
a woman/Neither a man nor a woman).  
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In Study 2, in addition to the Joel et al. (2014) item, I measured self-categorization with a 
novel measure adapted from a racial identity measure developed by Rockquemore and Arend 
(2002). This measure was designed to capture the ways that the social interpretation and 
availability of certain identity labels may differ from person to person, as they are constrained by 
both personal characteristics of the individual (e.g. physical appearance) and the social 
environment (e.g. the available socially recognized identity categories). A combination of these 
factors seems to determine whether people with one black and one white parent identify 
themselves as black, white, and/or biracial, or indicate that they identify as black, white, or 
biracial, but experience the world as a black, white, or biracial person (Rockquemore, 1998). 
Likewise, a combination of personal and social characteristics may determine how gender 
minorities categorize their genders (e.g. as men, women, non-binary, agender, or something 
else). 
Another source of content validity evidence is unconstrained responses from participants 
themselves. Typically, these are elicited through cognitive interviews. These yield information 
about how participants interpret the questions and choose their answers (e.g. Schwartz, 1999) to 
ensure that researchers and participants interpret the questions the same way, and that 
participants are only reporting information which is theoretically related to the construct being 
measured. While cognitive interviews have already been conducted for several of these 
measures, I wanted to provide similar evidence about the full range of participants’ self-
categorizations within a survey design, so I included a free-text question. If the majority of 
responses to the free-text question are captured by the options available in the multiple choice 
question, we have greater evidence of content validity (given my assumption that the free-text 
measure has the highest content validity from a participant’s perspective). 
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Assessing a Measure’s General Usability 
 Demonstrating a measure’s general usability, or the degree to which it can be used with 
other participants, tasks, and contexts, requires several different types of evidence. In this 
chapter, I consider the evidence for reliability. For instance, a measure must be reliable in order 
to be generally useable, so it must demonstrate adequate test-retest reliability, equivalence, and 
internal consistency. The question of the measure’s general usability across participants and 
contexts is considered in Chapter 5. 
Test-retest reliability (the relationship between the same measure given to the same 
participants at a different time) can in theory be easily demonstrated through mass testing and 
similar techniques. However, for the particular context of gender identity, any difference 
between the first and second tests could reflect changes in gender identity over time rather than a 
lack of reliability. Given the possibility that gender identity is a dynamically emerging construct 
(Diamond et al., 2011; Fausto-Sterling, 2012), approaches to establish test-retest reliability for a 
gender identity measure must be carefully considered. In both Study 1 and Study 2, I opted to 
administer the same gender identity measure to each person multiple times within the same 
survey, which provides some limited evidence of test-retest reliability. Alternatively, researchers 
may wish to simply accept that gender identity may differ from time to time and place to place in 
response to a wide variety of inputs (and may indeed even be influenced by the mere act of 
measuring it).  
Evidence of equivalence (the relationship between different forms of the measure given 
to the same participants at the same time) might include the similarity between participants’ 
scores on the various forms of inclusive questions. Both of these studies include multiple 
versions of the gender identity question with subtle differences, and while I do expect some 
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variation in responses to these questions (see Chapter 5), the vast majority of responses should 
remain consistent. 
Finally, internal consistency is another aspect of reliability which is usually assessed 
using a split-halves or interrater technique. However, these methods (and the concept of internal 
consistency itself) are not particularly applicable to the proposed measure, as none of the items 
are presumed to be measuring exactly the same construct, and the measure is very short. 
However, we will use independent raters to code the free-text portions of participants’ responses, 
and can assess interrater reliability on that basis. 
Summary of Goals 
The next portion of this chapter describes part of the methods for two studies conducted 
in 2016 with samples of undergraduate students and gender minorities to assess the simplicity, 
acceptability, and validity of several gender identity and transgender status measures in order to 
recommend a measure for general use in psychological research. In the Methods section, I 
present information about each sample and the gender identity and transgender status measures 
used in each study (see Chapter 2 for details about how these measures were selected). For each 
measure, I present the coding and/or analytic strategies I used for each one, with a specific focus 
on the handling of participants whose responses were challenging to categorize in a useable way. 
This section provides evidence about test-retest reliability, internal consistency, and inter-rater 
reliability. Then, in the Results section, I compare the categorizations produced by each measure, 
to determine how much of the information captured by each one is captured (or missed) by other 
measures, providing some evidence of the content validity of each one. Finally, in the Discussion 
section, I make general observations about the use of each method (including alternatives I did 
  
59 
 
not attempt that could be used by future researchers), and give specific recommendations about 
which measures are simplest to use.  
Method 
 
Participants 
Study 1 (Spring 2016). 
In spring 2016, I recruited a convenience sample of self-identified gender minorities9 via 
social media, LGBT listservs, and communication from previous participants, and a separate 
convenience sample of undergraduate participants (unselected for gender identity or transgender 
status) from the psychology department participant pool at a large public university in the 
Midwest United States. Gender minority participants had the opportunity to enter a raffle to win 
one of 50 $20 Amazon gift cards as compensation for participation (funding provided by a Clara 
Mayo Grant from the Society for the Scientific Study of Social Issues), while undergraduate 
participants received course credit for participating. Among the gender minority sample, 637 
participants consented, 330 completed Section 1 of the survey, and 291 completed the entire 
survey. Thus, 46% of gender minority participants who viewed the survey link went on to 
complete the entire survey. This high dropout rate among the gender minority sample may be 
partially explained by the survey’s length; it included well over 200 questions and likely took 
participants nearly an hour to complete.  In the student sample, 191 participants consented and 
190 completed the entire survey.  
                                                 
9 The recruitment materials read as follows: “Help us improve demographic questions about gender!  Do you 
identify as transsexual, transgender, genderqueer, non-binary, gender expansive, or gender non-conforming in some 
way, or have a history of gender transition? We want to hear your reactions to different types of gender questions to 
make these questions more inclusive and affirming for people with a variety of different gender identities and 
expressions.   The study will take about 45 minutes. If you participate in this study, you can choose to be entered in 
a raffle to win one of fifty $20 gift cards.”   
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Gender minority participants (N = 256) were 5% Black (N = 13), 0.3% Pacific Islander 
(N = 1), 3% Middle Eastern (N = 7), 1% East Asian (N = 3), 1% Southeast Asian (N = 3), 89% 
White (N = 229), 3% Latinx (N = 8), and 1% Native American (N = 3). No participants reported 
Indian Subcontinent. In all samples across all studies, participants could select more than one 
race/ethnicity, so percentages sum to more than 100%. Sixteen percent (N = 40) selected more 
than one race, and 9% (N = 24) wrote in another racial identity (examples include Dutch, Jewish, 
Romani, and Singaporean Indian).  Eight-seven percent (N = 225) had completed at least some 
college, 55% (N = 141) had a B.A. or higher, and 24% (N = 62) had a post-college degree. Sixty-
six percent (N =168) were lower middle class or below. Their ages ranged from 18-69 (M = 32). 
Undergraduate participants (N = 190) were 8% Black (N = 15), 4% Indian Subcontinent 
(N = 7), 1% Middle Eastern (N = 2), 9% East Asian (N = 17), 1% Southeast Asian (N = 2), 80% 
White (N = 151), 5% Latinx (N = 10), and 2% Native American (N = 2). No participants 
reported Pacific Islander.  Eleven percent (N = 20) selected more than one race, and 3% (N = 5) 
wrote in another racial identity (responses were Ethnically Persian/Iranian, Mexican, Prefer not 
to Answer, and White North American). Thirty percent were lower middle class or below. 
Despite the fact that all participants in this sample had to be enrolled as undergraduates in order 
to be part of the participant pool from which they were recruited, only 64% (N = 121) reported 
that they had completed at least some college, and 7% (N = 14) reported having a B.A. or higher. 
Their ages ranged from 18-22 (M = 19). 
Study 2 (Fall 2016). 
In the fall of 2016, we again recruited a convenience sample of self-identified gender 
minorities10 via social media (especially the Kinsey Institute Twitter and Facebook pages), 
                                                 
10 The recruitment materials read as follows: “Help us improve demographic questions about gender!  Do you 
identify as transsexual, transgender, genderqueer, non-binary, gender expansive, or gender non-conforming in some 
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LGBT listservs at major universities, and communication from previous participants, alongside a 
convenience sample of undergraduate participants (unselected for gender identity or transgender 
status) from the psychology department participant pool at a large public university in the 
Midwest United States. Gender minority participants had the opportunity to enter a raffle to win 
one of 50 $20 Amazon gift cards as compensation for participation, and all undergraduate 
participants received course credit as compensation for participation. In the gender minority 
sample, 186 participants consented, 102 completed Section 1, and 83 completed the entire 
survey. Thus, 45% of gender minority participants who viewed the survey link went on to 
complete the entire survey.  Again, this high dropout rate among the gender minority sample 
may be partially explained by the survey’s length; Study 2 also included well over 200 questions 
and likely took participants nearly an hour to complete. In the student sample, 543 consented and 
507 completed the entire survey, for a 93% completion rate. 
Gender minority participants (N=82) were 4.8% Black (N=4), 1.2% Middle Eastern 
(N=1), 1.2% East Asian (N=1), 86.6% White (N=71), 4.8% Latinx (N=4), and 4.8% Native 
American (N=4).11 Eight participants (9.8%) selected more than one race, and six (7.3%) wrote 
in another racial identity (responses were Ashkenazi, Central Asian, Latin American, mixed race 
– Black African/white, mixed white and Caribbean, and Slavic, Jew).   Ninety-five percent had 
completed at least some college, 61% had a B.A. or higher, and 26% had completed a post-
graduate degree. Their ages ranged from 18-74 (M = 29.8). 
                                                 
way, or have a history of gender transition? We want to hear your reactions to different types of gender questions to 
make these questions more inclusive and affirming for people with a variety of different gender identities and 
expressions.   The study will take about 45 minutes. If you participate in this study, you can choose to be entered in 
a raffle to win one of fifty $20 gift cards.”   
 
11 Participants could select more than one race/ethnicity, so percentages sum to more than 100%. 
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Undergraduate participants (N=505) were 8.3% Black (N=42), 0.3% Pacific Islander 
(N=2), 2.9% Indian Subcontinent (N=15), 1.7% Middle Eastern (N=9), 11.7% East Asian 
(N=59), 1.4% Southeast Asian (N=7), 73.3% White (N=370), 9.3% Latinx (N=47), and 0.8% 
Native American (N=4).12 Forty-eight participants (9.5%) selected more than one race, and three 
(0.6%) wrote in another racial identity (responses were Jewish, Multicultural).  As would be 
expected in a sample recruited from a student research pool, all undergraduate participants had 
completed at least some college, and 6% indicated that they had completed a B.A. or higher. 
Their ages ranged from 18-33 (M = 19). 
Materials 
 For a summary of all the measures included in Studies 1 and 2 and the order in which 
they appeared, refer to Appendix A. 
In Study 1, participants completed five gender identity measures (Binary, Binary + Other, 
Multiple-Choice, Short Free Text, Long Free Text) and three gender identity and transgender 
status measures (Multiple-Choice + Sex Assigned at Birth, Multiple-Choice + Transgender 
Identity, Multiple-Choice + Transition History) for a total of eight different measures.  
In Study 2, participants completed four gender identity measures (Binary, Binary + 
Other, Short Free Text, Multiple-Choice) and two gender identity and transgender status 
measures (Multiple-Choice + Sex Assigned at Birth, Multiple-Choice + Transgender Identity) 
for a total of six different measures. For more information about how these measures were 
selected and my predictions about each one, see Chapter 2.  
                                                 
12 Participants could select more than one race/ethnicity, so percentages sum to more than 100%. 
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For comparison and to provide further evidence of content validity, participants also 
completed a measure of gender self-categorization from Joel et al. (2014) in Studies 1 and 2, and 
one adapted from Rockquemore and Arend (2002) in Study 2. 
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Measures of Gender Identity. 
Binary. 
 
Figure 1. Binary gender identity question used in Studies 1 and 2. 
 
As described in Chapter 2, the binary question cannot yield complete information about gender 
identity or transgender status. It is included in these studies for comparison purposes. 
Table 1 
Frequency of binary gender identities in Studies 1 and 2 
 Gender Identity 
Sample Man Woman 
Study 1 203 264 
Study 2 251 309 
 
Short free text and long free text. 
 
Figure 2. Short free-text gender identity question used in Studies 1 and 2. 
 
 
Figure 3. Long free-text gender identity question used in Study 1. 
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Responses to all free text gender questions were coded for gender identity and transgender status 
by three undergraduate coders (see Appendix A for the exact coding guidelines).13 Coders 
grouped each free text response into one of six possible gender identity categories: 
 Man (e.g. masculine, boy, transman, AMAB/DMAB, cis-male, cis-man). 
 Woman (e.g. femme, girl, transwoman, AFAB/DFAB, cis-woman, cis-female). 
 Agender (e.g. agender, none - preference is given to agender in descriptions such as 
“agender woman.”) 
 Non-binary (e.g. androgynous, bigender, demiboy/demigirl, non-binary, genderfluid, 
genderqueer, genderfucker, neutrois, queer - preference is given to non-binary identities 
in descriptions such as “genderqueer woman” or “agender non-binary.”) 
 Rejects Gender (e.g. gender is made up, no thanks, irrelevant). 
 Does not know (e.g. I don’t know, not sure) 
 Not Enough Info (e.g. human, weariness, cyborg, me, gendermeh, gender non-
conforming). 
 
For the short free-text question in Study 1, the three raters had 84% agreement for the gender 
minority sample (N = 282, Fleiss’ Kappa = .83, Z = 42.6, p <.001) and 98.9% agreement for the 
student sample (N = 186, Fleiss’ Kappa = .986, Z = 24.2, p <.001). 
For the long free-text question in Study 1, the three raters had 71.3% agreement for the gender 
minority sample (N = 275, Fleiss’ Kappa = .69, Z = 36.4, p <.001) and 97.9% agreement for the 
student sample (N = 188, Fleiss’ Kappa = .973, Z = 24.9, p <.001). For the short free-text 
question in Study 2, the three raters had 85.5% agreement for the gender minority sample (N=83, 
                                                 
13 We also coded the short free-text responses for transgender status. For Study 1, responses were classified as 
cisgender (N = 7), transgender (N = 52), or not enough information (N = 401), and of 460 free-text responses, 87% 
could not be classified by transgender status, presumably because the question did not explicitly request transgender 
status. For Study 2, responses were classified as cisgender (N = 303), transgender (N = 26), or not enough 
information (N = 209). Of the 538 total responses, 38% could not be classified by transgender status, presumably 
because the question did not explicitly request transgender status. As expected from the number of participants who 
were Unclassified by the Free Text question, there was relatively low agreement between the Free Text question and 
the other two questions (62% agreement between Transgender Identity and Free Text, and 67% agreement between 
Assigned Sex at Birth and Free Text). Taken together, these results suggest that the free text measure did not 
succeed at collecting transgender status information, so we did not conduct any additional analyses using this 
variable. 
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Fleiss’ Kappa = .847, Z = 23, p <.001) and 99.8% agreement for the student sample (N = 459, 
Fleiss’ Kappa = .997, Z = 37.8, p <.001). 
To enable as many participants as possible to be categorized by free text response, we 
ultimately adopted a less conservative standard such that participants were placed in a gender 
identity category if two out of the three coders agreed. Even so, obtaining agreement this high 
required expertise about gender identity issues on the part of the raters. A majority of the 
research assistants who performed this coding had extensive personal familiarity with gender 
minority groups and high levels of knowledge about current gender terminology. Without this 
level of specialized knowledge, the interrater reliability would likely have been much lower. 
Table 2 
Frequency of free-text gender identities in Studies 1 and 2 
 Gender Identity by Free-Text 
Sample Man Woman Agender 
Non-
Binary 
Rejects 
Gender 
P Doesn't 
Know 
Not Enough 
Info 
Raters 
Disagreed 
Study 1  140 135 17 145 7 7 9 12 
Study 2  221 265 9 41 1 1 2 8 
 
Binary+Other. 
 
  
Figure 4. Binary plus Other gender identity question used in Studies 1 and 2. 
Participants who selected Other for the Binary + Other question were able to write in a 
free-text response. These responses were coded the same way as the free-text questions, by three 
undergraduate coders (see Appendix for the exact coding guidelines).  
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For the free-text responses to the Binary + Other question in Study 1, the three raters had 
88.8% agreement for the gender minority sample (N = 187, Fleiss’ Kappa = .83, Z = 33.9, p 
<.001).  In the student sample, the raters had perfect agreement for the one participant who 
selected “other,” and reliabilities could not be calculated. In Study 2, the three raters had 84.9% 
agreement for the gender minority sample (N = 53, Fleiss’ Kappa = .77, Z = 16.8, p <.001) and 
100% agreement for the student sample (N = 3, Fleiss’ Kappa = 1.0, Z = 4.24, p <.001).  
In Study 1, 12 participants who selected Other were coded as Man based on their free-
text responses (“Transman,” “transgender man,” “transmasculine,” “Intersex Man,” “Female-
bodied Man”), and another 11 were coded as Woman (“trans woman,” “Transgender Woman,” 
“Butch,” “Butch Woman,” “FTMTF”). In Study 2, two participants who selected Other were 
coded as Man based on their free-text responses (“trans masculine,” “transgender, masculine”), 
and another two who selected Other were coded as Woman (“Transgender woman,” 
“transwoman”). They were regrouped with the people who initially selected Man and Woman 
(but see the Discussion for a consideration of the issues with this recategorization). 
Table 3 
Frequency of binary + other gender identities in Studies 1 and 2 
 Gender Identity by Binary + Other 
Sample Man Woman Othera Agender 
Non-
Binary 
Rejects 
Gender 
P Doesn't 
Know 
Not Enough 
Info 
Study 1  155 154 17 17 128 4 2 5 
Study 2  233 284 6 7 39 - 3 3 
aPeople in this category selected Other but did not write in anything for the associated free-text response.  
 
Multiple-choice. 
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Figure 5. Multiple-choice gender identity question used in Study 1. 
 
 
Figure 6. Multiple-choice gender identity question used in Study 2. 
 
In Study 1, participants answered the same single-select multiple-choice question four 
times; in isolation, followed by a question about sex assigned at birth, followed by a question 
about transgender identity, and followed by a question about transition history. In Study 2, 
participants answered the same multiple-choice question three times; in isolation, followed by a 
question about sex assigned at birth, and followed by a question about transgender identity. We 
compared responses to each of the identical multiple-choice questions to classify participants by 
gender identity.  
 Coding inconsistent responses. 
We initially took a conservative approach; only those who responded the same way to all 
of the questions (all four questions in Study 1, all three questions in Study 2) were categorized as 
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that gender identity for the subsequent analyses, while those who responded inconsistently across 
the questions (including those who skipped one of the multiple-choice questions) were classified 
as “Inconsistent.” Using this analytic strategy, 9% of the participants in Study 1 (N=42) and 11% 
of the participants in Study 2 (N=67) were classified as “Inconsistent,” usually because they 
skipped one question.  
We felt that this definition was too conservative, so we revised our approach to classify 
anyone who responded consistently to three out of four multiple-choice questions (in Study 1) or 
to two out of three multiple-choice questions (in Study 2) as that gender identity. Participants 
who left three questions blank (in Study 1) or two questions blank (in Study 2) were also 
classified as inconsistent. Under this new definition, only 4% of participants in Study 1 (N=17) 
and 3% of participants in Study 2 (N=19) responded inconsistently; these responses are shown in 
Tables 4 and 5. For Study 1, 94% of the inconsistencies (N=16) were in the gender minority 
sample, but for Study 2, only 47% (N=9) were.  
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Table 4 
 
Inconsistent responses to multiple-choice gender identity measure (Study 1). 
Sample 
Multiple-
Choice 
MC + 
Assigned Sex 
at Birth 
MC + 
Transgender 
Identity 
MC + 
Transition 
History 
Free-Text 
Gender 
minority 
Other Genderqueer Woman Woman Sometimes I'm a 
lady and sometimes 
I have no gender. 
Man - - -  
Choose Not 
to Answer 
Other - -  
Choose Not 
to Answer 
Choose Not 
to Answer 
Other Don't 
Know 
 
Other Man Man Other Genderqueer trans 
male  
- Man - -  
Don't Know Don't Know Woman Woman Assigned female, 
masculine 
presenting most of 
the time, confused 
about my gender 
identity 
Genderqueer Genderqueer - -  
Genderqueer Genderqueer Don't Know Other trans-fabulous 
bottom with a touch 
of raccoon 
Woman - - -  
Genderqueer Genderqueer Woman Woman Agender Trans 
woman 
Choose Not 
to Answer 
Genderqueer Genderqueer Choose 
Not to 
Answer 
Genderfluid, 
typically leaning 
male 
Woman Woman - -  
Choose Not 
to Answer 
Don't Know Choose Not to 
Answer 
Don't 
Know 
 
- - Choose Not to 
Answer 
-  
Other Don't Know Other Don't 
Know 
jfc you tell me i dont 
know man i dont 
have one 
Student Man - Man - male 
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Table 5  
 
Inconsistent responses to multiple-choice gender identity measure (Study 2) 
Sample Multiple-Choice 
MC + 
Assigned 
Sex at Birth 
MC + 
Transgender 
Identity 
Free-Text 
Gender 
minority 
Don’t know - Woman bisexual 
Other Non-binary Man I hate gender 
- - Other I don't have one, I don't feel 
like gender should matter 
(though yes it does). I am 
somewhere in the spectrum of 
genders that is possible. 
- Don’t know - Non-binary woman 
- Woman - - 
- - Woman - 
- Man - Trans man 
Non-binary - - agender/male 
- - Non-binary male-brained in a female body, 
but not gender dysphoric 
Student 
- Man - - 
Woman - - Woman 
Man - - Male 
- - Woman - 
- - Man Male 
- Woman - - 
- Man - male 
- Woman - - 
Man - - Male 
- Man - - 
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We examined the free-text responses of participants whose gender identity was classified 
as “Inconsistent” to determine whether their inconsistent responding reflected genuine 
uncertainty about how to classify their gender identity on the multiple-choice question, or was 
merely an artifact of completing the survey quickly and without much thought. We found 
distinctly different patterns in the gender minority and student samples. As shown in Tables 4 
and 5, many responses from the gender minority sample (e.g. “Assigned female, masculine 
presenting most of the time, confused about my gender identity”) seem to indicate a substantial 
level of uncertainty on the part of the participant about how best to represent their gender 
identities using a multiple-choice question (an uncertainty that in many cases was also present 
for our coders when attempting to classify their free-text responses). In contrast, free-text 
responses of the “inconsistent” people in the student sample included “female,” “male,” 
“heterosexual woman,” and “woman?,” which seems to suggest that in this sample inconsistency 
was more often caused by hasty responding or the assumption that the researchers already had 
this information than by actual uncertainty about gender identity. 
Even among participants who were classified as Inconsistent, very few reported actually 
differing gender identities on across questions. In Study 1, seven participants were inconsistent 
because they left two or more of the questions blank, and two more were inconsistent because 
they selected “Choose Not to Answer” for two or more of the questions. For Study 2, 17 of the 
19 inconsistent participants were classified that way because they left two or more questions 
blank. This pattern of responding seems likely to be an artifact of survey fatigue, which we 
would not expect to influence participant responses to a gender question under ordinary 
circumstances. An alternative explanation is that participants felt more willing to answer some 
questions than others, or were using non-response to express dissatisfaction with some aspect of 
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the question and/or the survey overall; for a detailed exploration of this possibility, refer to 
Chapter 4.   
Coding “Another identity not listed” responses. 
For participants who consistently responded “Another identity not listed” (Study 1 N = 
105; Study 2 N = 10) we compared the codes assigned to the free text response they entered and 
added those participants into one of the existing categories where possible to facilitate their 
inclusion in statistical analyses (for interrater reliabilities, see the Appendix). This was 
particularly relevant in Study 1, where the multiple-choice gender identity question did not 
include an option for non-binary (although genderqueer was an option). Many participants wrote 
in identities like “non-binary” or “genderfluid,” and we grouped them with those who selected 
“genderqueer,” while participants who wrote in “transgender woman” or “heterosexual woman” 
were combined with those who selected “woman.”  
In Study 1, 14 participants also wrote in “agender,” which seemed conceptually distinct 
from non-binary (see Tate, Youssef, & Bettergarcia, 2014 for rationale) and so “agender” was 
added as a separate category (and included as its own option in Study 2). Participants for whom 
there was not enough information to make a categorization (e.g. “???????????????”) and those 
whose responses indicated a rejection of gender (e.g. “I do not identify with gender roles at all”) 
were left in the “Another identity not listed” category. Participants whose responses could not be 
categorized in any of the previous ways (i.e. those who selected “Another identity not listed” and 
were not categorized the same way on three out of four of their free-text responses to the 
multiple-choice gender questions) were grouped with those who inconsistently answered the 
multiple-choice questions. 
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Participants were ultimately grouped into one of eight possible categories on the basis of 
their multiple-choice gender identity (see Table 6). To allow adequate cell sizes for certain 
statistical analyses, we also created a condensed version of multiple-choice gender identity that 
dropped all categories except Man, Woman, and Non-Binary/Agender. 
Table 6 
 
Frequency of multiple-choice gender identities in Studies 1 and 2 
 Gender Identity by Multiple-Choice 
Sample Man Woman Agender 
Non-
Binary 
Another 
Identity Not 
Listed 
Don’t 
Know 
Choose Not 
to Answer 
Inconsistent 
Study 1  144 142 14 139 7 11 7 20 
Study 2 243 282 8 47 - 2 5 19 
 
  
  
75 
 
Alternative Measures of Gender Self-Categorization. 
As a pilot test, the gender minority sample in Study 1 completed the following single-
select self-categorization measure developed by Joel et al. (2014): Currently, I think of myself as: 
A man/A woman/Both a man and a woman/Neither a man nor a woman. All participants 
completed it in Study 2.  
Table 7 
 
Frequency of Gender Self-Categorization (Joel et al., 2014) in Study 1 Gender Minority Sample 
and Study 2.  
 Gender Self-Categorization (Joel et al. 2014) 
Sample Man Woman Both Neither 
Study 1 45 64 43 120 
Study 2 248 283 19 38 
 
In Study 2, participants also completed the following single-select multiple choice 
question (adapted from Rockquemore and Arend, 2002):  
Please indicate which of the following choices best describes how you personally think of 
your gender, even if it is not always how you are perceived by others. 
 I consider myself exclusively a woman 
 I consider myself exclusively a man. 
 I consider myself exclusively non-binary (neither a man nor a woman). 
 I consider myself non-binary, but I experience the world as a woman. 
 I consider myself non-binary, but I experience the world as a man. 
 I sometimes consider myself a man or a woman, and sometimes non-binary depending on 
the circumstances. 
 Gender is meaningless. I do not believe in gender identities. 
 Something else (please describe). [free text box] 
 
 
Table 8 
 
Frequency of Gender Self-Categorization (Rockquemore & Arend, 2002) in Study 2 
 
Gender Self-Categorization (Rockquemore & Arend, 2002) 
Mana Womanb Binary/NBc 
NB, 
Mand NB, Womane NBf 
Rejects 
Genderg 
Something 
Elseh 
232 267 11 5 30 12 14 21 
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Measures of Gender Identity and Transgender Status. 
Multiple-Choice + Sex Assigned at Birth. 
 
Figure 7. Multiple-choice gender identity and sex assigned at birth question used in Study 1. 
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 Figure 8. Multiple-choice gender identity and sex assigned at birth question used in Study 2. 
We compared the multiple-choice gender identity category to which each participant was 
assigned (not just their response to this measure; see previous section) to the sex assigned at birth 
question in order to categorize participants as Not Transgender, Transgender, or Unclassified. 
Participants whose gender identity was Man and sex assigned at birth was Male, or whose gender 
identity was Woman and sex assigned at birth was Female, were categorized as Not Transgender. 
Participants whose gender identity was Man and sex assigned at birth was Female, or whose 
gender identity was Woman and sex assigned at birth was Male, were categorized as 
Transgender. Participants with any other combination of gender identity and sex assigned at birth 
were categorized as Unclassified.14 
Coding transgender status for non-binary and agender participants. 
Importantly, in this categorization scheme, non-binary and agender people appear in the 
Unclassified category, a significant change from typical practice. In a typical coding scheme, 
either all non-binary and agender people are transgender (if transgender is defined as having any 
gender identity different from sex assigned at birth), or no non-binary or agender people are 
transgender (if transgender is defined to include only people with binary gender identities). Such 
categorization structures make transgender status redundant with gender identity; that is, 
knowing a non-binary or agender person’s sex assigned at birth does not provide any additional 
information about their transgender status that was not already evident from their gender identity. 
Table 9 
Frequency of transgender status by gender identity + sex assigned at birth in Studies 1 and 2. 
 Transgender Status by Gender Identity + Sex Assigned at Birth 
Sample Not Transgender Transgender Unclassified 
                                                 
14 In Study 1, only three participants selected Intersex, and in Study 2 one participant selected “Female, but I am 
intersex” and one participant selected “Male, but I am Intersex” while no participants selected “Intersex,” supporting 
the revised wording. No participants in Study 1 and only one participant in Study 2 selected “Do not know.” 
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Study 1 214 57 33 
Study 2 495 20 76 
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Multiple-Choice + Transgender Identity. 
 
Figure 9. Multiple-choice gender identity question and transgender identity question used in 
Study 1. 
 
Figure 10. Multiple-choice gender identity question and transgender identity question used in 
Study 2. 
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We categorized participants into one of three transgender status groups based on their 
answer to the transgender identity question. Those who answered “No” are categorized as Not 
Transgender, those who answered “Yes” are categorized as Transgender, and those who 
indicated “Do not know” or “Choose not to answer” are combined into an Unclassified category. 
As the transgender identity question categorizes participants’ transgender status based 
exclusively on their identity, non-binary and agender people may appear in any category.  
Table 10 
Frequency of transgender status by transgender identity in Studies 1 and 2. 
 Transgender Status by Transgender Identity 
Sample Not Transgender Transgender Unclassified 
Study 1 255 196 15 
Study 2 506 62 19 
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Multiple-Choice + Transition History. 
 
Figure 11. Multiple-choice gender identity and transition history measure used in Study 1. 
We categorized participants into one of three transgender status groups based on their 
answer to the transition history question. Those who answered “No” are not transgender, those 
who answered “Yes” are transgender, and those who indicated “Do not know” or “Choose not to 
answer” are combined into an Unclassified category. As the transition history question 
categorizes participants’ transgender status based exclusively on their thoughts and actions 
related to transitioning, non-binary and agender people may appear in any category.  
Table 11 
Frequency of transgender status by transition history in Study 1 
Transgender Status by Transition History 
Not Transgender Transgender Unclassified 
220 101 22 
 
Results 
Comparison of Binary and Multiple-Choice Gender Identity Measures 
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In both samples, the multiple-choice gender identity question suggests a much more 
gender-diverse sample than the binary question (Tables 12 and 13). In Study 1, 34.3% (N = 158 
of 460) participants were consistently classified as a gender other than man or woman, and in 
Study 2, 7.3% (N = 41 of 557) were (bearing in mind that the student sample made up a much 
larger proportion of participants in Study 2 than Study 1). 
Table 12 
Gender identity classification by binary and multiple-choice measures (Study 1; N = 460) 
 Multiple-Choice 
Binary Man Woman Agendera 
Gender-
queerb 
Another Not 
Listed 
Don’t 
Know 
Choose Not 
to Answer 
Inconsistent 
 
Man 144 - 4 35 2 6 1 10 
Woman - 142 9 88 3 4 6 6 
aAgender was not included as an explicit category in the multiple-choice question in the Study 1 survey, but was 
added because so many participants wrote it in to the “Another identity not listed” category. 
bThe option in the multiple-choice question was Genderqueer, but people who selected Another Identity Not Listed 
and wrote in “non-binary” or similar also appear in this column. 
 
Table 13 
Gender identity classification by binary and multiple-choice measures (Study 2; N = 557) 
 Multiple-Choice 
Binary Man Woman Agender 
Non-
Binary 
Another Not 
Listed 
Don’t 
Know 
Choose Not 
to Answer 
Inconsistent 
 
Man 233 - 2 7 - - 4 5 
Woman - 272 3 22 - 2 1 6 
 
Comparison of Binary + Other and Multiple-Choice Gender Identity Questions 
Table 14 shows how each participant’s gender identity was classified by the binary + 
other and multiple-choice gender identity measures for Study 1, and Table 15 shows the same 
information for Study 2. In Study 1, 85% (N = 409 of 480) were classified into the same one of 
our main four gender categories by both methods, and in Study 2, 95.4% (N = 547 of 573) were. 
These participants appear in green cells with bold text. A further 1% (N = 5) of participants in 
Study 1 and 0.1% (N=1) in Study 2 did not provide enough information, indicated that they did 
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not know their gender identity, or could not be classified on both measures; they appear in red 
cells with bold text. 
Inconsistent Responses between Binary + Other and Multiple-Choice Measures. 
Green Quadrant. 
The green quadrant shows responses that could be classified into one of our four main 
gender identity categories by both methods. The participants who were consistently classified 
have already been discussed.  
In Study 1, 3.1% (N = 15) of participants who were classified as one of the four main 
genders by either method were classified as a different one of the main four genders by the other 
method. Two participants classified as men and seven classified as women based on the binary + 
other question (and three who wrote in “agender”) selected Genderqueer for the multiple-choice 
gender measure. Three more participants who were classified as non-binary from their responses 
to the binary + other question selected Man or Woman on the multiple-choice measure. 
In Study 2, 1% (N = 6) of participants who were classified as one of the four main 
genders by either method were classified as a different one of the main four genders by the other 
method. One participant selected “Other” for the Binary + Other question and wrote in 
“agender,” and one other participant wrote in “transgender, masculline” and was recategorized as 
Man based on that response. Another participant selected “Man” for the binary + other question 
but “Genderqueer” for the multiple-choice questions and wrote in “male” for the short free-text 
measure. Finally, three participants selected “Woman” for the binary + other question, but 
“Man” for the multiple-choice questions, and wrote in “male” or “man” for the short free-text 
measure.  
 
Yellow Quadrant 
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The yellow quadrant shows participants who were classified as one of the four main 
genders by the multiple choice questions but not by the binary + other question.  
In Study 1, 2.7% of participants (N=13) were in this quadrant. All thirteen of them 
selected Other for the binary + other question, but did not write anything in the accompanying 
text box and so could not be classified any further by this question. Twelve of these participants 
selected Genderqueer for the multiple choice measure, and one wrote in agender. 
In Study 2, 1% (N = 6) of participants were in this quadrant. All six of these participants 
selected Other for the binary + other question, but four of them did not write anything in the 
accompanying text box and so could not be classified any further by this question. Two of them 
selected “Man” and two selected “Non-Binary” for the multiple-choice question, and they wrote 
in “Man,” “Agender/possibly male,” “Non-binary, demiboi, transmasculine,” and “genderqueer” 
for the short free-text measure. The remaining two participants wrote “no” and “I’m not sure, 
transgender?” in the text box for the binary + other question, selected “Agender” and “Woman” 
for the multiple-choice question, and wrote in “agender” and “woman?” for the short free-text 
measure. 
Blue Quadrant 
The blue quadrant shows participants who were classified as one of the four main gender 
identities by the binary + other question but not by the multiple choice question. 
In Study 1, 5.8% of participants (N=28) were in this quadrant. For the binary + other 
question, eleven selected man and seven selected woman, nine were classified as non-binary 
based on their write-in response, and one was classified as agender. On the multiple-choice 
questions, fifteen were inconsistently classified (responses included “genderfluid,” “non-binary 
trans boy,” and “sometimes I’m a woman and sometimes I’m something else entirely”), five 
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chose not to answer, and seven indicated that they didn’t know their identity (responses included 
“middleish”).  
In Study 2, 1.3% (N = 8) of participants were in this quadrant. For the binary + other 
question, three selected “Man” and five selected “Woman.” For the multiple choice question, one 
selected Don’t Know and two selected Choose Not to Answer; their short free-text responses 
were “Female,” “Male,” and “Female,” respectively. The remaining five were inconsistently 
classified by the multiple choice question. Two wrote in “Male” for the short free-text response, 
one wrote in “Bisexual,” and two did not write anything.  
Red Quadrant 
The red quadrant shows participants who could not be classified as one of the four main 
gender identities by either the multiple-choice questions or the binary + other question.  
In Study 1, 3.1% (N = 15) of participants were in this quadrant. All 15 selected other for 
the binary + other question, and four of them did not write in anything.  Five did not give enough 
information to allow further classification (responses included “SirHer,” “genderfuck,” 
“transgender,” “binary,” and “transgender queer”). Two were classified as not knowing their 
gender identity (responses included “??????????????” and “don’t know”), and four were 
classified as rejecting gender (responses included “Ethically and biologically irrelevant in nearly 
all contexts,” “human,” “gender does not exist” and “gender irrelevant”). 
In Study 2, 1% (N = 6) of participants were in this quadrant.  All six selected Other for 
the binary + other question, and two of them did not write anything in the associated text box, so 
they could not be categorized further by that question. For the short free-text question, they 
wrote “trans masculine” and “agender/male.” The remaining four wrote in “Questioning,” 
“shruggie,” “Man and Woman are not gender identities. They are biological sex,” and “Who 
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gives a shit? Sorry” for the binary + other question. For the short free-text question, these 
participants wrote in “Questioning,” “I hate gender,” nothing (left the question blank), and “I 
don't have one, I don't feel like gender should matter (though yes it does). I am somewhere in the 
spectrum of genders that is possible.” 
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Table 14 
Gender identity classification by binary+other and multiple-choice measures (Study 1; N = 480) 
 Multiple-Choice 
Binary + 
Other 
Man Woman Agendera 
Gender-
queerb 
Another 
Not Listed 
Don’t 
Know 
Choose Not 
to Answer 
Inconsistent 
Man 141 - - 2 - 4 1 6 
Woman - 140 - 7 - - 3 4 
Agender - - 13 3 - - - 1 
Non-Binary 1 2 - 115 1 3 1 4 
Otherc - - 1 12 - 1 1 2 
Not Enough 
Info 
- - - - 3 1 1 - 
P Doesn’t 
Know 
- - - - - 2 - - 
Rejects 
Gender 
- - - - 3 - - 1 
Note. No participants were classified as Raters Disagreed based on their free-text responses to the binary + other 
question, so that row was omitted. 
aAgender was not included as an explicit category in the multiple-choice question in Study 1, but was added because 
so many participants wrote it in to the “Another identity not listed” category. 
bThe option in the multiple-choice question was Genderqueer, but people who selected Another Identity Not Listed 
and wrote in “non-binary” or similar also appear in this column. 
cPeople in this category selected Other but did not write in anything for the associated free-text response.  
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Table 15 
Gender identity classification by binary+other and multiple-choice measures (Study 2; N = 573) 
 Multiple-Choice 
Binary + 
Other 
Man Woman Agender 
Non-
Binary 
Another 
Not Listed 
Don’t 
Know 
Choose Not 
to Answer 
Inconsistent 
Man 228 - - 2 - - 1 2 
Woman 3 274 - - - 1 1 3 
Agender - - 6 1 - - - - 
Non-Binary - - - 39 - - - - 
Othera 2 - - 2 - - 1 1 
Not Enough 
Info 
- - 1 - - - 1 1 
P Doesn’t 
Know 
- 1 - - - 1 - 1 
Rejects 
Gender 
- - - - - - - - 
Note. No participants were classified as Rejects Gender or Raters Disagreed based on their free-text responses to the 
binary + other question, so those rows were omitted. 
aPeople in this category selected Other but did not write in anything for the associated free-text response.  
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Comparison of Free-Text and Multiple-Choice Gender Identity Measures 
Table 16 shows how each participant’s gender identity was classified by the short free-
text15 and multiple-choice gender identity measures for Study 1, and Table 17 shows the same 
information for Study 2. In Study 1, 87.6% (N = 404 of 461) were classified into the same one of 
our main four gender categories by both methods, and in Study 2, 95.7% (N = 516 of 539) were. 
These participants appear in green cells with bold text. A further 1.7% (N=8) of participants in 
Study 1 and 0.4% (N=2) in Study 2 did not provide enough information, indicated that they did 
not know their gender identity, or could not be classified on both types of measures; they appear 
in red cells with bold text. Overall, the vast majority of participants were classified the same way 
by both the multiple-choice and free text gender identity question across both studies. 
  
                                                 
15 The short and long free-text responses were usually coded the same way, so for the sake of space we focused only 
on the short free-text question (which seems more likely to be widely used in any case).  
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Table 16 
Gender identity classification by free-text and multiple-choice measures (Study 1) 
 Multiple-Choice 
Free Text Man Woman Agendera 
Gender-
queerb 
Another 
Not Listed 
Don’t 
Know 
Choose Not 
to Answer 
Inconsistent 
Man 137 - - - - 1 1 1 
Woman - 128 - 5 1 - 1 - 
Agender - - 13 2 - 1 - 1 
Non-Binary 3 8 - 126 1 1 1 5 
Not Enough 
Info 
- 1 - 1 3 1 2 1 
P Doesn’t 
Know 
- - - - - 5 - 2 
Rejects 
Gender 
- 2 - - 2 1 1 1 
Raters 
Disagreed 
- - - - 1 - - - 
aAgender was not included as an explicit category in the multiple-choice question in Study 1, but was added because 
so many participants wrote it in to the “Another identity not listed” category. 
bThe option in the multiple-choice question was Genderqueer, but people who selected Another Identity Not Listed 
and wrote in “non-binary” or similar also appear in this column. 
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Table 17 
Gender identity classification by free-text and multiple-choice measures (Study 2) 
 Multiple-Choice 
Free Text Man Woman Agender 
Non-
Binary 
Another 
Not Listed 
Don’t 
Know 
Choose Not 
to Answer 
Inconsistent 
Man 212 - - 1 - - 2 6 
Woman - 259 - 1 - 1 1 1 
Agender 1 - 6 1 - - - 1 
Non-Binary - 1 - 39 - - - 1 
Not Enough 
Info 
- - - - - - - 1 
P Doesn’t 
Know 
- - - - - 1 - - 
Rejects 
Gender 
- - - - - - - 1 
Raters 
Disagreed 
- - - - - - 1 1 
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Inconsistent Responses Between Multiple-Choice and Free-Text Measures. 
Green Quadrant. 
The green quadrant shows responses that could be classified into one of our four main 
gender identity categories by both methods. The participants who were consistently classified 
have already been discussed. 
In Study 1, 18 participants (3.9%) who were classified as one of the four main genders by 
either method were classified as a different one of the main four genders by the other method. 
Five participants selected Genderqueer for the multiple-choice measure but were classified as 
women by their free text responses, which were “butch leather dyke,” “butch female,” (indicated 
by two participants) “Butch,” and “I’m male, that’s my sex; I’m a girl, that’s my gender.” Two 
participants selected Genderqueer for the multiple-choice measure but were classified as agender 
by their free-text responses, which were “Agender” and “agender genderqueer femme faggot.” 
Three participants selected Man for the multiple-choice measure but were classified as non-
binary by their free text responses, which were “Nonbinary trans man,” “Male, with an internal 
rarely shown but very real, if private identification as female, or of some complex mixed gender 
without a name but definitely non binary,” and “Genderqueer Trans Man.” Finally, eight 
participants selected Woman on the multiple-choice measure and were assigned to the non-
binary category based on their free-text responses. Four of these responses were from trans 
women: “I'm a lovely nonbinary witch & a proud, angry trans woman,” “Non Binary Trans 
Femme,” “Genderfluid trans woman,” “Genderqueer trans woman.” The remaining four were 
“Genderqueer femme woman,” “Primarily female, but also genderfluid,” “Androgynous female-
bodied person,” and “femme genderqueer.” 
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In Study 2, only five of the participants who were classified as one of the four main 
genders by either method were classified as a different one of the main four genders. Their free-
text responses were as follows: “male,” “transgender female (femme),” “Agender/possibly 
male,” “agender,” and “primarily female.” 
Yellow Quadrant. 
The yellow quadrant shows participants who were classified as one of the four main 
genders by the multiple choice measure but not by the free text question.  
In Study 1, 0.8% (N = 4) of participants were in this quadrant, and their free-text 
responses were “Bisexual,” “*pterodactyl noises*,” “I don't have gender feels, but as society 
treats me as a woman, I have a political gender identity as a woman,” and 
“Woman/nonconforming/has weird gendery thoughts sometimes.” 
In Study 2, there were no participants in this quadrant (N = 0).  
Blue Quadrant. 
The blue quadrant shows participants who were classified as one of the four main gender 
identities by the free text measure but not by the multiple choice measure. 
In Study 1, 3.2% (N = 15) of participants were in this quadrant. Five participants were 
inconsistently classified based on their responses to the multiple-choice measures, but classified 
as non-binary based on their free-text responses, which were as follows: “Sometimes I'm a lady 
and sometimes I have no gender,” “Genderqueer trans male,” “Genderfluid, typically leaning 
male,” “Transqueer nonbinary transboy,” and “Non-binary (agender).” One person who selected 
Choose Not to Answer for the multiple choice measure and one person who was inconsistently 
classified both wrote in “Male” for the free text response. The remaining eight participants had 
the following free-text responses: “Cis by default male,” “Woman, biologically and 
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psychologically but not behaviorally,” “Transfeminine / trans woman,” “Agender Trans 
woman,” “Non-binary,” “nonbinary/undefinable,” “None,” and “Genderfuck.” 
In Study 2, 2.4% (N = 13) of participants were in this quadrant. Five of these participants 
wrote “male,” two wrote “female,” and one wrote “woman” as their free-text responses, and both 
the person who selected Don’t Know and the person who selected Choose not to Answer wrote 
in “Female.” The remaining five participants’ free-text responses were “male-brained in a female 
body, but not gender dysphoric,” “trans man,” “trans masculine,” “agender/male,” and “non-
binary woman.” 
Red Quadrant. 
The red quadrant shows participants who could not be classified as one of the four main 
gender identities by either the multiple-choice measures or the free-text question  
In Study 1, 4.3% (N = 20) of participants were in this quadrant.  Eight of these 
participants were consistently classified by the two methods, but into categories that would 
probably be excluded from most samples, so I examined the free-text responses more closely to 
determine whether these responses could have been grouped into a category that is more likely to 
be used. Three participants selected “Another identity not listed” for the multiple-choice 
measures but could not be classified as one of our gender categories based on that response, and 
were similarly unclassified by their responses to the free-text measure (they were assigned to the 
Not Enough Information category). The responses for these participants were “7,” “Binary,” and 
“???????????????.” An additional five participants were categorized as Don’t Know by both the 
multiple-choice and free-text measures; these free-text responses were as follows: “I don't 
know!,” “Dont know,” “Don't know/female,” “Unknown,” and “Unknown, but some flavor of 
trans.” With the possible exception of the person who wrote “Don’t know/female,” who could 
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potentially have been grouped with women, it seems that these responses were too uninformative 
to be useable for most research.  
In Study 1, the remaining 13 responses (2.8%) in the red quadrant were not consistent 
between the two methods. Two of these expressed uncertainty or confusion about their gender 
identities: “jfc you tell me i dont know man i dont have one,” and “Assigned female, masculine 
presenting most of the time, confused about my gender identity.” Three more indicated that 
gender did not apply to them (“Human, I don't care about gender,” “N/A,” “Gender irrelevant”). 
The remaining participants had the following responses: “I do not have one, because I do not 
identify with patriarchal gender roles,” “Without defining gender, I can't answer that,” 
“Weariness, or something like it,” “Autogynephillic,” “gender non conforming lezboi,” and 
“trans-fabulous bottom with a touch of raccoon.” 
In Study 2, 0.9% (N=5) of participants were in the red quadrant. The one participant 
consistently classified as “Don’t Know” by both the multiple-choice and free-text question wrote 
“Questioning” as their gender in the free-text question, and one participant who could not be 
classified by either the free-text or multiple-choice questions wrote “I don't have one, I don't feel 
like gender should matter (though yes it does). I am somewhere in the spectrum of genders that is 
possible.” The remaining three participants indicated that their genders were “bisexual,” “I hate 
gender,” and “non-conforming.” 
Comparison of Multiple-Choice Gender Identity and Gender Self-Categorization Measures 
Gender Self-Categorization (Joel et al. 2014). 
Table 18 shows the correspondence between responses to the multiple-choice gender 
identity question and the gender self-categorization question from Joel et al. (2014) for Studies 1 
and 2.  Based on theory, we expected that people who selected “Man” or “Woman” on the 
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multiple-choice gender identity question would also select “Man” or “Woman” respectively on 
the gender self-categorization question. We also anticipated that people who selected “Non-
Binary” on the multiple-choice gender identity question would select “Both” or “Neither” on the 
gender self-categorization question, and that people who selected “Agender” on the multiple-
choice gender identity question would select “Neither” on the gender self-categorization 
question.  
In Study 1, 78.5% (N=212) of the 270 total responses to the gender self-categorization 
question were expected based on the responses to the multiple-choice gender identity question 
(shown in green in Table 18).  Only 9.2% (N=25) were unexpected (yellow in Table 18). 
In Study 2, 94.9% (N=550) of the 579 total responses to the gender self-categorization question 
were expected based on the responses to the multiple-choice gender identity question (shown in 
green in Table 18).  Only 2% (N=12) were unexpected (yellow in Table 18).  
These results suggest that the addition of Both and Neither options to the binary options 
captures additional information beyond the non-binary and agender options (because both non-
binary and agender participants selected Neither most frequently). This is a limitation of the 
multiple-choice gender identity measure which should be addressed in future research. The 
difference between non-binary and agender identities is not straightforward, and there is 
substantial heterogeneity within each category. Future research should investigate the 
commonalities and difference between non-binary and agender identities, as well as any 
additional gender categories which may emerge in the near future.  
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Table 18  
Gender identity classification by multiple-choice and gender self-categorization (Joel et al., 
2014) in Study 1 gender minority sample and Study 2 
 Gender Self-Categorization (Joel et al. 2014) 
 Man Woman Both Neither 
Multiple-Choice Gender Identity S1 S2 S1 S2 S1 S2 S1 S2 
Man 40 235 - - 2 1 2 3 
Woman 1 - 43 271 3 2 3 - 
Non-Binary 2 3 12 3 32 12 85 25 
Agender - - - - - 1 12 7 
Not Enough Info - - 1 - 1 - 5 - 
Don't Know 1 - 1 1 2 - 6 1 
Choose Not to Answer 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 
Inconsistent - 6 3 3 1 1 6 - 
Note. S1 = Study 1. S2 = Study 2. 
 
 
Table 19 
 
Gender identity classification by multiple-choice measure and gender self-categorization 
(adapted from Rockquemore & Arend, 2002) in Study 2 (N=584). 
 Gender Self-Categorization (adapted from Rockquemore & Arend, 2002) 
Multiple-
Choice  Mana Womanb 
Binary/
NBc 
NB, 
Mand 
NB, 
Womane NBf 
Rejects 
Genderg 
Something 
Elseh 
Man 222 1 2 2 - 1 8 2 
Woman - 257 3 1 7 - 3 5 
Non-Binary 1 - 6 1 17 9 1 8 
Agender - - - - 2 2 - 4 
Don't Know - - - - 1 - 2 - 
Choose Not 
to Answer 
1 1 - 1 - - - - 
Inconsistent 5 5 - - 1 - - 2 
aI consider myself exclusively a man. 
bI consider myself exclusively a woman 
cI sometimes consider myself a man or a woman, and sometimes non-binary depending on the circumstances. 
dI consider myself non-binary, but I experience the world as a man. 
eI consider myself non-binary, but I experience the world as a woman. 
fI consider myself exclusively non-binary (neither a man nor a woman). 
gGender is meaningless. I do not believe in gender identities. 
hSomething else (please describe). 
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Gender Self-Categorization (adapted from Rockquemore & Arend, 2002). 
Table 19 shows the correspondence between responses to the multiple-choice gender 
identity question and the gender self-categorization question I developed based on Rockquemore 
and Arend (2002). Based on theory, we expected that most people who selected “Man” or 
“Woman” on the multiple-choice gender identity question would also select “Man” or “Woman” 
respectively on the gender self-categorization question. However, we expected that some others 
would choose a category reflecting a dislocation between identity (as non-binary) and practical 
experience (as a man or woman), or a category reflecting vacillation between multiple categories 
(as binary and non-binary). A majority of participants (87.6%) were classified the same way 
between both questions, and only two participants gave fully inconsistent responses (red cells in 
Table 19). Most participants were classified as exclusively men or exclusively women on both 
measures (N = 479, or 82%), and 5.6% (N=33) of participants indicated that they identified as 
non-binary on both measures (green cells in Table 19).  
Another 2.3% of people (N=14) who identified as men or women on the multiple-choice 
gender measure indicated that they identified as non-binary but experience the world as a man or 
woman, or that they vacillate between identifying as binary and non-binary (blue cells in Table 
19).  One possible explanation for this result (in line with Rockquemore and Arend, 2002) is that 
lack of social recognition of one’s identity category may reduce the likelihood of claiming or 
disclosing that identity. That is, when non-binary gender identities are not widely socially 
recognized as possible, and are not given social reality, claiming them may feel extremely 
difficult (even when given the option in a survey question). This problem is distinct from the one 
faced by binary transgender people; while many face identity invalidation and denial in terms of 
their membership in their identity, no one doubts the existence of the categories “women” and 
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“men.” Future research is needed to investigate the distinct experiences of non-binary people, 
and what factors in their social environments influence their labelling of their identities, 
particularly the relationship between social recognition of a group’s existence and strength of 
identity with that group.  These interesting possibilities aside, while these results suggest a 
moderate level of construct validity for the multiple-choice gender identity measure, there is 
clearly more diversity present within categories (especially within the non-binary category). In 
addition, about 10% of the sample (N=58) selected an unexpected combination of responses.  
Twenty-one participants chose to write in a different response; these answers are shown in Table 
20, alongside the participants’ multiple-choice gender identity and transgender identity. 
The responses suggest that participants are extremely aware of social norms around 
gender categories and that many of them are actively determining how to make/find space that 
fits them (e.g. “Lean heavily towards being a woman, not sure what else there is yet.” or “I 
consider myself to have aspects of men and women but I don't really fit either. I am my own 
thing.”). Several participants (especially agender people) emphasize that gender is relatively 
unimportant/meaningless to them but not to others. For example, one person describes gender as 
“a lens we force on others, not how many of us actually are.” Still other participants suggest that 
strength of identification with gender categories is an important dimension of their experience:  
“I experience aspects of male and female identification, sometimes at the same time, but 
neither of them is a strong or complete identification (my identification with them is 
always partial and weak, so neither label fits well even though both have elements of the 
truth).” 
 
Taken together, these responses suggest several avenues for future research about the 
gender categories which participants perceive as available to them, the categories they feel others 
assign to them, and the strength of their identification with any of these available categories (see 
van Anders, 2015 for a recent thought-provoking approach to these questions). 
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Table 20 
 
Free-Text Comments on “Something Else” Choice for Gender Self-Categorization Measure 
(adapted from Rockquemore & Arend, 2002) in Study 2. 
Gender 
Identity 
Trans 
Identity 
Comment after Selecting “Something Else” 
M T I don't consider gender particularly meaningful, but am aware of it as a social norm. I am 
mostly perceived as a woman but would like to be able to be perceived as a man. 
M T I consider myself male and identify as male, and am perceived by society to be a man based on 
my behavior and presentation (e.g. clothes, mannerisms, hair,), but also feel very non-binary 
because 22 years of acting like and being perceived like a girl/woman has influenced how I 
experience the world. 
W T Lean heavily towards being a woman, not sure what else there is yet. 
W T I consider myself a trans women. It's different than just being a "women" but I also believe that 
gender shouldn't be labeled. As a society we should just let people be people. 
W T I consider myself a trans-woman, with the "trans" part very much at the fore at the moment. 
W NT I identify as a woman and perceive myself as a woman, but am more androgynous, without 
being non-binary. 
W NT I consider myself a woman because it would not be possible for me to be a man in the full 
biological sense, but if I could I would be reborn male but able to adjust myself to also look 
female 
NB T mostly non-binary, but sometimes a woman. 
NB T I experience the world as non-binary, but the world perceives and reacts to me as a woman 
NB T I experience aspects of male and female identification, sometimes at the same time, but neither 
of them is a strong or complete identification (my identification with them is always partial and 
weak, so neither label fits well even though both have elements of the truth). 
NB T I'm a prettyboy but people treat me as a woman  
NB T I consider myself non-binary, and experience the world as a person who is a combination of 
masculine and feminine energies but am often perceived and treated as a man. 
NB NT I consider myself to have aspects of men and women but I don't really fit either. I am my own 
thing. 
NB NT A man with feminine characteristics 
NB DK/NA I consider my soul agender, but I experience the world as a woman. 
A T None 
A T I do not understand the concept of gender but understand it is not that way for everyone 
A T Gender has meaning to others, so it can't be meaningless, but I believe that gender is a lens we 
force on others, not how many of us actually are. I don't identify with either gender, but I 
respect the pride others can take in it. 
A DK/NA I don't identify as any particular gender, but that doesn't mean I think gender is meaningless to 
others 
I DK/NA i hate it but more or less "sometimes man or woman sometimes nb" 
I - i consider myself pretty much evenly a man and nothing at the same time most of the time, 
sometimes i just feel like nothing, sometimes i just feel like a man, i never ever feel like a 
woman 
Note. M: Man, W: Woman, NB: Non-Binary, A: Agender, I: Inconsistent. T: Transgender, NT: Not Transgender, 
DK/NA: Don’t Know/No Answer 
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Comparison of Transgender Status Measures 
We assessed transgender status with three different measures in Study 1 (transgender 
identity, transition history, and gender identity + sex assigned at birth) and two different 
measures in Study 2 (transgender identity and gender identity + sex assigned at birth). For each 
question, participants were categorized as Not Transgender, Transgender, or Unclassified as 
described in the Methods. The number of participants in each category for each measure is 
shown in Figure 12 for Study 1 and Figure 13 for Study 2.  
 
Figure 12. Transgender status of participants by measure in Study 1. 
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Figure 13. Transgender status of participants by measure in Study 2. 
The number of Unclassified participants is consistently lowest for the Transgender 
Identity question (and Transition History, in Study 1), because that category includes only 
participants who selected “Don’t Know” or “Choose not to answer” when asked whether they 
identify as transgender/whether they have a history of transition. In contrast, for the Assigned 
Sex at Birth question, all participants who selected a gender identity other than “Man” or 
“Woman” or an assigned sex at birth other than “Male” or “Female”  (e.g. all non-binary and 
agender people) appear in the Unclassified category. Finally, the number of Unclassified people 
for the Free Text question is so large because the question did not explicitly ask participants to 
report transgender status, and all participants who did not explicitly describe themselves as 
cisgender or transgender (e.g. people who wrote “man” or “woman”) were categorized as 
Unclassified.  
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Figure 14. Consistency of transgender status classification across transgender identity, 
transition history, and assigned sex at birth measures (Study 1). 
 
Figure 14 shows the consistency of transgender status classification across the three 
measures in Study 1. Not all participants answered all three measures, so these comparisons are 
based on the 270 participants who did complete all three measures. Eighty-three percent (N=225) 
were consistently classified as Not Transgender, Transgender, or Unclassified by all three 
measures (solid bars in Figure 14), while 15.5% (N = 42) were classified the same way by two 
out of three measures (striped bars in Figure 14). Three participants were classified fully 
inconsistently (i.e. differently by each of the three measures). 
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Table 21  
Transgender status classification by transgender identity and transition history measures (Study 
1; N=342) 
 Transgender Identity 
Transition History Not Transgender Transgender Unclassified 
Not Transgender 237 25 6 
Transgender 3 47 3 
Unclassified - 17 4 
 
Table 22 
Transgender status classification by transgender identity and gender identity + sex assigned at 
birth measures (Study 1; N=271) 
 Transgender Identity 
Gender Identity + Sex 
Assigned at Birth 
Not Transgender Transgender Unclassified 
Not Transgender 187 10 11 
Transgender 2 43 - 
Unclassified - 18 - 
 
Table 23  
Transgender status classification by transition history and gender identity + sex assigned at 
birth measures (Study 1; N=270) 
 Transition History 
Gender Identity + Sex 
Assigned at Birth 
Not Transgender Transgender Unclassified 
Not Transgender 197 7 4 
Transgender 1 41 2 
Unclassified 1 12 5 
 
Table 24 
Transgender status classification by transgender identity and gender identity + sex assigned at 
birth measures (Study 2; N=523) 
 Transgender Identity 
Gender Identity + Sex 
Assigned at Birth 
Not Transgender Transgender Unclassified 
Not Transgender 458 3 14 
Transgender 2 13 - 
Unclassified - 30 3 
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As shown in Tables 21-23, the rate of agreement about transgender status between the 
transgender identity and transition history measures was 84.2%, the rate of agreement between 
transgender identity and gender identity + sex assigned at birth was 84.8%, and the rate of 
agreement between transition history and gender identity + sex assigned at birth was 90%. None 
of these categorization methods perfectly overlap with any of the others.  
Table 24 shows the consistency of transgender status classification between the two 
measures for Study 2. Ninety percent (N= 474) were consistently classified as Not Transgender, 
Transgender, or Unclassified by both measures. These results suggest that there is substantial 
overlap in the results produced by these two measures.  
Discussion 
Gender Identity Measures 
 Binary vs. Multiple-Choice. 
 As was theoretically expected based on the literature presented in Chapter 1, the multiple-
choice gender identity measure was able to identify substantially more diversity in the same 
sample than the binary measures. Between 7.3% (in Study 2, a majority cisgender sample) and 
34.3% (in Study 1, a majority gender minority sample) of participants categorized as men or 
women by the binary question were classified as a different gender by the multiple-choice 
question.  
Binary + Other vs Multiple-Choice 
Correspondence between the binary + other measure and the multiple-choice question 
was fairly high (85% the same in Study 1, 95% the same in Study 2) and on par with the free-text 
question. If we consider only this evidence, binary + other question performs about as well as 
most others, but consistency of responding is not the only consideration.  
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The fact that we recategorized several participants who had selected “Other” back into 
the Man or Woman categories based on their free-text responses (23 people in Study 1, four in 
Study 2, all of them transgender people) was somewhat concerning given our theoretical 
expectation that the Binary + Other coding cues transgender participants to believe that 
researchers do not regard their gender identities as legitimate (e.g. Pope & Warner, 2017). This 
possibility is explored in more depth in Chapter 4, where we conclude that the binary + other 
question is disliked by gender minorities and cisgender people alike, and may act as a cue to 
identity threat for gender minorities. Considering that it requires nearly as much hand-coding of 
responses as the free-text question, and is dramatically less well-liked, we do not recommend it. 
 Free Text vs. Multiple-Choice. 
The number of responses that were classified differently by the multiple-choice and free-
text responses was much higher in Study 1 than Study 2. This is presumably because the 
proportion of gender minority participants was much higher in Study 1, and we might expect that 
the responses from this group are genuinely more complex to categorize. In addition, the absence 
of an explicit Agender category in the multiple-choice question in Study 1, and the labeling of 
one option as Genderqueer rather than Non-Binary, may help explain the relatively higher 
proportion of inconsistency in Study 1.  
Considering the results from both studies, it seems that responses to the free-text question 
could be meaningfully categorized somewhat more often than responses to the multiple-choice 
question (as demonstrated by the consistently larger numbers of participants in the blue 
quadrants than the yellow quadrants). This was true despite the fact that the multiple-choice 
question includes an option to write in a free-text response, which was coded and categorized by 
hand using the same coding scheme. It may be that participants believed that researchers were 
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interested in a greater level of detail when the free-text box was the only gender measure. In 
contrast, they may have assumed (often accurately) that write-in responses to the multiple-choice 
measure were more likely to be discarded as unusable, and thus did not put in as much effort to 
clearly express their identities in that context.  
Many of the differences between free-text and multiple-choice categorizations seem to 
originate with participants whose experiences of gender cannot be neatly captured by the 
available options in our multiple-choice question. Ironically, the process of coding the free-text 
responses is more able to impose a rigid categorization structure on the experiences of 
participants who are unable or unwilling to impose those categorization structures on themselves. 
For example, consider the participant in Study 2 who selected “Genderqueer” for two multiple-
choice questions and “Woman” for the other two. This participant wrote in “Agender trans 
woman” for the free-text response, which we coded as “Agender” because our coding guidelines 
opted to prioritize agender identity when multiple identities were written in at once. However, it 
is at least equally defensible to code this response as “Woman.” Given the explicit choice 
between the two, this participant quite reasonably chose both equally often. 
Other participants were classified inconsistently by the free text and multiple-choice 
measures because the researchers’ interpretation of the meaning of a given gender label differs. 
from the participants’ own interpretation of that label. For instance, in Study 1, four participants 
selected “Genderqueer” as their gender identity on the multiple-choice measure and wrote 
“Butch” for the free-text measure. According to our coding scheme, “Butch” is a subset of the 
gender category “Woman,” so it was grouped accordingly. However, given that the participants 
themselves indicated that they both use the label “Butch” and feel the category “Genderqueer” 
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best reflects their understanding of their gender identities, the coding scheme is clearly invalid 
for this case.  
Both the free-text coding scheme and multiple-choice measure are also limited in their 
ability to accurately capture the experiences of people whose gender spans more than one of our 
designated categories (e.g. “Non-binary woman,” “Agender Trans woman,” “Non-binary 
(agender)”  or fluctuates (e.g. “Genderfluid trans woman,” “Genderfluid, typically leaning 
male”). In the free-text coding scheme, we gave priority to the underrepresented categories “non-
binary” and “agender” when multiple gender labels appeared in a response, but participants 
frequently selected a different category for themselves on the multiple-choice question. It seems 
likely that if the multiple-choice measure permitted multiple selections, many of these 
participants would have chosen more than one (indeed, some recent research found that up to 
90% of gender minority participants selected multiple options when given the opportunity; 
Staples, Bird, Masters, and George, 2018). While researchers would probably better capture their 
experiences by allowing them to do so, the difficulty of analyzing multiple-select questions make 
this approach too complex to recommend for general use.  
Given all these concerns, we find that any method which requires coding all responses or 
substantial simplification of data from a multi-select form (e.g. choosing which ones to prioritize, 
or creating dozens of different categories) presents too much of a barrier to entry for general use. 
The development and maintenance of a valid coding scheme for free-text responses would 
require multiple rounds of cognitive interviewing with participants, with frequent changes likely 
being required, as gender identity terminology, usage, and visibility have been changing rapidly 
in recent years (e.g. the shift from genderqueer to non-binary as an accepted umbrella term). 
Likewise, most common statistical techniques require reducing the data from multi-select 
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questions to mutually exclusive categories before analysis, adding work for researchers. Even 
with this level of attention to detail and investment of resources from researchers, the addition of 
these extra steps reduces the likelihood that the ultimate categorization of a participant is one 
they would agree with, thus reducing the validity of the data these measures produce.  
Instead, we conclude that the difficulties of categorizing a wide range of participants into 
a few gender identity groups are best left to the participants themselves, i.e. by presenting them 
with single-select multiple-choice measures. Researchers should invest their time and energy into 
informing their participants about the purposes for which their information will be used and the 
reasons why the categories in the multiple-choice question were selected, emphasizing the fact 
that statistical analysis limits them to offering only a few options. If a free-text response option is 
included (as we recommend), it is a built-in mechanism for identifying options which should be 
modified and additional categories which should be added (for example, we added Agender as an 
option and changed the Genderqueer option to Non-Binary in Study 2 on the basis of free-text 
responses participants wrote in for Study 1). Researchers might also explicitly inform 
participants that if they do not choose one of the main provided options and write in another, 
their data will be recategorized by the researcher or excluded from analysis. While this might 
artificially increase homogeneity of responding, this outcome is likely preferable to the loss of 
data from participants whose responses would otherwise not be useable. This approach leads to 
two highly positive outcomes; it reduces work for researchers while increasing the level of 
control given to participants to self-determine how they are categorized (and thus the validity of 
their data). 
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Transgender Status Measures  
 As described for gender identity measures, inconsistency of classification between 
transgender status measures is partially the result of researcher choices about how to classify 
particular response patterns, which may or may not align with the choices participants would 
make for themselves. In particular, the decision to classify all non-binary and agender people as 
Unclassified for the Assigned Sex at Birth measure likely caused much of the inconsistency (the 
substantive theoretical and pragmatic question about whether non-binary and agender people are 
transgender, or transgender in the same way as binary transgender people, remains outside the 
scope of this paper).  
Another cause of inconsistency, however, is much more pronounced for transgender 
status measures than for gender identity measures. While the multiple-choice and free-text 
gender identity measures are both still assessing gender identity, these transgender status 
measures are actually assessing theoretically distinct constructs (see Chapter 2 for detailed 
explanations). A person whose gender identity differs from their sex assigned at birth, which is a 
concrete (if invasive) question about their birth certificate, does not necessarily identify as 
transgender, which is among other things a question about group membership and perception of 
oneself as belonging to the social category of “transgender people.” Likewise, a person who has 
a history of transition (social or otherwise) need not identify as transgender, and vice versa. This 
is why Balarajan et al. (2011) recommend that all three of these measures be included in surveys 
aiming to maximize their identification of transgender participants, a recommendation we echo 
for researchers in that situation. However, most research does not require this level of exhaustive 
identification of transgender participants, which is unnecessarily lengthy, invasive (see Chapter 
4), and complex to consolidate for analysis.  
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Overall, the Assigned Sex at Birth question seems to work as intended to identify binary 
transgender people, and may be useful if information about physical bodies is needed (e.g. for 
health research). It is less well-suited for psychological research, as it does not provide any 
additional information about the transgender identities of non-binary and agender people. An 
additional drawback of this method is the complexity of analyzing its results, which requires 
comparison of responses to two measures to determine transgender status. In contrast, responses 
to the Transgender Identity and Transition History questions are relatively simpler to analyze and 
can be interpreted in the same way regardless of a participant’s gender identity, minimizing 
researcher labor and maximizing the number of usable responses. 
General Recommendations 
 In both samples, the multiple-choice measure captured much more gender diversity than 
did the binary question, about the same amount as the hand-coded binary + other question, and 
somewhat less than hand-coded free text responses. We do not recommend the binary + other 
question because it requires a substantial effort to hand code responses, is not well-liked, and 
may produce identity threat for gender minorities by literally “othering” them (see Chapter 4). In 
contrast, the free text measure is well-liked and non-threatening, and will certainly produce 
meaningful and nuanced categorizations, but because of the dramatically increased time required 
to code the data it produces, and the loss of self-determination for the participants, we do not 
recommend this method for general use. Instead, we recommend the multiple-choice measure, 
because it requires much less time and effort for researchers, and gives more control to 
participants. 
For general use, we find that the transgender identity question and transition history 
question are equally easy to administer and analyze because they can be used as-is without the 
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recoding which is necessary for the Sex Assigned at Birth question. The transgender identity 
question has our final recommendation because it has greater face validity for concepts related to 
identity (which is of greater relevance for social psychology) and does not invoke the 
ambiguities and issues related to medicalization and gatekeeping of transgender people’s 
identities that are raised by asking about transition history (see Chapter 4). 
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Chapter 4: Acceptability and Identity Safety of Gender Measures 
In the previous chapter, we considered how to analyze the results of several different 
transgender-inclusive gender measures, with the aim of identifying the questions that best 
balanced accuracy and simplicity of use. This chapter explores whether these same gender 
measures may act as cues to identity safety for transgender and non-binary participants, and how 
these cues may differ across various contexts in which researchers might use gender measures. 
Our aim is to identify the gender measures that are most acceptable to participants of varying 
gender identities and transgender statuses, and that provide the greatest sense of identity safety 
across contexts. 
Identity Threat and Identity Safety 
Several researchers who have conducted qualitative research about inclusive gender 
questions have pointed out that many transgender people are uncomfortable answering certain 
questions or do not feel that they can adequately express their identities using the options 
provided (e.g. Conron et al., 2008; Balarajan et al., 2011; Fenway Health, 2013). Despite the 
quantity of qualitative research suggesting that transgender people may react negatively to 
certain gender question formulations, no one has yet connected these findings to social 
psychological research on identity threat and identity denial.  
Identity threat is the recognition that one may be devalued in a given setting because of 
one’s social identity. Social psychological research on this subject suggests that members of 
stigmatized groups are particularly sensitive to environmental cues that may help them determine 
whether identity threat is likely in a given setting. As Murphy, Steele, and Gross (2007) describe, 
“when a setting contains threatening situational cues, it raises the specter of identity threat—
prompting heightened cognitive and physiological vigilance, decreased feelings of belonging, 
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and decreased desire to participate in the setting” (p. 884). While they are not an “environment” 
in the conventional sense, it seems clear that the type and wording of gender questions might 
serve as cues to identity threat or identity safety for gender minority participants in various 
settings (e.g. job applications, psychological experiments, health care clinics, social media sites).  
In addition, some kinds of gender questions may even act as identity denial for gender 
minority participants. This research has largely investigated participants’ reactions to verbal 
questioning of their racial or national identities. For example, Cheryan and Monin (2005) found 
that Asian-American participants (but not white Americans) worked harder to demonstrate 
American cultural knowledge (reasserting American identity) when asked whether they spoke 
English before the experiment. While the question may seem benign in isolation, repeated 
questioning of this type (e.g. “where are you really from?”) can reinforce the idea that 
marginalized groups do not fully belong. In many contexts, the targets of this threat may react 
with identity assertion, redoubling their efforts to demonstrate membership in the group, as the 
participants in Cheryan and Monin (2005) did.  
However, answering a demographic question alone does not provide much opportunity 
for identity assertion, especially when the question itself is the source of identity denial. In this 
situation, threatened participants may be more likely to withdraw effort from the task at hand. 
Townsend and colleagues (2009) proposed that multiracial participants who are forced to choose 
only one racial category on a racial demographic question may experience identity denial, 
reasoning that participants who hold more than one racial identity will inevitably feel that their 
identities are being denied if they are only allowed to communicate one of those identities to the 
researchers. Indeed, multiracial participants forced to select only one racial identity option 
subsequently showed lower motivation and self-esteem than multiracial participants who were 
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allowed to select more than one option. Townsend et al. (2009) argue that these effects are 
evidence of self-induced identity denial experienced when completing forced-choice racial 
identity questions. 
Both identity threat and identity denial may be at work when gender minority participants 
encounter certain types of gender questions. For instance, when genderqueer or other non-binary 
identified people encounter a binary gender question, they may experience identity denial, as 
they can anticipate that the researchers will misperceive their identities. Likewise, if a 
transgender man sees himself as both transgender and a man, he may experience identity threat 
and identity denial if a gender question forces him to choose between these identities. By 
including a “transgender” option as a gender identity (e.g. in a set of responses like 
man/woman/transgender) the researchers have signaled a belief that transgender people cannot 
be men or women, and that they are likely to misperceive and devalue this participant’s identity 
as a transgender man.   
Consequences of Identity Threat/Identity Denial 
To the extent that certain gender questions induce identity threat and/or identity denial, 
previous research suggests that gender minorities will feel lower self-esteem and motivation, 
decreased investment in the task at hand, reduced willingness to disclose sensitive information, 
reduced goodwill toward the person asking the question in general, and have lower rates of 
participation. 
These effects are particularly concerning for psychological research because gender 
minorities are often already poorly represented in psychological research and mistrustful of 
researchers. As the APA Task Force on Gender Identity and Gender Variance (2009) noted,  
“some transgender people, particularly some community activists, have been 
disillusioned by traditional research. …The clinical language, the inclusion of some types 
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of gender variance in the DSM, the apparent focus on prevention, and the perceived 
gatekeeping role of some research are alienating and stigmatizing” (p. 26). 
 
Though not all psychological research is clinical in focus, this distinction may not be apparent to 
non-psychologists, and their concerns are likely to carry over to other areas of psychology as 
well.  
As the psychological community has not historically had the best interests of gender 
minorities in mind, many gender minorities are understandably wary of the intentions of 
psychological researchers. However, the same participants may help researchers to recruit 
additional participants if they perceive the studies as inclusive and considerate. For instance, 
Meier and Labuski (2013) have found that 
“because the trans community has a strong Internet presence, they are well connected and 
can refer many other trans people to studies that they deem ‘sensitive’ and ‘worthwhile,’ 
whereas they may also warn others not to participate in studies not considered ‘safe’” (p. 
301). 
 
Both the preexisting barriers to the participation of gender minorities in psychological research, 
and the potential these same people have to increase participation of the other members of their 
communities make maintaining the goodwill and trust of gender minority participants a crucial 
goal for psychologists. Identifying which questions serve as cues to identity safety and 
acceptance and which serve as cues to identity threat and denial may be a major help in 
accomplishing that goal. 
The existing literature on trans-inclusive gender questions suggests that merely allowing 
participants to choose multiple gender identities or to identify themselves as transgender may not 
be sufficient to reduce identity threat or identity denial. I propose that participants with a history 
of transition who do not identify as transgender (but who nevertheless may be viewed as 
transgender by the researchers) may experience similar feelings of identity denial when they 
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encounter the two-question method and are asked to disclose their sex assigned at birth. Most 
transgender people are aware of the significance of disclosing different information for sex 
assigned at birth and gender identity, and know that doing so will cause researchers to identify 
them as transgender. Thus, questions that ask participants to report their sex assigned at birth 
may cause both identity threat and identity denial, as they suggest that researchers either do not 
understand or do not value participants’ own gender identities (or both). 
This perspective may help to make sense of the actions of the participants in Glen and 
Hurrell (2012) who report a history of transition but do not indicate a difference between sex 
assigned at birth and current gender identity. To the extent that they do not feel their sex assigned 
at birth accurately describes their identity, these participants might be acting to avoid self-
inflicted identity denial by reporting their sex assigned at birth as congruent with their gender 
identity. For participants who do not regard their sex assigned at birth as relevant to their gender 
identity in any way, it is even possible that merely asking about sex assigned at birth will induce 
the experience of identity denial. Consistent with these ideas, Conron et al. (2014) seem to find 
that some participants are more comfortable answering a question about transgender identity than 
about sex assigned at birth.  Likewise, Glen and Hurrell (2012) find that some participants seem 
more comfortable indicating that they have a history of transition than indicating that their sex 
assigned at birth is different from their current gender identity.  
The following set of analyses examines the possibility that different formulations of 
inclusive gender questions may pose different risks of identity threat. We hypothesize that the 
level of identity threat or identity denial experience will vary along with individual differences in 
participants’ identities. For example, some binary transgender people may not feel identity denial 
when they see the binary gender question, as they are able to indicate their genders. Participants’ 
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philosophies about the nature of those gender identities may also influence their experiences of 
threat. Some non-binary people who view their identity as occupying a “third space” beyond 
man and woman may not experience identity threat when they see “other” as a third option in 
addition to “man” and “woman,” because this question format conforms to their own philosophy 
of gender. Finally, we propose that these varying levels of perceived risk may partially account 
for between-participant differences in willingness to disclose information and participate in 
research.  
Effects of Context 
Nearly every organization that has published recommendations about gender questions 
also notes that it is crucial for respondents to know what the information is going to be used for, 
both so that they can respond accurately and so that they have trust in the people asking the 
question. For instance, the Equality and Human Rights Commission (2012) suggests that 
an introductory text should be provided before this question in order to encourage 
participation and to gain respondents’ trust to answer the questions. The text should 
explain why the data are being collected; how the data will be protected… and how 
respect for the respondents’ answers will be achieved by the organization [emphasis 
mine]; for example, through ensuring confidentiality and anonymity throughout (p. 12). 
 
This suggests that the context in which gender questions are asked may have significant effects 
on participants’ willingness to answer the questions in the first place.  
It also seems possible that the way participants think about these identities and label 
themselves may differ according to context. In particular, I propose that contexts vary in terms of 
the gender salience and motivation to be perceived accurately that they elicit. That is, gender is 
likely to be a highly salient identity category in some contexts (e.g. when searching for a 
romantic partner) and much less salient in others (e.g. during grocery shopping). Likewise, in 
some contexts people are highly motivated to ensure that others perceive their gender identities 
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accurately (e.g. when on a date), while in other circumstances it is less crucial to be perceived 
accurately (e.g. when at a movie theater alone). It may be that the context in which gender 
questions are asked will influence participants’ comfort with the questions and perceptions of the 
research and researchers.  
Method 
Like Chapter 3, this chapter describes results from different parts of the same two studies 
(each sampling undergraduates and self-identified gender minorities for four total samples). For 
a detailed description of the sample, the gender demographic measures, and the coding 
techniques used for each one, see Chapter 3. For a detailed description of each question and how 
it was chosen, see Chapter 2. 
Design Overviews  
In Study 1 (Spring 2016), we used a fully-crossed 3 (context) x 4 (gender question) 
design to determine the effects of survey context and gender question type on participants’ 
expectations of identity threat and identity denial. To manipulate context, we randomly assigned 
each participant to see one version of the following paragraph: 
Please answer the following gender question(s) as you would if you were completing a 
demographic questionnaire on a clinic intake form/for a psychology experiment/on an 
online dating website. 
 
These contexts were chosen because gender questions are likely to be asked in each of them, but 
the researchers and participants are likely concerned with different components of gender in each 
circumstance (e.g. asking about physical bodies via sex assigned at birth may be viewed as more 
relevant and acceptable in a health care context than in a psychology experiment). After reading 
a context description, participants were randomly assigned to see one of four different gender 
questions, designed to represent the most common types of inclusive gender questions currently 
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recommended by major public health and demographic research organizations. These were the 
Binary plus Other, Multiple-Choice, Multiple-Choice + Sex Assigned at Birth, and Multiple-
Choice + Transgender Identity.  
In Study 2 (Fall 2016), we did not include a context manipulation, which permitted us to 
experimentally compare more gender questions while reducing the number of cells in the design 
to increase power. We kept the same measures which were compared in Study 1, except that we 
removed the multiple-choice + transition history question because it was poorly ranked, and 
added the binary measure to allow direct comparison of the gender minority inclusive questions 
to the status quo. We also added the short free-text question, which was consistently viewed 
most positively by participants in Study 1. Thus, participants in Study 2 were randomly assigned 
to see one of six gender demographic measures (Binary, Binary + Other, Multiple-Choice, 
Multiple-Choice + Sex Assigned at Birth, Multiple-Choice + Transgender Identity, or Free Text).  
In both Study 1 and Study 2, after completing the randomly assigned gender measure, 
participants completed several dependent measures intended to assess their levels of identity 
threat, perceptions of the researchers conducting the survey, and their investment in future 
research. In Study 1, items were randomized within scales, but scales were presented in the same 
order each time. In Study 2, items were randomized within scales and scales were presented in a 
random order within blocks of the survey. Participants then completed all the same gender 
identity and transgender status measures that were randomly assigned at the beginning of the 
study, provided feedback about each one, and rated their level of preference for each one. In 
Study 1, participants also completed the Binary, Multiple-Choice + Transition History, and Long 
Free-Text measures at the end of the survey, although these were not part of the randomly 
assigned pool at the beginning of the survey. Thus, each participant completed one randomly 
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assigned gender measure at the beginning of the survey, and eight (in Study 1) or six (in Study 2) 
gender measures at the end.  
Experimental Effects of Question Type (Between-Participants Manipulations) 
Identity Threat Measures. 
Study 1. 
 After the experimentally assigned gender measure, we measured gender salience.16 
Participants were then prompted to write free-text responses giving feedback on the measure 
(what they liked, what they didn’t like), perceptions of the organizations that created the 
measure, and any additional comments. Participants then answered several questions designed to 
measure various aspects of identity threat, worded to match the context manipulation to which 
they were assigned. Participants indicated their answer to each question on a 7-point Likert scale 
(1 = Not at all, 7 = Very much).  
Being Understood and Respected (α = 0.90, M = 5.0, SD = 1.8). 
 How likely do you think it is that [the clinic staff/ others on the dating website/ the 
experimenters] will accurately perceive your gender? 
 How likely do you think it is that [the clinic staff/ others on the dating website/ the 
experimenters] will correctly understand your gender? 
 How likely do you think it is that [the clinic staff/ others on the dating website/ the 
experimenters] will respect your gender? 
 How likely do you think it is that [the clinic staff/ others on the dating website/ the 
experimenters] will accept your gender? 
 
Comfort with Question (α = 0.93, M = 5.7, SD = 1.4) 
 How comfortable do you feel answering this gender question? 
 How comfortable would you feel knowing that [the clinic staff/ others on the 
dating website/ the experimenters] had this information about you? 
 How safe do you feel answering this question? 
                                                 
16 These questions were “How much are you currently thinking about your gender?” and “How much are you 
currently focusing on your gender?” Unfortunately, because these questions appeared immediately after the gender 
question manipulation, some participants seem to have believed that they were part of the gender question 
manipulation, and their comments reflected this confusion. Because of this confusion, these two questions were not 
included in any additional analyses. 
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 How safe would you feel knowing that [the clinic staff/ others on the dating 
website/ the experimenters] had this information about you? 
 
Willingness to Participate (α = 0.93, M = 5.1, SD = 1.6). 
 How comfortable would you feel [visiting this particular clinic/using this 
particular dating website/ participating in this particular psychology 
experiment]? 
 How safe would you feel [visiting this particular clinic/using this particular 
dating website/ participating in this particular psychology experiment]? 
 How willing would you be to [visit this particular clinic/use this particular dating 
website/ participate in this particular psychology experiment]? 
 How much would you like to [visit this particular clinic/use this particular dating 
website/ participate in this particular psychology experiment]? 
 
Willingness to Refer a Friend (α = 0.95, M = 4.7, SD = 1.8). 
 How willing would you be to refer a friend to [this particular clinic/this 
particular dating website/this particular psychology experiment]?  
 How enthusiastically would you refer a friend to [this particular clinic/this 
particular dating website/this particular psychology experiment]?  
 How comfortable would you be referring a friend to [this particular clinic/this 
particular dating website/this particular psychology experiment]?  
 
 Composite Identity Threat for Study 1.  
 Based on a scree plot, these items showed some evidence of unidimensionality (Factor 1 
accounted for 53% of total variance), so I created a composite score combining all 15 identity 
threat items into a single scale, which had high reliability (α = 0.94, M = 5.2, SD = 1.3). 
Study 2. 
Evaluation of Question. 
In Study 2, we asked four questions immediately following the experimentally assigned 
gender measure to assess participants’ initial, general impressions.  Participants indicated their 
answers on 7-point Likert scales (1 = Not at all, 7 = Very much).  
 Overall, how much do you like this gender question?  
 How fully and accurately does your answer reflect your OWN understanding of your 
gender? 
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 How fully and accurately do you think OTHER PEOPLE would perceive your gender 
based on your answer?  
 How much do you think OTHER PEOPLE will perceive your gender as real and 
legitimate based on your answer? 
 
These four questions had acceptable reliability (α=.79), so they were averaged into a single 
composite score (M= 5.1, SD = 1.3). 
Authenticity (Kraus, Chen, and Keltner, 2011). 
We included a 4-item measure of felt authenticity developed by Kraus, Chen, and Keltner 
(2011).  Participants reported how much they currently agreed with statements like “I feel like I 
can be myself with others” on a 7 point Likert scale (1 = disagree strongly, 7 = agree strongly). 
The items had acceptable reliability (α = .76) and were averaged (M = 5.1, SD = 1.2). 
Collective Self-Esteem (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992). 
We adapted the 16-item Collective Self-Esteem Scale developed by Luhtanen and Crocker 
(1992) to refer to “gender groups” instead of “social groups,” and used it with a 7 point Likert 
scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree). While Luhtanen and Crocker reported that the 
scale has four subscales (Membership, Private, Public, and Identity), principal components 
analysis of our data suggested that a 2-factor solution was more appropriate. Using a 
combination of our observed factor loadings and theoretical reasoning, we opted to create one 
subscale containing the items from Luhtanen and Crocker’s Membership/Private/Identity 
subscales (12 items, M=5.6, SD=0.94, α=0.86) and one subscale containing the Public items (4 
items, M=4.8, SD=1.4, α=0.79). Typical items from the Membership/Private/Identity are “I am a 
worthy member of the social groups I belong to” and “In general, I’m glad to be a member of the 
social groups I belong to,” and a typical item from the Public scale is “In general, others respect 
the social groups that I am a member of.” 
Expectations of Belonging and Respect. 
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Before answering these questions, participants saw a reminder of the gender demographic 
measure they answered at the beginning of the survey. They were asked to give their answers 
with respect to the hypothetical researchers who asked the questions at the beginning of the 
survey. 
 How likely do you think it is that they will treat you with respect? 
 How likely do you think it is that they will reject you? 
 How likely do you think it is that they will treat you like you belong? 
 How likely do you think it is that they will treat you like an outsider? 
 How likely do you think it is that they will treat you like you belong? 
 
Participants answered questions on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = Very unlikely, 7 = Very likely). 
These questions were averaged into a single composite score (α=.90, M = 5.6, SD = 1.4). 
 Comfort with/Investment in Research. 
Before answering these questions, participants saw a reminder of the gender demographic 
measure they answered at the beginning of the survey. They were asked to give their answers 
with respect to the hypothetical researchers who asked the questions at the beginning of the 
survey. 
 How comfortable would you be asking a friend to answer their survey/form? 
 How willing would you be to recommend this survey to a friend? 
 How comfortable would you feel continuing to answer their questions? 
 How comfortable would you feel knowing that these people had this information about 
you? 
 How comfortable would you feel completing the rest of their survey/form? 
 How comfortable do you feel answering their gender question?  
 How willing would you be to complete the rest of their survey/form? 
 
Participants answered questions on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = Not at all, 7 = Very much). These 
questions were averaged into a single composite score (α=.93, M = 5.4, SD = 1.4). 
Perceptions of Researchers’ Knowledge about Gender Minorities. 
 Study 1. 
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Participants were asked to indicate their perceptions of the researchers who created these 
questions on several dimensions. Where not otherwise indicated, participants answered each 
question on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = Not at all, 7 = Very much). 
 Researcher Knowledge about Gender. 
Participants answered each question on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = Almost nothing, 7 = A 
large amount). The composite score for these four items was reliable (α = 0.95, M = 4.7, SD = 
1.6). 
 How much do you think the people who created this gender question know about… 
 …gender in general 
 …transgender people 
 …gender non-conforming people 
 ….people with non-binary genders 
 
Question Consequences (α = 0.94, M = 4.5, SD = 1.3). 
Participants answered each question on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = Very negatively, 7 = 
Very positively).  
How do you think the use of this gender question will affect… 
 …transgender people 
 …gender non-conforming people 
 …people with non-binary genders? 
 …you? 
 
Researcher Caring about Gender Minorities (α = 0.97, M = 5, SD = 1.6). 
How much do you think the people who created this gender question care about the well-
being of … 
 …transgender people 
 …gender non-conforming people 
 ….people with non-binary genders   
 
Researcher Caring about You (α = 0.88, M = 4.5, SD = 1.6). 
How much do you think the people who created this gender question… 
 …care about your well-being 
 …understand you 
 …are interested in your opinions 
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Composite Perceptions of Researchers (Study 1). 
 Based on a scree plot, these items showed some evidence of unidimensionality (Factor 1 
accounted for 64% of total variance), so I created a composite score combining all 14 
perceptions of researchers items into a single scale, which had high reliability (α = 0.96, M = 4.7, 
SD = 1.3). 
Study 2. 
Before answering each of these next questions, participants saw a reminder of the gender 
demographic measure they answered at the beginning of the survey. They were asked to give 
their answers with respect to the hypothetical researchers who asked the questions at the 
beginning of the survey. Unless otherwise indicated, participants answered questions on a 7-
point Likert scale (1 = Very unlikely, 7 = Very likely):  
Perceptions of Researcher Knowledge/Concern about Transgender People. 
 How likely do you think it is that they are concerned about non-binary people’s well-
being? 
 How likely do you think it is that they consulted transgender people when creating the 
questions? 
 How likely do you think it is that they are concerned about transgender people’s well-
being? 
 How likely do you think it is that they consulted non-binary people when creating the 
questions?  
 How likely do you think it is that they are transgender themselves?  
 
These questions had high reliability (α=.93), so they were averaged into a single composite score 
(M = 4.4, SD = 1.7). 
 Attitudes and Emotions toward Researchers. 
Attitudes toward Researchers (Study 1). 
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Attitudes toward researchers were measured on five 7-point bipolar scales (1 = positive, 7 
= negative) such as Good/Bad, Caring/Uncaring.   
Emotions Toward Researchers (Study 1 and Study 2). 
 
In both studies, participants were asked the degree to which they felt each of 10 emotions 
toward the researchers on a 7-point Likert scale (1=not at all, 7 = very much). Principal 
components analysis of our data suggested that a 2-factor solution was appropriate in both 
studies, so we created a subscale for positive emotions (Satisfaction, Empathy, Compassion, 
Pride) and a subscale for negative emotions (Fear, Irritation, Shame, Anxiety, Anger, Guilt).  The 
positive emotions subscale (Study 1 M=3.5, SD=1.6; Study 2 M=3.3, SD=1.7) had good 
reliability (Study 1 α=0.86; Study 2 α=.89), as did the negative emotions subscale (Study 1 
M=2.1, SD=1.3, α=.91; Study 2 M=2.1, SD=1.3, α=.92). 
Within-Participants Variables (Perceptions and Rankings of All Gender Measures). 
In the second half of each study, all participants answered each one of several different 
gender questions and provided feedback about each one. For more information about how these 
questions were selected and my predictions about each one, see Chapter 2. For more information 
about how responses to these questions were coded, see Chapter 3. 
In Study 1, these were the Binary, Binary + Other, Multiple-Choice, Multiple-Choice + 
Sex Assigned at Birth, Multiple-Choice + Transgender Identity, Multiple-Choice + Transition 
History, Short Free Text, and Long Free Text questions. Four of these (Binary + Other, Multiple-
Choice, Multiple-Choice + Sex Assigned at Birth, Multiple-Choice + Transgender Identity) were 
the same as those used in the experimental portion of Study 1, and the other four (Binary, 
Multiple-Choice + Transition History, Short Free Text, and Long Free Text) were new questions 
included for comparison purposes.  
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In Study 2, all participants answered all six gender questions that were used in the 
experimental portion of the study (Binary, Binary + Other, Multiple-Choice, Multiple-Choice + 
Sex Assigned at Birth, Multiple-Choice + Transgender Identity, Short Free Text).  
Perceptions of Gender Questions. 
Each gender measure was followed by questions about perceptions of that measure on 7-
point Likert scales (1= Not at all, 7=Very much) and a free-text box for comments about that 
question/question pair.  
In Study 1, these questions were: 
 How much did this gender question allow you to fully express your gender?  
 How accurately does your answer to this gender question reflect your own 
understanding of your gender? 
 How accurately do you think other people would perceive your gender based on 
your answer to this question? 
 What comments do you have about this gender question? 
 
 In Study 2, these questions were: 
 Overall, how much do you like [this gender question/these gender questions]?  
 How fully and accurately [does your answer/do your answers] reflect your OWN 
understanding of your gender? 
 How fully and accurately do you think OTHER PEOPLE would perceive your 
gender based on your [answer/answers]? 
 How much do you think OTHER PEOPLE will perceive your gender as real and 
legitimate based on your [answer/answers]? 
 What comments do you have about [this gender question/these two gender 
questions (as a pair)]? 
 
In each study, we combined the Likert-scale items about each gender measure into a single 
composite score for each of the measures. The scree plots for each of these 14 scales showed a 
clear, sharp drop after the first factor, supporting the hypothesis that these scales are 
unidimensional. 
Ranking of Gender Questions. 
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After answering each of the different gender identity and transgender status measures and 
providing feedback about each one individually, participants ranked the measures compared to 
one another in order of their preference for each one (see Tables 4 and 6). 
In Study 1, participants answered one question ranking the eight measures they had just 
seen, with the following prompt: 
You have now seen several different types of gender questions. Please rank these 
questions in order of your overall preference, with the question you like best in Position 
1, and the question you like least in Position 8. 
In Study 2, participants were asked to rank all six measures they had just seen, but within 
a specific context. These contexts included the same three that were asked about experimentally 
in Study 1, as well as a new context – a job application. This new context was chosen because 
disclosure of gender identity and transgender status on a job application seems to carry the 
potential for discrimination, but not much potential benefit to participants (in contrast to clinics 
and dating websites, where disclosure may lead to better health care or better match suggestions).  
Participants answered the following question four times, about each of four different contexts 
(bracketed, in bold): 
 Imagine that you are completing a profile for a [clinic intake form/psychology 
experiment/dating website/job application]. Which of these questions would you most 
prefer to see in that context?   Please rank these questions in order of your overall 
preference, with the question you like best in Position 1, and the question you like 
least in Position 7.    
 
The options were all previously answered six gender questions and a new option: “No gender 
question asked (Gender information is not collected at all).” This new option was included 
because gender information is routinely collected without a clear rationale or plan for the use of 
these data, and avoiding this sort of data collection would reduce the risks for participants 
inherent in disclosure. However, there is currently insufficient evidence about what positive 
value participants may place on this disclosure in different context, so we aimed to determine 
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how strongly participants valued having the opportunity to disclose their gender identity and 
transgender status in the first place. 
Results 
Between-Participants Analyses 
Details about all significant results are reported in Appendix B. 
 Identity Threat. 
 Study 1: Effects of Question, Context, and Transgender Identity. 
The three-way interaction of question (binary + other, multiple-choice, multiple-choice + 
assigned sex at birth, and multiple-choice + transgender identity), context (clinic intake, dating 
website, or psychology experiment) and transgender identity (not transgender or transgender) 
had no significant effect on identity safety, perceptions of researchers, attitudes toward 
researchers, or emotions toward researchers. In those analyses, there were no two-way 
interactions or main effects of question for any of the dependent variables, so question was 
dropped from subsequent analyses.  
However, there was a significant interaction of context and transgender identity for 
perceptions of researchers. Cisgender people in the dating website context perceived researchers 
as knowing and caring less about gender minorities, while transgender people in the dating 
context perceived researchers as knowing and caring more about gender minorities (Table B1). 
There were not enough unclassified participants for inclusion in this analysis.  
There was a main effect of context on identity safety and perceptions of researchers’ 
knowledge and caring (Table B2). Compared to participants in the clinic intake context, those in 
the dating website context reported less identity safety and perceived researchers as knowing and 
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caring less about gender minorities. Those in the psychology experiment context did not differ 
from those in the clinic intake context. 
There was a main effect of transgender identity on identity safety, perceptions of 
researchers’ knowledge and caring, attitudes toward researchers, and positive emotions toward 
researchers (Table B3). Compared to cisgender people, transgender people felt less identity 
safety and perceived researchers as knowing and caring less about gender minorities, but also 
had significantly more positive attitudes and emotions toward researchers. Unclassified 
participants did not differ from cisgender participants. 
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Table 1 
 
Results for Two-Way ANOVA Testing Effects of Context and Transgender Identity on Dependent 
Variables (Study 1). 
Dependent Variable 
Context * 
Trans Identity Context Trans Identity 
 
Identity Safety ns 
F (2, 544) = 27.36, 
p <.001 
F (2, 463) = 23.69, 
p <.001 
 
Perceptions of Researchers’ 
Knowledge/Caring 
F (2, 443) = 3.70, 
p =.025 
F (2, 520) = 4.89, 
p =.007 
F (2, 461) = 8.54, 
p <.001 
 
Attitudes toward 
Researchers ns ns 
F (2, 447) = 4.71, 
p =.009 
 
Positive Emotions toward 
Researchers ns ns 
F (2, 459) = 3.49, 
p =.03 
 
Negative Emotions toward 
Researchers ns ns ns 
ns p >.05 
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Study 2: Effects of Question and Transgender Identity. 
The interaction of question (binary, binary + other, multiple-choice, multiple-choice + assigned 
sex at birth, multiple-choice + transgender identity, and short free text) and transgender identity 
(not transgender, transgender, or unclassified) had a significant effect on comfort with research. . 
Compared to cisgender people, transgender people were significantly less comfortable with 
research when they saw the binary question, but significantly more comfortable when they saw 
any other question (Table B4). There was no significant interaction of question and transgender 
identity for any of the other dependent variables.  
 There was a main effect of question on several dependent variables (Table B5). 
Compared to those who saw the binary question, participants who saw the multiple-choice, 
multiple-choice + assigned sex at birth, multiple-choice + transgender identity, or short free text 
question had higher expectations of belonging, higher comfort with research, higher perceptions 
of researchers’ knowledge of and caring about gender minorities, higher positive emotions 
toward researchers, and lower negative emotions toward researchers.  Participants who saw the 
binary + other question also had higher perceptions of researchers’ knowledge of and caring 
about gender minorities, and lower negative emotions toward researchers compared to those who 
saw the binary question, but did not differ from the those who saw the binary on any other 
variables. There were no significant effects of question on evaluation of question, authenticity, or 
CSES (public or private).  
 There was also a main effect of transgender identity on several dependent variables 
(Table B6). Compared to cisgender people, transgender participants and those who could not be 
classified had lower evaluation of questions, lower authenticity, lower CSES (both public and 
private), and lower expectations of belonging and respect. Unclassified participants had lower 
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comfort with research than cisgender people, but transgender people did not differ from 
cisgender people. Transgender people had more positive emotions toward researchers than 
cisgender people; unclassified people did not differ from cisgender people.  
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Table 2 
 
Two-Way ANOVAs Testing Effects of Question and Transgender Identity on Dependent 
Variables (Study 2) 
Dependent Variable 
Question * 
Trans Identity Question Trans Identity 
 
 
Evaluation of Question ns ns 
F (2, 583) = 24.72, 
p <.001 
 
 
Authenticity ns ns 
F (2, 588) = 32.43, 
p <.001 
 
 
CSES (Private Subscale) ns ns 
F (2, 570) = 26.18, 
p <.001 
 
 
CSES (Public Subscale) ns ns 
F (2, 580) = 52.28, 
p <.001 
 
Expectation of 
Belonging/Respect ns 
F (5, 528) = 5.39, 
p <.001 
F (2, 584) = 27.67, 
p <.001 
 
 
Comfort with Research 
F (10, 490) = 3.08, 
p <.001 
F (5, 527) = 4.92, 
p <.001 
F (2, 584) = 7.49, 
p <.001 
 
Perceptions of 
Researchers ns 
F (5, 527) = 31.35, 
p <.001 ns 
 
Positive Emotions 
Toward Researchers ns 
F (5, 522) = 9.30, 
p <.001 
F (2, 579) = 4.81, 
p = .008 
 
Negative Emotions 
Toward Researchers ns 
F (5, 523) = 4.07, 
p = .001 ns 
ns p >.05 
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Within-Participants Analyses 
Details about all significant t-tests are reported in Appendix B. 
Study 1. 
Question perceptions. 
Across all participants, the binary question was perceived as the least accurate and 
complete, and the binary + other and multiple-choice + transition history had the next lowest 
evaluations. The multiple-choice, multiple-choice + assigned sex at birth, and multiple-choice + 
transgender identity questions were perceived as more accurate and complete, and the short and 
long free-text questions were perceived as most accurate and complete (Table 3).   
The interaction of gender identity (man, woman, or non-binary/agender) and transgender 
identity (not transgender, transgender, or unclassified) did not have a significant effect on 
perceptions of any question.  
There was a main effect of gender identity on perception of every question except long 
free-text (Table B7). Non-binary/agender people perceived all questions as less accurate and 
complete than men did. Women perceived the binary question as less accurate and complete than 
men did, but did not differ from men on their perceptions of any other question. 
There was a main effect of transgender identity on perception of every question (Table 
B8). Compared to non-transgender people, transgender people perceived every question except 
long free-text as less accurate and complete, and unclassified people perceived all questions as 
less accurate and complete. 
Question rankings. 
The interaction of gender identity (man, woman, or non-binary/agender) and transgender 
identity (not transgender, transgender, or unclassified) had a significant effect on rankings of the 
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multiple-choice + assigned sex at birth, short free-text, and long free-text questions (Table B9). 
For the multiple-choice + assigned sex at birth question, women and non-binary/agender people 
who were unclassified on trans identity assigned the question a lower ranking. For the short free-
text question, transgender women assigned the question a lower ranking, but unclassified women 
assigned the question a higher ranking. For the long free-text question, women and non-
binary/agender people who were unclassified on trans identity assigned the question a higher 
ranking. 
There was a main effect of gender identity on rankings of all questions except multiple-
choice + transition history. Compared to men, non-binary/agender people assigned lower 
rankings to the binary, binary + other, and multiple-choice + assigned sex at birth questions, and 
higher rankings to the multiple-choice, multiple-choice + transgender identity, short free-text, 
and long free-text questions. Women assigned lower rankings to the binary question compared to 
men, but did not differ from men in their rankings of any other question. 
There was also a main effect of transgender identity for on rankings of all questions 
except multiple-choice + transition history. Compared to cisgender people, transgender people 
assigned lower rankings to the binary, binary + other, and multiple-choice + assigned sex at birth 
questions, and  higher rankings to the multiple-choice, multiple-choice + transgender identity, 
short free-text, and long free-text questions. Unclassified people assigned lower rankings to the 
binary question compared to cisgender people, but did not differ from cisgender people in their 
rankings of any other question. 
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Table 3 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Composite Scores Assessing Perceptions of Gender Measures (Studies 
1 and 2) 
 Gender Measure Evaluated M SD α 
Study 1 
(3 items) 
Binary 4 2.3 0.93 
Binary + Other 5.4 1.6 0.86 
Multiple-Choice 5.7 1.5 0.85 
Multiple-Choice + Assigned Sex at Birth 5.6 1.5 0.88 
Multiple-Choice + Transgender Identity 5.7 1.5 0.89 
Multiple-Choice + Transition History 5.3 1.7 0.92 
Short Free-Text 6.1 1.2 0.85 
Long Free-Text 6.4 1.1 0.87 
Study 2 
(4 items) 
Binary 4.9 1.7 0.85 
Binary +Other 5.3 1.5 0.85 
Multiple-Choice 5.6 1.3 0.84 
Multiple-Choice + Assigned Sex at Birth 5.4 1.4 0.83 
Multiple-Choice + Transgender Identity 5.4 1.4 0.85 
Short Free-Text 5.8 1.4 0.88 
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Table 4 
Rankings of Gender Questions (Study 1) 
Gender Question Mean Ranking SD Median Ranking 
Short Free-Text 3.41 2.26 2 
Long Free-Text 3.47 2.76 2 
Multiple-Choice 3.75 1.57 4 
Multiple-Choice + Transgender Identity 4.17 1.58 4 
Multiple-Choice + Assigned Sex at Birth 4.60 1.85 5 
Binary + Other 4.75 2.07 5 
Multiple-Choice + Transition History 5.42 1.63 6 
Binary 6.43 2.54 8 
Note. Higher numbers indicate lower ranking (i.e. 8 is the lowest possible ranking, and 1 is the highest).  
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Table 5 
 
Two-Way ANOVAs Testing Effects of Gender Identity and Transgender Identity on Perceptions 
of Questions (Study 1) 
Dependent Variable 
Gender Identity * 
Trans Identity 
Gender Identity Trans Identity 
 
 
Binary ns 
F (2, 422) = 256.65, 
p <.001 
F (2, 475) = 208.46, 
p <.001 
 
 
Binary + Other ns 
F (2, 421) = 16.35, 
p <.001 
F (2, 472) = 49.545, 
p <.001 
 
 
Multiple-Choice ns 
F (2, 422) = 4.44, 
p =.012 
F (2, 473) = 32.04, 
p <.001 
 
MC + Assigned Sex 
at Birth ns 
F (2, 421) = 20.61, 
p <.001 
F (2, 472) = 71.06, 
p <.001 
 
MC + Transgender 
Identity ns 
F (2, 422) = 5.83, 
p =.003 
F (2, 474) = 45.33, 
p <.001 
 
MC + 
Transition History ns 
F (2, 421) = 29.21, 
p <.001 
F (2, 469) = 73.34, 
p <.001 
 
 
Short Free-Text ns 
F (2, 418) = 8.23, 
p <.001 
F (2, 467) = 18.18, 
p <.001 
 
 
Long Free-Text ns ns 
F (2, 464) = 12.42, 
p <.001 
ns p >.05 
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Table 6 
 
Two-Way ANOVAs Testing Effects of Gender Identity and Transgender Identity on Rankings of 
Questions (Study 1) 
Dependent Variable 
Gender Identity * 
Trans Identity Gender Identity Trans Identity 
Binary ns 
F (2, 373) = 37.18, 
p <.001 
F (2, 421) = 47.85, 
p <.001 
Binary + Other ns 
F (2, 373) = 11.24, 
p <.001 
F (2, 421) = 15.79, 
p <.001 
Multiple-Choice ns 
F (2, 373) = 4.89, 
p =.008 
F (2, 421) = 3.20, 
p =.04 
MC + Assigned Sex at Birth 
F (4, 366) = 3.58, 
p = .007 
F (2, 373) = 3.39, 
p =.03 
F (2, 421) = 11.36, 
p <.001 
MC + Transgender Identity ns 
F (2, 373) = 10.55, 
p <.001 
F (2, 421) = 17.30, 
p <.001 
MC + Transition History ns ns ns 
Short Free-Text 
F (4, 366) = 3.84, 
p = .004 
F (2, 373) = 6.74, 
p <.001 
F (2, 421) = 18.09, 
p <.001 
Long Free-Text 
F (4, 366) = 4.13, 
p = .002 
F (2, 373) = 13.58, 
p <.001 
F (2, 421) = 18.08, 
p <.001 
Note. Higher numbers indicate lower ranking (i.e. 8 is the lowest possible ranking, and 1 is the 
highest). 
ns p >.05 
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Study 2. 
Question perceptions. 
Across all participants, the binary question was perceived as the least accurate and 
complete. The binary + other, multiple-choice + assigned sex at birth, and multiple-choice + 
transgender identity questions were perceived as more accurate and complete, and the multiple-
choice and short free-text questions were perceived as most accurate and complete (Table 3).   
The interaction of gender identity (man, woman, or non-binary/agender) and transgender 
identity (not transgender, transgender, or unclassified) did not have a significant effect on 
perceptions of any question (Table 7). However, there were main effects of both gender identity 
and transgender identity on perceptions of all questions (Table B12 and Table B13).  
Compared to men, non-binary/agender people perceived all questions as less accurate and 
complete. Women evaluated the multiple-choice, multiple-choice + assigned sex at birth, 
multiple-choice + transgender identity, and short free-text questions as more accurate and 
complete than men did, but evaluated the binary question as less accurate and complete. Women 
did not differ from men in their perceptions of the binary + other question.  
Compared to cisgender people, transgender people perceived all gender questions as less 
accurate and complete. Unclassified people also perceived all questions except multiple-choice + 
assigned sex at birth as less accurate and complete than cisgender people did. 
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Table 7 
 
Two-Way ANOVAs Testing Effects of Gender Identity and Transgender Identity on Perceptions 
of Questions (Study 2) 
Question Type 
Gender Identity * 
Trans Identity Gender Identity Trans Identity 
Binary ns 
F (2, 572) = 40.51, 
p <.001 
F (2, 583) = 33.27, 
p <.001 
Binary + Other ns 
F (2, 568) = 48.05, 
p <.001 
F (2, 578) = 38.68, 
p <.001 
Multiple-Choice ns 
F (2, 574) = 23.83, 
p <.001 
F (2, 583) = 16.14, 
p <.001 
MC + Assigned Sex at Birth ns 
F (2, 566) = 38.93, 
p <.001 
F (2, 575) = 40.09, 
p <.001 
MC + Transgender Identity ns 
F (2, 576) = 14.60, 
p <.001 
F (2, 588) = 15.81, 
p <.001 
Short Free-Text ns 
F (2, 573) = 20.53, 
p <.001 
F (2, 583) = 24.89, 
p <.001 
ns p >.05 
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Question rankings. 
In the clinic intake context and psychology experiment context, the binary and no 
question asked options were ranked the lowest, followed by the binary + other question. The next 
highest ranked options were the multiple-choice, multiple-choice + assigned sex at birth, and 
multiple-choice + transgender identity. The short free-text question was ranked most highly. 
In the dating website context, the binary and no question asked options were ranked the 
lowest. The next highest ranked options were the binary + other, multiple-choice, multiple-
choice + assigned sex at birth, and multiple-choice + transgender identity. The short free-text 
question was ranked most highly. 
In the job application context, the binary, multiple-choice + assigned sex at birth, and 
multiple-choice + transgender identity were ranked the lowest. The next highest ranked options 
were the binary + other and the multiple-choice question. The short free-text question and no 
question asked options were ranked most highly. 
The interaction of gender identity and transgender identity did not have a significant 
effect on rankings of any question in the psychology experiment, dating website, or job 
application contexts. In the clinic intake context only, the interaction had a significant effect on 
rankings of the multiple-choice + transgender identity question. Women who identified as 
transgender (M = 5.78, SE = 0.73, diff. = 1.66) ranked this question less highly (t (4, 472) = 2.26, 
p = .023). Similarly, non-binary/agender people who identified as transgender (M = 6.64, SE = 
0.81, diff. = 2.52) ranked this question less highly (t (4, 472) = 3.09, p = .002). 
Main effects of gender identity on question rankings by context. 
In the clinic intake and psychology experiment contexts, there was a main effect of 
gender identity for rankings of the binary, binary + other, multiple-choice, and multiple-choice + 
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transgender identity questions (Table B14 and B15). In both contexts, women and 
nonbinary/agender people gave lower rankings to the binary and binary + other questions, and 
higher rankings to the multiple-choice and multiple-choice + transgender identity questions than 
men did. 
In the dating website context, there was a main effect of gender identity for rankings of 
every question (Table B16). Women gave lower rankings to the binary and binary + other 
questions, and higher rankings to the multiple-choice, multiple-choice + assigned sex at birth, 
and multiple-choice + transgender identity than men did. Women and men did not differ in their 
rankings of the no question asked option. Non-binary/agender people gave lower rankings to the 
binary, binary + other, and multiple-choice + assigned sex at birth questions, and higher rankings 
to the multiple-choice, multiple-choice + transgender identity, short free-text, and no question 
asked option than men did. 
In the job application context, there was a main effect of gender identity for rankings of 
every question except multiple-choice + transgender identity (Table B17). Women gave lower 
rankings to the binary and binary + other questions, and higher rankings to the multiple-choice, 
short free-text, and no question asked option than men did. Women and men did not differ in 
their rankings of the multiple-choice + assigned sex at birth question. Non-binary/agender people 
gave lower rankings to the binary, binary + other, and multiple-choice + assigned sex at birth 
questions, and higher rankings to the multiple-choice, short free-text, and no question asked 
option than men did. 
Main effects of transgender identity on question rankings. 
In the clinic intake context, there was a main effect of transgender identity for rankings of 
the binary, binary + other, multiple-choice, and multiple-choice + transgender identity questions 
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(Table B18). Transgender people gave lower rankings to the binary and binary + other questions, 
and higher rankings to the multiple-choice and multiple-choice + transgender identity questions, 
than cisgender people did. Unclassified people gave lower rankings to the binary + other 
question, and higher rankings to the multiple choice question than cisgender people did, but 
otherwise did not differ from cisgender people in their rankings. 
In the psychology experiment context, there was a main effect of transgender identity for 
rankings of the binary and multiple-choice + transgender identity questions (Table B19). 
Transgender people gave lower rankings to the binary question and higher rankings to the 
multiple-choice + transgender identity question than cisgender people did. Unclassified people 
did not differ in their rankings from cisgender people. 
In the dating website context, there was a main effect of transgender identity for rankings 
of the binary, multiple-choice, multiple-choice + assigned sex at birth, short free-text, and no 
question asked questions (Table B20). Transgender people gave lower rankings to the binary and 
multiple-choice + assigned sex at birth questions, and higher rankings to the multiple-choice, 
short free-text, and no question asked questions than cisgender people did. Unclassified people 
gave lower rankings to the binary question than cisgender people did, but otherwise did not differ 
in their rankings from cisgender people. 
In the job application context, there was a main effect of transgender identity for rankings 
of the binary, multiple-choice, multiple-choice + assigned sex at birth, and no question asked 
questions (Table B21). Transgender people gave lower rankings to the binary and multiple-
choice + assigned sex at birth questions, and higher rankings to the multiple-choice and no 
question asked questions than cisgender people did. Unclassified people did not differ in their 
rankings from cisgender people. 
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Figure 1. Rankings of Gender Measures by Context (Study 2).  
Note. Higher numbers indicate lower ranking (i.e. 7 is the lowest possible ranking, and 1 is the highest). 
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Table 8 
 
Two-Way ANOVAs Testing Effects of Gender Identity and Transgender Identity on Rankings of 
Questions (Study 2) 
 
Question 
Gender Identity * 
Trans Identity Gender Identity Trans Identity 
C
li
n
ic
 I
n
ta
k
e 
C
o
n
te
x
t 
Binary ns 
F (2,482) = 24.01, 
p <.001 
F (2,490) = 8.31, 
p <.001 
Binary + Other ns 
F (2,482) = 17.33, 
p <.001 
F (2,490) = 6.15, 
p =.002 
Multiple-Choice ns 
F (2,482) = 6.62, 
p =.001 
F (2,490) = 5.21, 
p =.005 
 
MC + Assigned Sex at Birth ns ns ns 
MC + Transgender Identity 
F (4,472) = 2.71, 
p=.02 
F (2,482) = 11.41, 
p <.001 
F (2,490) = 5.88, 
p =.002 
 
Short Free-Text ns ns ns 
 
No Question Asked ns ns ns 
P
sy
ch
o
lo
g
y
 C
o
n
te
x
t 
Binary ns 
F (2,457) = 21.99, 
p <.001 
F (2,464) = 9.00, 
p =.002 
Binary + Other ns 
F (2,457) = 13.75, 
p <.001 ns 
Multiple-Choice ns 
F (2,457) = 10.27, 
p <.001 ns 
 
MC + Assigned Sex at Birth ns ns ns 
MC + Transgender Identity ns 
F (2,457) = 9.13, 
p <.001 
F (2,464) = 4.42, 
p =.01 
 
Short Free-Text ns ns ns 
 
No Question Asked ns ns ns 
D
at
in
g
 W
eb
si
te
 C
o
n
te
x
t Binary ns 
F (2,468) = 29.98, 
p <.001 
F (2,475) = 12.84, 
p <.001 
Binary + Other ns 
F (2,468) = 9.90, 
p <.001 ns 
Multiple-Choice ns 
F (2,468) = 16.64, 
p <.001 
F (2,475) = 12.24, 
p <.001 
MC + Assigned Sex at Birth ns 
F (2,468) = 12.60, 
p <.001 
F (2,475) = 8.23, 
p <.001 
MC + Transgender Identity ns 
F (2,468) = 3.50, 
p =.03 ns 
Short Free-Text ns 
F (2,468) = 11.71, 
p <.001 
F (2,475) = 3.42, 
p =.03 
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No Question Asked ns 
F (2,468) = 7.52, 
p <.001 
F (2,475) = 4.81, 
p =.008 
Jo
b
 A
p
p
li
ca
ti
o
n
 C
o
n
te
x
t 
Binary ns 
F (2,460) = 14.93, 
p <.001 
F (2,468) = 10.04, 
p <.001 
Binary + Other ns 
F (2,460) = 7.37, 
p <.001 ns 
Multiple-Choice ns 
F (2,460) = 8.23, 
p <.001 
F (2,468) = 6.17, 
p =.002 
MC + Assigned Sex at Birth ns 
F (2,460) = 9.60, 
p <.001 
F (2,468) = 10.52, 
p <.001 
 
MC + Transgender Identity ns ns ns 
Short Free-Text ns 
F (2,460) = 7.66, 
p <.001 ns 
No Question Asked ns 
F (2,460) = 13.33, 
p <.001 
F (2,468) = 10.61, 
p <.001 
ns p >.05 
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Discussion 
Do Gender Questions Cue Identity Safety and/or Identity Denial? 
These results suggest that wording of gender questions does serve as a cue to identity 
safety for transgender participants, and that seeing inclusive questions improves views of 
researchers and comfort with research. While there was no significant effect of question on any 
of the dependent variables for Study 1, all experimentally tested questions in Study 1 were at 
least nominally inclusive of transgender people. In Study 2, with the addition of the binary 
question as a baseline, there was a significant interaction of question and transgender identity for 
comfort with research. Transgender people were significantly less comfortable with research 
when they saw the binary question, and significantly more comfortable when they saw any other 
question, suggesting that the use of inclusive gender questions does serve as a cue to identity 
safety, increasing comfort with research and likely increasing rates of participation among 
transgender people. 
This increase in comfort is particularly important because the baseline for transgender 
participants was lower than for cisgender ones. Across questions, transgender participants felt 
less authentic, had lower public and private collective self-esteem, and had lower expectations of 
belonging and respect than cisgender participants. While there was no direct effect of question 
on collective self-esteem or authenticity, our measures of those constructs ask about general 
experiences, while the effect of a gender question seems likely to be quite localized to a 
situation. Transgender people also evaluated questions less positively across the board, perhaps 
suggesting that they are more sensitive to the wording of any given question, and thus less 
satisfied with any specific option. These results are consistent with the idea that transgender 
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people experience generally lower identity safety and feel less positively about their identities 
than cisgender people. 
Across participants, those who saw any question other than the binary perceived 
researchers as knowing and caring more about gender minorities, and had fewer negative 
emotions toward researchers. However, not all inclusive questions convey the same levels of 
identity safety. The binary + other question did not increase feelings of belonging, comfort with 
research, or positive emotions toward researchers relative to the binary question (presumably 
because of the identity denial they pose for non-binary and agender participants), but all other 
inclusive questions did. Those who saw any question other than the binary or binary + other also 
had higher expectations of belonging, higher comfort with research, and more positive emotions 
toward researchers. This pattern of results suggests that both cisgender and transgender 
participants notice the presence of inclusive questions, and use this to infer researchers’ views of 
gender minorities. Seeing inclusive gender questions improved perceptions of researchers and 
made both cisgender and transgender participants more comfortable with research. Thus, using 
inclusive gender questions in research may increase retention of both transgender participants 
and cisgender ones.  
What Effects Does Context Have on Perceptions of Gender Questions? 
 Study 1: Between-Participants Context Effects 
 Study 1 included context as an experimental variable. Overall, participants found the 
dating website to be less identity safe than the clinic intake or psychology experiment conditions, 
and perceived researchers in that condition as less caring and less informed about gender 
minorities. This is consistent with our previous findings that the salience of gender and 
motivation to be perceived accurately is heightened in dating contexts relative to clinic intake 
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contexts among cisgender people (Haupert, Murphy, & Smith, 2014). It seems that the way in 
which gender information is collected on dating websites acquires greater significance than in 
other contexts, presumably because information about gender is an essential component of dating 
for most people. 
In addition to the main effect of context, there was a significant interaction of context and 
transgender identity on perceptions of researcher caring; cisgender people in the dating website 
context perceived researchers as knowing and caring less about gender minorities, while 
transgender people in the dating context perceived researchers as knowing and caring more about 
gender minorities. This appears to be an area of misperception between cisgender and 
transgender people; cisgender people perceived these questions as relatively uninformed and 
uncaring towards transgender people, while transgender people themselves perceived the 
questions as relatively more inclusive and informed. Because all experimentally tested questions 
in Study 1 were at least nominally inclusive of transgender people, we interpret this to mean that 
transgender people value the opportunity to disclose their transgender status in a dating context, 
and thus perceive an inclusive question in that context particularly positively. In contrast, 
cisgender people seem to misperceive how transgender people will feel about disclosing their 
transgender status, and undervalue the opportunity to do this.   
The free-text comments about what participants disliked about each question also provide 
some support for this interpretation. For example, one cisgender woman (undergraduate student 
sample, dating context, multiple-choice + sex assigned at birth question) commented “Although 
you gave many options it may be controversial because trans individuals may not be comfortable 
with stating that on paperwork so they will still just choose male or female.” In contrast, a 
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participant who identified as “CAMAB17 genderqueer woman” (gender minority sample, dating 
context, multiple-choice question) commented “I was not allowed to select multiple boxes (e.g. 
genderqueer woman); I was not allowed to identify that I was transgender.” Another participant 
who identified as “Trans woman, currently unable to transition” (gender minority sample, dating 
context, binary + other question) commented  
“Why would questions of preoccupation and focus on gender crop up on a dating 
website?18 There is additionally no distinguishment between trans and cis identities. I 
would consider accounting for trans status to be an important and confidential feature of 
any dating site that respects gender minorities.” 
 
Taken together, this anecdotal evidence supports the quantitative findings and suggests that 
having some opportunity to disclose transgender status in a dating context is generally valuable 
to transgender people, and likely more valuable than cisgender people anticipate.  
 Study 2: Within-Participants Context Effects 
 In Study 2, we included context as a within-participants variable rather than an 
experimental variable, and added a job application context alongside the clinic intake, 
psychological experiment, and dating website contexts used in Study 1.  Across contexts and 
participants, the binary question was ranked lowest, and the short free-text question was ranked 
highest, consistent with our findings in Study 1.  This is unsurprising given the many 
objectionable features of the binary question (see Chapter 1) and the fully customizable nature of 
the short free-text question. As this was consistent across all groups and conditions, we do not 
discuss this finding further.  
 Clinic intake and psychology experiment contexts. 
                                                 
17 Coercively Assigned Male At Birth 
18 This is a reference to the questions about how much you are currently thinking about/focusing on your gender, 
which some participants believed were intended as part of the gender question itself in Study 1. 
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 The pattern of results in the clinic intake and psychology experiment contexts was quite 
similar. In both contexts, the multiple-choice, multiple-choice + assigned sex at birth, and 
multiple-choice + transgender identity questions were ranked about the same (and second only to 
the short free-text).  The binary + other question was ranked lower, and the no question asked 
option lower still. For both contexts, transgender participants ranked the binary question lower 
and the multiple-choice + transgender identity question higher than cisgender participants, and in 
the clinic context, transgender participants also ranked the binary + other question lower and the 
multiple-choice question higher than cisgender participants. Likewise, in both contexts women 
and non-binary/agender participants ranked the binary and binary + other questions lower and 
the multiple-choice and multiple-choice + transgender identity questions higher than men.  
These results suggest that in clinic and psychological contexts, participants generally 
want to disclose more information about their identities (as evidenced by the low rankings of no 
question asked, binary, and binary + other questions). The questions about transgender status 
also seem broadly acceptable to participants, with a question about transgender identity being 
particularly well-received by transgender participants. It may be that disclosing transgender 
status is perceived as lower-risk (or at least as having a better ratio of benefits to costs) in clinical 
and psychological contexts relative to other contexts, which may increase participants’ desire to 
disclose more detailed information about their identities.  
Dating website context. 
In the dating website context, the binary + other, multiple-choice, multiple-choice + sex 
assigned at birth, and multiple-choice + transgender identity questions were all ranked roughly 
equally, with no question asked and the binary question ranking lowest. Indeed, the binary + 
other question was regarded more positively in the dating context than in any other context. In 
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the dating context, transgender people ranked the multiple-choice, short free-text, and no 
question asked questions more highly, and the binary and multiple-choice + assigned sex at birth 
question lower than did cisgender people. Likewise, non-binary/agender people ranked the 
multiple-choice, short free-text, and no question asked questions more highly, and the binary, 
binary + other, and multiple-choice + assigned sex at birth question lower than did men. 
However, cisgender and transgender people did not differ in their rankings of the binary + other 
and multiple-choice + transgender identity questions.  
In combination with our findings from Study 1, these results suggest that many 
transgender people value the opportunity to disclose their transgender status in dating contexts, 
but that the type of question matters. Transgender people and non-binary/agender people 
preferred the multiple-choice + transgender identity question over the multiple-choice + assigned 
sex at birth question, presumably because the former emphasizes self-definition and identity 
instead of the physical body (see Chapter 2 for a full discussion). However, the higher ranking of 
the multiple-choice and no question asked options among transgender people relative to 
cisgender people also suggests that there are some transgender people who would prefer not to 
disclose their transgender status in dating contexts. This tension may reflect the fact that 
disclosing transgender status in a dating context carries a greater risk than in other contexts (i.e. 
of intimate partner violence; Dank et al., 2014; James et al., 2016) but also the possible benefit of 
avoiding dates with transphobic partners. Different people will weigh these risks and benefits 
differently, which in turn will influence their question preferences. For general use, we feel that 
these results most support the use of the multiple-choice + transgender identity question (which 
was highly ranked by both cisgender and transgender people of all genders), but they also 
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indicate the importance of allowing participants to opt out of answering the question by 
including a “prefer not to answer” option and/or making the entire question optional.  
Job application context. 
In the job application context, the short free-text question and no question asked options 
were rated most highly, followed by the binary + other and multiple-choice questions. The 
binary, multiple-choice + assigned sex at birth, and multiple-choice + transgender identity were 
ranked lowest. Transgender people gave lower rankings to the binary and multiple-choice + 
assigned sex at birth questions, and higher rankings to the multiple-choice and no question asked 
questions than cisgender people did. Similarly, non-binary/agender people gave lower rankings 
to the binary, binary + other, and multiple-choice + assigned sex at birth questions, and higher 
rankings to the multiple-choice, short free-text, and no question asked option than men did. 
The most highly-ranked questions in the job application context (short free-text and no 
question asked) permit participants to disclose the smallest amount of information about 
themselves, and the next most highly-ranked questions (binary + other and multiple-choice) 
allow expression of gender identity without asking about transgender identity in any way. 
Disclosing gender information, and especially transgender status, has the potential to result in 
employment discrimination, but very little potential benefit. Indeed, a job application that 
collects gender information poses sufficient risk of discrimination in most cases that an applicant 
who encounters one can file a sex discrimination lawsuit (EEOC, 2018). In this context, 
obviously, we would suggest not collecting gender information at all (at least not as part of the 
application itself). 
Which questions do participants prefer? 
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 As expected, across both studies, the short free-text question was perceived as most 
accurate and complete, and ranked highest regardless of participant gender, transgender status, or 
context. It was closely followed by the multiple-choice question, and the binary + other, 
multiple-choice + assigned sex at birth, and multiple-choice + transgender identity questions 
were next most liked. The binary question was perceived as least accurate and complete, and 
ranked lowest regardless of participant gender, transgender status, or context in both studies.  
Preferences did differ between participants. In Study 2, overall, non-binary/agender 
people gave lower rankings to the binary and binary + other questions, and higher rankings to the 
multiple-choice and multiple-choice + transgender identity questions compared to men. 
Likewise, across contexts, transgender people gave lower rankings to the binary question than 
cisgender people did. This further strengthens our case that the binary and binary + other 
questions are not good choices for researchers in any context. The frequent similarity in response 
patterns between women and non-binary participants relative to men (e.g. women, like non-
binary people, evaluated the multiple-choice, multiple-choice + assigned sex at birth, multiple-
choice + transgender identity, and short free-text questions as more accurate and complete than 
men did, but evaluated the binary question as less accurate and complete) may also suggest 
opportunities for coalition-building among women and non-binary/agender people; both groups 
face discrimination and prejudice on the basis of gender, and have more reason than men to be 
concerned by the way researchers collect and use this information. 
 The two measures of transgender status (multiple-choice + assigned sex at birth and 
multiple-choice + transgender identity) were usually ranked comparably by cisgender people, but 
transgender people and non-binary/agender people preferred the multiple-choice + transgender 
identity question in most contexts. As we suggested in Chapter 2, this makes sense given that a 
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question about transgender identity empowers participants to describe themselves as they choose, 
while a question about assigned sex at birth privileges the physical body and leaves attributions 
about its meaning to the researcher.  
Which questions should researchers use? 
As discussed in previous chapters, we do not recommend the binary question for use in 
any context because of its many theoretical issues. This chapter also presents evidence that the 
binary question poses a risk of identity threat for transgender and non-binary people. For 
different reasons, we do not recommend the short free-text question. While it is very well-liked 
and creates a sense of identity safety, coding responses is challenging and time-consuming, and 
ultimately removes agency from participants and places it on researchers (see Chapter 3). 
Therefore, we do not recommend either the binary question or the short free-text question.  
When information about transgender status is not needed, these results provide the 
strongest support for use of the multiple-choice question. It was very well-liked across 
participants and contexts in both studies, and appeared to create a greater sense of identity safety 
among participants than the binary or binary + other questions. In Study 2, participants who were 
experimentally assigned to see the multiple-choice question had higher expectations of 
belonging, higher comfort with research, and lower negative emotions toward researchers than 
those who saw the binary. In contrast, those who saw the binary + other question did not differ 
from those who saw the binary question on those measures.  
When information about transgender status is necessary, we suggest using the multiple-
choice + transgender identity question. The rankings of the multiple-choice + transition history 
question in Study 1 were low enough that we did not include it in Study 2 at all. The multiple-
choice + assigned sex at birth and multiple-choice + transgender identity questions did not differ 
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in the identity safety they cued, and both were somewhat less well-liked than the multiple-choice 
question alone. However, while cisgender people and men ranked the two questions similarly, 
transgender people and non-binary/agender people ranked the multiple-choice + transgender 
identity question more highly in most contexts. Given that the multiple-choice + transgender 
identity question also yields more readily-usable results (especially for non-binary/agender 
people) than the multiple-choice + assigned sex at birth question (as shown in Chapter 3), we 
recommend the multiple-choice + transgender identity question for general use. That said, the 
multiple-choice + assigned sex at birth question also performed well, and may be still be useful, 
particularly in clinical contexts. 
Alongside all of these questions, researchers should explain their considerations in 
choosing this particular question (e.g. number of groups for statistical analyses), and what 
exactly they will use the information for (e.g. Will it be used simply to ensure a diverse 
participant pool, or will responses between groups be compared? Are researchers more interested 
in bodies or social perceptions?). As described in Chapter 1, this information helps participants 
give researchers the information they are seeking, and reduces the potential for 
miscommunication. It may even serve as another cue to identity safety, helping gender minority 
participants to see that researchers have considered their situation and care about their responses.  
Conclusion 
We recommend the multiple-choice and multiple-choice + transgender identity questions 
for general use, as they were identity safe and well-liked across contexts, particularly for 
transgender and non-binary/agender participants. They also meet our other considerations for 
simplicity of collection and analysis, as discussed in Chapter 3. In Chapter 5, we present 
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evidence for the validity of the multiple-choice question (tested with and without the transgender 
identity question). 
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Chapter 5: Validating Inclusive Gender Identity Measures 
In Chapter 3, I discussed the process of data cleaning for each of several different gender 
identity and transgender status measures, and recommended the multiple-choice gender identity 
measure and transgender identity measure as having high sensitivity, content validity, and 
generalizability while remaining comparatively simple to administer and analyze. In Chapter 4, I 
presented experimental evidence about the risk of identity threat posed by each of these gender 
identity and transgender status measures, and identified the multiple-choice gender identity 
measure (with or without a transgender identity measure) as the least threatening across contexts 
and most liked by a wide range of participants (that is, with the best consequential validity). In 
this chapter, I present evidence from two studies which examined the substantive validity, 
generalizability, and external validity of the multiple-choice gender identity measure, alongside 
the transgender identity measure.  
Types of Validity 
To achieve acceptance in psychological research, the proposed gender identity measure 
needs to be theory-grounded and rigorously validated.  Researchers are unlikely to replace the 
current, familiar binary gender question with the proposed gender identity measure unless it has 
significant advantages in terms of precision or is much better at predicting outcomes of interest.  
The next sections describe several different types of validity and the evidence I will present 
about each type. 
Substantive Validity 
Substantive validity is typically established by using a measure to distinguish criterion 
and contrast groups, to predict behavior over time, or to demonstrate prediction or moderation of 
another process (John & Benet-Martinez, 2000).  I argue that gender identity is conceptually 
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most related to the way a person views the relationship between themselves and a given gender 
group, and thus need not perfectly predict gendered appearance, stereotypical behavior, or other 
more distant gendered constructs. Likewise, while a measure’s substantive validity is frequently 
established through its ability to distinguish criterion and contrast groups, in the current situation 
criterion and contrast groups are themselves already distinguished by imperfect methods. The 
general human tendency is to immediately and uncontrollably perceive individuals as either men 
or women, and subsequently to regard these perceptions as objective even in the face of 
substantial contradictory evidence and/or conflicting perceptions from other people (e.g. Kessler 
& McKenna, 1978). For this reason, there may be some discrepancies between results on this 
measure and gender criteria (e.g. physical appearance, sex on passport) which are not attributable 
to a lack of substantive validity. Nonetheless, there are several behaviors and processes which 
are clearly related exclusively or primarily to identity that may be useful for demonstrating the 
substantive validity of the multiple-choice gender identity question.  
Evidence from self-definition and self-investment. 
Leach et al. (2008) subdivide group identity into self-definition (a subjective assessment 
of the degree of similarity between the members of a given gender group and the self, and 
homogeneity of the available gender groups in the culture), and self-investment (a subjective 
assessment of the centrality of a given gender group to one’s sense of self and of the satisfaction 
and solidarity one feels in relation to that gender group). In Study 1, I test the ability of each 
gender identity question to predict the levels of self-definition and self-investment participants 
feel with the groups “men” and “women” using the Leach et al. (2008) Multi-Dimensional Social 
Identity Scale. For example, if men show higher self-definition and self-investment in the group 
“men” than people of other genders, this will provide evidence of substantive validity. I also 
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measured identification with each of several different gender groups using versions of a single-
item social identification scale designed by Postmes et al. (2013).  
Evidence from identity denial. 
The experience of identity denial should also theoretically be influenced by gender 
identity. McLemore (2014) has shown that transgender people who experience identity denial in 
the form of misgendering (i.e. being treated by others as a gender other than the one with which 
they identify) feel stigmatized and less authentic as a result. Generalizing from this finding, we 
can presume that participants who are described by pronouns inconsistent with their gender 
identities (e.g. a woman being called “he,” a man being called “she,” or a genderqueer person 
being called “he” or “she”) will feel discomfort. However, participants who are described with 
identity-consistent pronouns will not experience identity denial and thus should not report 
discomfort. Similarly, we expect that participants who are required to select identity-denying 
gender options on official forms will experience discomfort. Many transgender people must do 
this in order to access needed resources (e.g. if a person’s sex on health insurance forms does not 
match their claim, the bill may be denied). In Study 2, I used five items adapted from the Multi-
Gender Identity Questionnaire (Joel et al., 2014) to measure this feeling of identity denial in 
relation to others’ pronoun use and the collection of gender information on administrative forms 
(e.g. In the past 12 months, have you been upset when other people used female pronouns 
(she/her) to refer to you?).  
Generalizability 
I provided evidence about the reliability component of the generalizability of the 
multiple-choice gender identity question in Chapter 3 (i.e. test-retest reliability, equivalence, and 
internal consistency), and some limited evidence about generalizability across contexts (e.g. 
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psychological research, health care intake forms) in Chapter 4. In this chapter, I consider the 
generalizability of the multiple-choice gender identity question across participants.  
John and Benet-Martinez (2000) suggest that there is no necessary or sufficient level of 
generalizability which a measure must achieve to be valid; rather, there are valid and invalid 
degrees of generalization from a particular measure. The designer of a given measure must 
therefore carefully consider the scope of the construct being studied, as well as the measure’s 
intended use, when determining what level of generalizability is appropriate. The considerations 
involved in making this decision are often referred to as the bandwidth-fidelity tradeoff, which 
states that measures of broad constructs can predict a wide range of outcomes with low fidelity, 
while measures of narrow constructs can predict a narrow range of outcomes with much higher 
fidelity. For example, political ideology (liberal vs. conservative) is a broad construct because it 
predicts many outcomes with a low level of precision (there is substantial variation within each 
category). In contrast, a measure of attitudes toward tax cuts is a narrow construct which predicts 
specific behaviors related to tax cuts (e.g. voting decisions on a referendum) with much greater 
precision, but may not accurately predict anything about attitudes toward immigration. 
In the context of gender questions, the ubiquitous binary gender question clearly 
measures (albeit imperfectly) an extremely broad construct, and can thus predict a wide range of 
outcomes. However, I argue that the fidelity of this question is low; there is a large amount of 
variation within each group. In contrast, the multiple-choice gender identity measure is designed 
to capture a relatively narrow construct with higher fidelity, and we feel that it is only 
appropriate to predict a limited range of outcomes (i.e. those related specifically to identity) and 
less appropriate to predict gender presentation, gender roles, etc.  
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That said, I do have a few specific predictions about the intended generalizability of the 
proposed measure which will need to be tested. The measure should be appropriate for use with 
both cisgender and transgender participants, meaning that conclusions drawn from cisgender 
participants’ responses to the proposed measure should also be applicable to transgender people, 
and vice versa (see the sections on substantive validity and external validity for examples of such 
outcomes). The measure was also designed to capture both binary and non-binary gender 
identities, so both types of gender identities should have similar implications for other outcomes 
related to identity. To assess these, I included measures of gender centrality, gender 
identification, and emotions toward one’s own gender group, which I expect to be similar within 
gender identities regardless of trans status. 
External Validity 
 External validity can be demonstrated by showing that a measure relates to other 
previously-established measures in the ways that would be predicted by theory. Thus, a measure 
with high external validity should be highly related to theoretically similar measures (e.g. other 
measures of the same construct) and mostly unrelated to theoretically dissimilar measures. In 
addition, an externally valid measure should be able to predict conceptually-related behaviors 
and outcomes.   
I expect to find significantly different patterns of responding by gender identity (and in 
certain cases by transgender identity) to the Multi-Gender Identity Questionnaire (Joel et al., 
2014) and my self-created Non-Binary Experiences Scale. For example, I expect both men and 
women to be more likely to feel like, use the pronouns of, and wear clothing consistent with their 
genders. Similarly, I expect both non-binary and agender people to be significantly less likely to 
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feel like men or like women, more likely to feel like neither a man nor a woman, more likely to 
use gender-neutral pronouns, and more likely to endorse non-binary experiences.  
Overview 
I present evidence from two studies about the substantive validity, generalizability, and 
external validity of the multiple-choice gender identity measure, alongside the transgender 
identity measure. Substantive validity evidence comes from self-definition, self-investment, and 
experiences of identity denial. Generalizability evidence comes from gender centrality, gender 
identification, and emotions toward one’s own gender group, and external validity evidence 
comes from pronoun usage, clothing choices, feeling like a man or woman, and endorsement of 
non-binary experiences.  
Method 
This chapter and Chapters 3 and 4 describe results from different parts of the same two 
studies (each sampling undergraduates and self-identified gender minorities for four total 
samples). For a detailed description of the sample, the gender demographic measures, and the 
coding techniques used for each one, see Chapter 3.  
 After answering the gender demographic questions and indicating their perceptions of 
those questions and the researchers who asked them (see Chapters 3 and 4), participants 
completed a series of measures designed to provide preliminary evidence of the validity of the 
multiple-choice gender identity question (when paired with the transgender identity question). 
Materials 
Gender Identity Measures. 
In both studies, participants completed multiple-choice gender identity questions and a 
transgender identity measure (Figures 1 and 2). The following analyses use the condensed 
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multiple-choice gender identities and transgender identities (see Table 1 for frequencies). For 
details about how these measures were constructed, see Chapter 2; for details about how they 
were coded, see Chapter 3. 
Table 1 
 
Frequencies of condensed multiple-choice gender identity and condensed transgender identity in 
Study 1 and Study 2 
 Condensed Multiple-Choice Gender Identity 
Condensed 
Transgender Identity 
Men Women Non-Binary/Agender 
Study 1 Study 2 Study 1 Study 2 Study 1 Study 2 
Not Transgender 99 221 93 263 1 11 
Transgender 38 12 42 12 133 35 
Unclassified 7 9 7 6 4 7 
 
 
Figure 1. Multiple-choice gender identity question and transgender identity question used in 
Study 1. 
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Figure 2. Multiple-choice gender identity question and transgender identity question used in 
Study 2. 
 
Dependent Variables. 
Substantive Validity – Self-Definition and Self-Investment. 
Multi-Component Social Identity Scale (Leach et al., 2008; Study 1).19 
We adapted the Multi-Component Social Identity Scale (Leach et al., 2008) to ask about 
identity as a man and identity as a woman. These questions are as follows:  
 I feel a bond with [men/women]. 
 I feel solidarity with [men/women]. 
 I feel committed to [men/women].  
 I am glad to be a [man/woman]. 
 I think that [men/women] have a lot to be proud of. 
 It is pleasant to be a [man/woman]. 
 Being a [man/woman] gives me a good feeling. 
 I often think about the fact that I am a [man/woman].  
 The fact that I am a [man/woman] is an important part of my identity. 
 Being a [man/woman] is an important part of how I see myself. 
 I have a lot in common with the average [man/woman]. 
                                                 
19 Participants were also asked to provide comments about the group identification questions. 
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 I am similar to the average [man/woman]. 
 [Men/women] have a lot in common with each other.  
 [Men/women] are very similar to each other.  
 
All participants answered all questions about identity as a man and all questions about 
identity as a woman in order to test the ability of each gender demographic question to predict 
identity as a man, woman, both, or neither (in line with Tate, Youssef, & Bettergarcia, 2014). 
However, the original Multi-Component Social Identity Scale is designed to be used only with 
participants who have already self-categorized into a particular group, so the wording of certain 
questions might have been confusing to participants. For example, the item “Being a man is an 
important part of how I see myself” might be confusing to women. In an attempt to address this, 
we provided participants with a “Not applicable” option in addition to the original 7-point Likert 
scales (1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree) used by Leach et al. (2008). All responses of 
“Not applicable” were omitted from these calculations.  Both scales had high reliability (identity 
as man α = .93; identity as woman α = .92) and the items were averaged into composite scores 
(identity as man M = 3.8, SD = 1.6; identity as woman M = 4.5, SD = 1.4).  
Single-Item Social Identification Scales (Postmes et al., 2013; Study 1 Gender Minority 
Sample).  
We assessed identification with each of several different gender groups using versions of 
a single-item social identification scale designed by Postmes et al. (2013). Agreement with the 
statement “I identify with [my group]” captures most of the variance in the self-investment 
dimension of the Multi-Component Social Identity scale developed by Leach et al. (2008), as 
well as some of the variance in the self-definition dimension, making this single item a concise 
way to assess general identification with a group. Participants indicated their agreement with the 
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following seven statements about their identification with various gender groups on 7-point 
Likert scales (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree).  
 I identify with gender minorities (M = 5.9 , SD = 1.4) 
 I identify with transgender people (M = 5.4, SD = 1.7) 
 I identify with gender non-conforming people (M = 5.9, SD = 1.5) 
 I identify with people with non-binary genders (M = 5.8, SD = 1.7) 
 I identify with men (M = 3.67, SD = 2.1) 
 I identify with women (M = 4.46, SD = 1.8) 
 I identify with cisgender people (M = 2.74, SD = 1.8) 
This measure was included in the survey that was distributed to gender minority participants as a 
pilot test, and was omitted from the survey completed by the student sample. 
Identity as a Man/Woman/Non-Binary Person (adapted from the Multi-Gender Identity 
Questionnaire, Joel et al., 2014; Study 2). 
These questions were adapted from the Multi-Gender Identity Questionnaire (Joel et al., 
2014) to be more inclusive of non-binary gender identities. All participants answered all 
questions regardless of their gender identity or transgender status. Questions were prefaced with 
“In the past 12 months, have you…” and answered on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = Always, 5 = 
Never). We first asked about identity as a man and identity as a woman (8 questions): 
 ...thought of yourself as a [man/woman]?  
 ...felt more like a [man than like a woman/woman than like a man]? 
 ...felt that you did not have a lot in common with [men/women]? 
 ...felt that it is/it would be better for you to live as a [man than as a woman/woman 
than as a man]? 
 
We then asked about identity as a non-binary person (4 questions): 
 ...felt somewhere in between a woman and a man? 
 ...felt that you are neither a man nor a woman? 
 ...felt that you have nothing in common with men and nothing in common with 
women? 
 ...felt at times more like a man and at times more like a woman? 
 
  
171 
 
We aggregated the four items about identity as a man (M = 2.8, SD = 1.2, α = 0.7), woman (M = 
2.9, SD = 1.2, α = 0.75), and non-binary person (M = 1.5, SD = 0.9, α = 0.84), respectively, to 
create a composite score for each identity. 
Generalizability 
Gender Centrality (Leach et al., 2008; Study 1 Gender Minority Sample). 
A general measure of gender centrality was adapted from the centrality subscale of the 
Multi-Component Social Identity Scale (Leach et al., 2008) to avoid specifying a particular 
gender. It included three items measured on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly 
agree). 
 I often think about my gender. 
 My gender is an important part of my identity. 
 My gender is an important part of how I see myself. 
 
These three questions had acceptable reliability (α =.84), so they were averaged into a single 
composite score (M = 5.8, SD = 1.3). This measure was included in the survey that was 
distributed to gender minority participants as a pilot test, and was omitted from the survey 
completed by the student sample. 
Gender Identification (Egan & Perry, 2001; Study 2). 
Egan and Perry (2001) designed a multidimensional gender measure explicitly for use in 
interviews with children. Their scale had five dimensions: knowledge of which gender category 
one belongs to, feelings of typicality for that gender and contentedness with that gender 
assignment, felt pressure to behave according to gender stereotypes, and bias toward one’s own 
gender group. While their original measure was designed for use only with participants who had 
already been classified as girls or as boys, we modified their measure to be answerable by a 
person of any gender. We further adapted the format to be comparable to the other measures 
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used in our survey. Half of participants saw the positive wordings of items 1, 2, and 5 and the 
negative wordings of items 3, 4, and 6 (version 1), while the other half of participants saw the 
inverse (version 2). Participants were asked to indicate their level of agreement with each of the 
following statements on a 7-point Likert scale (1= Strongly disagree, 7= Strongly agree).  
When you see the words “my gender,” think about your gender identity, regardless of the 
way you are perceived by others. 
1. I feel that my personality is similar to the personalities of most members of my 
gender/ I don’t feel that my personality is similar to the personalities of most 
members of my gender.  
2. I feel I fit in with other members of my gender/ I don’t feel that I fit in with other 
members of my gender. 
3. I feel I’m just like all other members of my gender/ I don’t feel I’m just like all other 
members of my gender. 
4. I feel that the things I like to do in my spare time are similar to what most members of 
my gender like to do in their spare time/ I don’t feel that the things I like to do in my 
spare time are similar to what most members of my gender like to do in their spare 
time.  
5. I feel that the kinds of things I’m good at are similar to what most members of my 
gender are good at / I don’t feel that the kinds of things I’m good at are similar to 
what most members of my gender are good at.  
6. I think I am a good example of my gender/ I don’t think I am a good example of my 
gender. 
 
All negatively worded items (beginning with “I don’t”) were reverse-coded and the scores were 
aggregated into a single composite variable. Scores on each version were very similar (version 1: 
M = 4.9, SD = 1.2; version 2: M = 5.2, SD = 1.1), and reliabilities were high for both version 1 
(α= .83) and version 2 (α = .81).  
Emotions toward Gender Groups (Studies 1 and 2). 
We asked participants to indicate the degree to which they feel each of four positive 
(Pride, Satisfaction, Compassion, and Empathy) and six negative (Anger, Irritation, Anxiety, 
Fear, Guilt, and Shame) emotions toward each of seven gender groups (in Study 1) or toward 
their own gender group (in Study 1 and 2). For each group, the items for positive emotions and 
negative emotions were averaged into composite scores (all α >.87 for positive emotions, all α 
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>.92; see Table C1). Due to space concerns, we only analyzed the emotions toward one’s own 
gender group here.  
Substantive Validity. 
 Identity Denial (adapted from the Multi-Gender Identity Questionnaire (Joel et al., 2014; 
Study 2). 
 These questions were adapted from the Multi-Gender Identity Questionnaire (Joel et al., 
2014) to be more inclusive of non-binary gender identities. All participants answered all 
questions regardless of their gender identity or transgender status. Unless otherwise specified, 
questions were prefaced with “In the past 12 months, have you…” and answered on a 5-point 
Likert scale (1 = Always, 5 = Never). These items ask participants how they feel about the 
pronouns others use for them (3 questions) and about reporting a gender on official forms (2 
questions). In addition to the 5-point Likert scale, we included a “Not relevant” option to 
accommodate participants who have never had the experience of being referred to by those 
pronouns / been required to report a particular gender on official forms. Participants who 
selected “Not relevant” were excluded from analyses on these questions. 
 ...been upset when other people used female pronouns (she/her) to refer to you? 
 ...been upset when other people used male pronouns (he/him) to refer to you? 
 ...been upset when other people used gender-neutral pronouns (e.g. they/them, ze/hir, 
etc.) to refer to you? 
 ...been bothered by having to check the box [‘F’ for female/ ‘M’ for male] on official 
forms (e.g. driver’s license, passport)?  
 ...been bothered by the fact that any gender information is requested on official 
forms?  
 
External Validity. 
Pronoun Use (adapted from the Multi-Gender Questionnaire, Joel et al., 2014; Study 2). 
We asked participants about which pronouns they use to refer to themselves. These 
questions were adapted from the Multi-Gender Identity Questionnaire (Joel et al., 2014) to be 
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more inclusive of non-binary gender identities. All participants answered all questions regardless 
of their gender identity or transgender status. Questions were prefaced with “In the past 12 
months, have you…” and answered on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = Always, 5 = Never). 
 ...used male pronouns (he/him) to refer to yourself?  
 ...used female pronouns (she/her) to refer to yourself?  
 ...used gender-neutral pronouns (e.g. they/them, ze/hir, etc.) to refer to yourself? 
 
Clothing Choices (adapted from the Multi-Gender Questionnaire, Joel et al., 2014; Study 
2). 
We asked participants about what types of clothing they typically purchase and wear. All 
participants answered all questions regardless of their gender identity or transgender status. 
Questions were prefaced with “In the past 12 months, have you…” and answered on a 5-point 
Likert scale (1 = Always, 5 = Never). 
 ...when you went into a department store to buy yourself clothing, did you shop mostly 
in a department labeled for [men/women]? 
 ...have you worn the clothes typically associated with [men/women]? 
 
We combined the two items about men’s clothing (M = 2.9, SD = 1.6, α = 0.95) and the two 
items about women’s clothing (M = 3.0, SD = 1.7, α = 0.97) into composite scores to simplify 
analysis. 
Additional Measures Not Analyzed. 
 
Multi-Gender Identity Questionnaire (adapted from Joel et al., 2014; Study 2). 
In addition to the measures already described, our adaptation of the Multi-Gender Identity 
Questionnaire included 10 questions about participants’ feelings about being a man and being a 
woman (5-point Likert scales, 1= Always, 5 = Never, and a Not Relevant option), four questions 
about their experiences of physical dysphoria (5-point Likert scales, 1= Always, 5 = Never, and a 
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Not Relevant option), and two questions about whether they would like to be reborn as a man or 
a woman (Options were No, To some extent, To a large extent, Not Sure, and Don’t Care).  
Feelings About Being a Man/Woman 
 In the past 12 months, have you felt pressured by others to be a ‘proper’ [man/woman]? 
 In the past 12 months, have you felt that you were not a ‘real’ [man/woman]? 
 In the past 12 months, have you felt satisfied being a [man/woman]? 
 In the past 12 months, have you felt that you have to work at being a [man/woman]? 
 In the past 12 months, have you had the wish or desire to be a [man/woman]? 
 
Experiences of Physical Dysphoria 
 
 In the past 12 months, have you disliked your body because it is [male/female]?  
 In the past 12 months, have you disliked your body because of its primary sex 
characteristics (e.g. genitals)? 
 In the past 12 months, have you disliked your body because of its secondary sex 
characteristics (e.g. chest shape, hair growth patterns)?  
 
Desire to Be Reborn as a Man/Woman 
 If you could be reborn, would you like to be born as a [man/woman]? 
 
These 16 questions were included because they were part of the original scale, but as they 
were not directly relevant to our goal of validating a gender identity question, we did not analyze 
them further.  
Gender Essentialism (Study 2) 
We included a newly created 28-item gender essentialism scale with the other dependent 
variables to collect pilot data for scale construction and modification (see Chapter 6).  
Transgender Congruence Scale (Kozee et al., 2012) and Gender Identity Reflection and 
Rumination Scale (Bauerband & Galupo, 2014) 
The Transgender Congruence Scale and Gender Identity Reflection and Rumination Scale 
were included as a preliminary attempt to understand the experience of dysphoria among non-
binary and agender participants, a question which is outside the scope of this dissertation. 
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Participants completed the 12-item Transgender Congruence Scale developed by Kozee et al. 
(2012) using a 7-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree). This scale was 
designed for use with a transgender population and assesses the level of congruence felt between 
one’s physical appearance and one’s gender identity (e.g. My outward appearance represents my 
gender identity), as well as general comfort with one’s gender identity (e.g. I have accepted my 
gender identity). Scores had high reliability (α =.94), and were aggregated into a single 
composite score (M = 5.8, SD = 1.2).  
Participants completed the 15-item Gender Identity Reflection and Rumination Scale 
(Bauerband & Galupo, 2014) using a 4-point Likert scale to indicate how often they have 
particular thoughts about their gender identity (1 = Almost never, 4 = Almost Always). This 
scale measures the frequency of rumination on topics related to one’s gender identity (e.g. Think 
about things I cannot do because of my gender identity; Try to figure out what others think about 
my gender identity). Scores had high reliability (α =.95), and were aggregated into a single 
composite score (M = 1.6, SD = 0.6). 
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Results 
 
For all comparisons, we used condensed versions of the multiple-choice gender identity 
(only men, women, and non-binary/agender participants; other responses were dropped for this 
analysis) and transgender identity questions (Transgender, Not Transgender, Don’t Know/No 
Answer). For details about the construction of these variables, refer to Chapter 3. 
Evidence for Substantive Validity 
Evidence for Substantive Validity from Self-Definition and Self-Investment. 
Multi-Component Social Identity Scale (Leach et al. 2008) – Study 1. 
The interaction of gender identity and transgender identity had a significant effect on 
identity as a man (F (4, 385) = 3.01, p = .018) and identity as a woman (F (4, 391) = 3.07, p = 
.017). There was also a main effect of gender identity on identity as a man (F (2, 392) = 60.04, p 
<.001) and as a woman (F (2, 398) = 64.08, p <.001), and a main effect of transgender identity 
on identity as a man (F (2, 437) = 66.65, p <.001) and as a woman (F (2, 443) = 27.89, p <.001). 
Means comparisons are presented in Table C1. 
Overall, men identified more as men than did women or non-binary/agender people, 
women identified more as women than did men or non-binary/agender people, and non-
binary/agender people identified less as men or women than did men or women.  
Cisgender men identified the most as men, followed by cisgender women, transgender 
men, and men who did not know whether they identified as transgender. Transgender women, 
women who did not know whether they identified as transgender, and all non-binary people 
identified least as men. Cisgender and transgender women identified the most as women, 
followed by cisgender men and all those who did not know whether they identified as 
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transgender. Transgender and non-transgender non-binary/agender people identified least as 
women. 
 
Figure 3. Mean identity as a man and mean identity as a woman (Leach et al., 2008) by gender 
identity and transgender identity (Study 1). 
 
Single-Item Social Identification Scales (Postmes et al. 2013) – Study 1. 
These measures were only included in the gender minority survey. We could not analyze 
the interaction between gender identity and transgender identity for these variables because of an 
empty cell (there were no men in the sample who did not know whether they identified as 
transgender), so we report only the main effects.  
Identification with men.  
There was a main effect of gender identity (F (2, 222) = 55.66, p <.001) on identification 
with men, but no effect of transgender identity. Men identified more as men than did women or 
non-binary/agender people. 
Identification with women.  
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There was a main effect of gender identity (F (2, 224) = 48.17, p <.001) on identification 
with women, but no effect of transgender identity. Women identified more as women than did 
men or non-binary/agender people. 
Identification with non-binary people.  
There was a main effect of gender identity (F (2, 223) = 54.62, p <.001) and transgender 
identity (F (2, 267) = 28.28, p <.001) on identification with non-binary people. Non-
binary/agender people identified more as non-binary than did men or women, but transgender 
men and all women regardless of transgender identity identified with non-binary people next 
most strongly, while cisgender men had the lowest levels of identification with non-binary 
people. 
Identification with gender non-conforming people. 
There was a main effect of gender identity (F (2, 224) = 30.71, p <.001) and transgender 
identity (F (2, 268) = 29.52, p <.001) on identification with gender non-conforming people. Non-
binary people, regardless of transgender identity, identified most strongly with gender non-
conforming people. Transgender men and all women regardless of transgender identity identified 
next most strongly with gender non-conforming people. Cisgender men had the lowest levels of 
identification with gender non-conforming people. 
Identification with gender minorities.  
There was a main effect of gender identity (F (2, 224) = 8.70, p <.001) and transgender 
identity (F (2, 268) = 37.59, p <.001) on identification with gender minorities. All non-
binary/agender people and all transgender people identified most strongly with gender 
minorities, followed by cisgender women and women who did not know whether they identified 
as transgender. Cisgender men had the lowest levels of identification with gender minorities. 
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Identification with transgender people. 
There was no effect of gender identity on identification with transgender people, but there 
was a main effect of transgender identity (F (2, 267) = 27.92, p <.001).  All transgender people 
and all non-binary/agender people (regardless of transgender identity) identified more strongly 
with transgender people than cisgender men, cisgender women, or women who did not know 
whether they identified as transgender.  
Identification with cisgender people.   
There was a main effect of gender identity (F (2, 223) = 6.61, p =.002) and transgender 
identity (F (2, 267) = 15.72, p <.001) on identification with cisgender people. Cisgender men and 
cisgender women identified most strongly with cisgender people. All other categories identified 
less strongly with cisgender people. 
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Figure 4. Mean identification with men, women, and non-binary people (Postmes et al., 2013) by 
gender identity and transgender identity (Study 1). 
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Figure 5. Mean identification with gender non-conforming people, gender minorities, 
transgender people, and cisgender people (Postmes et al., 2013) by gender identity and 
transgender identity (Study 1). 
 
  
  
183 
 
Identity as Man/Woman/Non-Binary – Study 2. 
The interaction of gender identity and transgender identity had a significant effect on 
identity as a man (F (4, 544) = 3.47, p =.008) and as a woman (F (4, 540) = 2.86, p =.023), but 
not on identity as a non-binary person.  Men who were unclassified on the transgender identity 
measure identified less as men than transgender or non-transgender men, and unclassified 
women identified less as women than transgender or non-transgender women. Transgender and 
non-transgender men did not differ in identification as men, and transgender and non-transgender 
women did not differ in identification as women. 
There was a main effect of gender identity on identity as a man (F (2, 554) = 582.04, p 
<.001), woman (F (2, 550) = 533.34, p <.001), and non-binary person (F (2, 550) = 218.37, p 
<.001). Men identified more as men than did women or non-binary/agender people. Women 
identified more as women than did men or non-binary/agender people. Non-binary/agender 
people identified more as non-binary than did women or men. 
There was no main effect of transgender identity on identity as a man or as a woman, but 
there was a main effect of transgender identity on identity as a non-binary person (F (2, 559) = 
118.89, p <.001). Transgender and unclassified people identified more as non-binary people than 
non-transgender people. 
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Figure 6. Mean identity as a man, a woman, or a non-binary person by gender identity and 
transgender identity (Study 2). 
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Evidence of Substantive Validity from Identity Denial. 
Discomfort with Mispronouning 
The interaction of gender identity and transgender identity had a significant effect on 
being upset when others use he/him pronouns (F (4, 305) = 2.98, p =.019), and she/her pronouns 
for you (F (4, 374) = 5.08, p =.001). However, the interaction did not have a significant effect on 
being upset when others use gender neutral pronouns (they/them, ze/hir) for you.   
There was a main effect of gender identity on being upset when others use he/him 
pronouns (F (2, 314) = 24.81, p <.001), she/her pronouns (F (2, 383) = 107.89, p =.001), and 
gender neutral pronouns for you (F (2, 319) = 5.82, p =.003). There was a main effect of 
transgender identity on being upset when others use he/him pronouns (F (2, 319) = 12.48, p 
<.001) and she/her pronouns (F (2, 392) = 55.33, p <.001) for you. However, there was no 
significant effect of transgender identity on being upset when others use gender neutral pronouns 
for you. Means comparisons are presented in Tables C44, C48, and C52. 
Transgender women and non-binary/agender people who did not know whether they 
identified as transgender were much more upset than any other groups when others used male 
pronouns to refer to them. All women and non-binary/agender people were more upset than men 
when others used male pronouns to refer to them, and transgender people were more upset than 
cisgender people.  
Transgender men and transgender non-binary/agender people were most upset when 
others used female pronouns to refer to them. All men and non-binary/agender people were more 
upset than women, and transgender people were more upset than cisgender people.  
Men (especially transgender men) were more upset than women or non-binary/agender 
people when others used gender neutral pronouns for them. 
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Figure 7. Mean frequency of being upset when others use male, female, or gender neutral 
pronouns for you by gender identity and transgender identity (Study 2). 
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Discomfort with Gender Collection on Forms – Study 2. 
The interaction of gender identity and transgender identity had a significant effect on 
discomfort with checking the box “F” on official forms (F (4, 359) = 8.30, p <.001), and on 
discomfort when any gender information is requested on official forms (F (4, 487) = 5.54, p 
<.001). Because of an empty cell, the interaction could not be analyzed for the effect of 
discomfort with checking the box “M” on official forms.  There was a main effect of gender 
identity on discomfort with checking the box “F” (F (2, 369) = 152.90, p <.001), with checking 
the box “M” (F (2, 307) = 17.35, p <.001), and with any gender information being requested on 
official forms (F (2, 497) = 115.77, p <.001).  There was also a main effect of transgender 
identity on discomfort with checking the box “F” (F (2, 375) = 100.59, p <.001), with checking 
the box “M” (F (2, 310) = 34.26, p <.001), and with any gender information being requested on 
official forms (F (2, 505) = 130.41, p <.001). Means comparisons are presented in Tables C55, 
C59, and C63. 
All transgender people (regardless of gender identity) had great discomfort that any 
gender information is collected on official forms, as did all non-binary/agender people 
(regardless of transgender identity). Non-binary/agender people (regardless of transgender 
identity) and transgender men experienced much greater discomfort with checking the box “F” 
on official forms than women (regardless of trans identity) or cisgender men. Transgender 
women and non-transgender non-binary/agender people had the most discomfort with checking 
the box “M” on official forms, but transgender non-binary/agender people and transgender men 
also had greater discomfort than cisgender men and women or men and women who did not 
know. 
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Figure 8. Mean frequency of discomfort when required to check the “M” or “F” box on official 
forms, or when any gender information is requested, by gender identity and transgender identity 
(Study 2). 
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Evidence for Generalizability. 
Emotions Toward Own Gender Group – Study 1. 
The interaction of gender identity and transgender identity did not have a significant 
effect on positive or negative emotions toward one’s own gender group. However, there was a 
main effect of gender identity on positive (F (2, 408) = 54.13, p <.001) and negative emotions (F 
(2, 407) = 4.86, p = .008), and a main effect of transgender identity on positive (F (2, 453) = 
31.56, p <.001) and negative emotions (F (2, 452) = 4.17, p =.016).  
Women had more positive emotions toward their own gender group than did men or non-
binary people, and transgender people had more positive emotions toward their own gender 
group than did cisgender or unclassified people, regardless of gender identity. People who were 
unclassified had more negative emotions toward their own gender group than did cisgender or 
transgender people. 
Emotions Toward Own Gender Group – Study 2. 
 
The interaction of gender identity and transgender identity had a significant effect on 
positive emotions toward one’s own gender group (F (4, 543) = 2.52, p =.040), but not on 
negative emotions.  There was a main effect of gender identity on positive (F (2, 553) = 47.05, p 
<.001) and negative emotions (F (2, 547) = 5.40, p =.005) toward one’s own gender group. There 
was also a main effect of transgender identity on positive (F (2, 562) = 21.59, p <.001) and 
negative emotions (F (2, 556) = 3.40, p =.034) toward one’s own gender group. 
Transgender people had higher levels of positive emotion toward their own gender 
groups than cisgender people or those who did not know, and non-binary/agender people had 
higher levels of positive emotion toward their own gender groups than men or women. However, 
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cisgender men had much lower positive emotions toward their gender group than transgender 
men or those who did not know.   
Nonbinary/agender people had the lowest levels of negative emotion toward their gender 
group, regardless of transgender status. Unclassified men and women had the highest levels of 
negative emotions toward their own gender group, and cisgender and transgender men and 
women did not differ. 
Gender Centrality – Study 1. 
The gender centrality questions were only included in the gender minority survey, so we 
could not analyze the effect of the interaction of gender identity and transgender identity due to 
empty cells in the analysis. There was no main effect of gender identity on gender centrality, but 
there was a main effect of transgender identity on gender centrality (F (2, 268) = 19.81, p <.001) 
such that transgender participants were higher on gender centrality compared to cisgender and 
unclassified participants. 
Gender Identification – Study 2. 
The interaction of gender identity and transgender identity had a significant effect on 
gender identification (F (4, 548) = 4.63, p =.001). There was also a main effect of gender identity 
(F (2, 558) = 20.57, p <.001) and transgender identity (F (2, 567) = 35.04, p <.001) on gender 
identification. Non-transgender men and women had much higher gender identification than non-
transgender non-binary/agender people. Transgender and unclassified people did not differ in 
their level of gender identification by gender.  
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Figure 9. Mean positive and negative emotions toward one’s own gender group by gender 
identity and transgender identity (Study 1). 
 
 
Figure 10. Mean positive and negative emotions toward one’s own gender group by gender 
identity and transgender identity (Study 2). 
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Figure 11. Mean gender centrality by gender identity and transgender identity (Study 1). 
 
 
Figure 12. Mean gender identification by gender identity and transgender identity (Study 2). 
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Evidence for External Validity 
Use of Pronouns – Study 2. 
The interaction of gender identity and transgender identity could not be analyzed for 
pronoun use because of empty cells. There was a significant main effect of gender identity on 
use of male pronouns (he/him) (F (2, 559) = 455.46, p <.001), female pronouns (she/her) (F (2, 
559) = 536.67, p <.001), and gender neutral pronouns (they/them, ze/hir) (F (2, 560) = 116.69, p 
<.001) to refer to yourself. There was a no significant main effect of transgender identity on use 
of male pronouns (he/him) or female pronouns, but there was a significant effect on use of 
gender neutral pronouns (they/them, ze/hir) to refer to yourself (F (2, 569) = 61.83, p <.001). 
Men used male pronouns to refer to themselves more often than women or non-
binary/agender people did. Transgender women used male pronouns for themselves more often 
than non-transgender women and those who did not know. Non-transgender non-binary/agender 
people used male pronouns for themselves more often than transgender non-binary/agender 
people or those who did not know.  
Women used female pronouns to refer to themselves more often than men or non-
binary/agender people did. Cisgender women used female pronouns for themselves more than 
transgender women or those who did not know. Men rarely used female pronouns for 
themselves, regardless of trans identity.  
Non-binary/agender people used gender neutral pronouns to refer to themselves more 
often than men or women did. Transgender non-binary/agender people used gender neutral 
pronouns to refer to themselves more often than non-transgender non-binary/agender people, or 
those who did not know.  
 
  
194 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Mean frequency of using male, female, or gender neutral pronouns to refer to yourself 
by gender identity and transgender identity (Study 2). 
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Clothing Choices – Study 2. 
 
The interaction of gender identity and transgender identity was not significant for 
choosing men’s clothing, but was significant for choosing women’s clothing (F (4, 551) = 9.57, p 
<.001). There was no main effect of transgender identity on choosing men’s or women’s 
clothing. There was a main effect of gender identity on choosing men’s clothing (F (2, 558) = 
30.34, p <.001) and women’s clothing (F (2, 561) = 652.76, p <.001).  
Men were more likely to choose men’s clothing than women were, and women were 
more likely to choose women’s clothing than men were. Cisgender women were more likely to 
choose women’s clothing than transgender women or those who did not know their transgender 
identity.  Non-binary/agender people who did not know whether they identified as transgender 
were more likely to wear women’s clothing than transgender or non-transgender non-
binary/agender people. Men were unlikely to choose women’s clothing regardless of transgender 
status. 
Non-Binary Experiences Scale – Study 2. 
 
The interaction of gender identity and transgender identity had no effect on endorsement 
of non-binary experiences. However, there was a main effect of gender identity (F (2, 304) = 
37.81, p <.001) and transgender identity (F (2, 308) = 36.58, p <.001). Non-binary/agender 
people endorsed non-binary experiences more frequently than men or women. Those who were 
unclassified also endorsed non-binary experiences more frequently than cisgender or transgender 
people. 
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Figure 14. Mean frequency of choosing men’s and women’s clothing by gender identity and 
transgender identity (Study 2). 
 
 
             
Figure 15. Mean scores on Non-Binary Experiences Scale by gender identity and transgender 
identity (Study 2). 
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Discussion 
As described in Chapters 3 and 4, the multiple-choice gender identity question combined 
with a question about transgender identity provided the best combination of theoretical precision, 
simplicity of analysis, and acceptability to participants. This chapter presented evidence for the 
substantive validity, generalizability, and external validity of the multiple-choice gender identity 
measure, heavily based on discussions of validation research by Messick et al. (1989) and John 
and Benet-Martinez (2000). Overall, the multiple-choice gender identity measure seems suitable 
for use with both cisgender and transgender populations.  
Evidence of substantive validity  
To determine the substantive validity of the multiple-choice gender identity question, we 
tested its ability to predict levels of self-definition and self-investment in different gender groups, 
as well as the experience of identity denial from pronoun use or gender selection on official 
forms. We expected participants to experience greater self-investment and self-definition in the 
gender groups into which they categorized themselves, and to experience identity denial when 
being referred to by the wrong gender pronoun (“mispronouning”) or being required to indicate a 
gender other than the one they identify with on an official form. These hypotheses were 
supported, suggesting that the multiple-choice gender identity question has good substantive 
validity for use in both cisgender and transgender populations, and with non-binary/agender 
people. 
 Evidence from self-definition and self-investment. 
 Multi-Dimensional Social Identity Scales (Leach et al., 2008), Study 1 
The Leach et al. (2008) Multi-Dimensional Social Identity Scales (one for identity as a 
man and one for identity as a woman) showed the expected patterns overall, with men 
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identifying more as men than did women or non-binary/agender people, women identifying more 
as women than did men or non-binary/agender people, and non-binary/agender people 
identifying less as men or women than did men or women. However, there were some 
unexpected differences by transgender identity. Transgender people showed the expected pattern 
of high identification with their own gender and lower identification with the other genders, but 
while cisgender men and women each identified more strongly with their own genders, the 
difference between cisgender men and cisgender women’s identification with men was smaller 
than we expected. We attribute this to the unfamiliarity of being asked about level of 
identification with a gender category to which one does not belong; the Multi-Dimensional 
Social Identity Scale (Leach et al., 2008) explicitly assumes that a person completing it already 
self-identifies as a member of that group, so these results, while suggestive, should be interpreted 
with caution. 
Single-Item Social Identification Scales (Postmes et al. 2013), Study 1 
Responses to the Single-Item Social Identification Scales (Postmes et al. 2013) looked 
more as we expected. Men, women, and non-binary/agender people each identified more with 
their own gender than the other two genders did. Non-binary/agender people identified 
somewhat more as men than women did, and somewhat more as women than men did. These 
patterns were identical regardless of transgender identities. All non-binary/agender people 
(regardless of transgender identity) and all transgender people (regardless of gender identity) 
identified more with gender non-conforming people, gender minorities, and transgender people 
than did cisgender men, cisgender women, or women who did not know whether they identified 
as transgender. Conversely, cisgender men and cisgender women identified most strongly with 
cisgender people, and all other categories identified less strongly.  
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The fact that all non-binary/agender people (regardless of transgender identity) identified 
strongly with transgender people and very weakly with cisgender people is somewhat surprising. 
It suggests that the identity “non-binary” may connote an affiliation with transgender identities 
and a distancing from cisgender ones, rather than simply a gender identity (and/or that the 
transgender identity question is a very poor predictor of self-definition and self-investment in 
transgender groups for non-binary/agender people!). Future research should examine the 
relationship between non-binary/agender identities and the label “transgender” to shed further 
light on what non-binary and agender people mean when they do or do not choose to call 
themselves transgender. 
Identity as a Man/Woman/Non-Binary Person (Joel et al., 2014), Study 2 
Men, women, and non-binary/agender people each identified more as their own gender 
than did the other two genders. Transgender and cisgender men and women did not differ in their 
identities as men or women, but men and women who were unsure whether they were 
transgender had lower identification with their gender group (as would be expected given that 
uncertainty about transgender status probably indicates uncertainty about gender identity 
membership, at least for men and women). Transgender and unclassified people, as well as non-
binary/agender people regardless of transgender identity, identified more as non-binary 
(presumably because transgender status is often socially construed as “third-gender” 
membership). 
 These results suggest that responses to the multiple-choice gender identity measure do 
predict self-definition and self-investment in those gender groups. This was true regardless of 
transgender identity; that is, the multiple-choice gender identity question predicts level of 
identification with a gender category for both transgender and cisgender people of that gender, 
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and both transgender and cisgender people tend to identify equally strongly with their genders. 
Non-binary/agender people also had a distinct response pattern which was clearly distinguishable 
from those of men and women, suggesting that non-binary/agender identity can be meaningfully 
measured. 
Evidence from identity denial. 
Mispronouning (Joel et al., 2014) Study 2 
As anticipated, women were more upset than men or non-binary people when others used 
male pronouns for them, and men were more upset than women or non-binary people when 
others used female pronouns for them. This was especially true for transgender people, who 
presumably both experience mispronouning more frequently and feel greater identity denial 
when it occurs. Interestingly, while men were somewhat more upset about others using gender 
neutral pronouns for them than women or non-binary/agender people were, overall levels of 
discomfort were quite low for all participants. This may reflect the fact that use of the singular 
gender neutral pronoun “they” is increasingly common in English (Guo, 2016; Baron, 2018).  
 Gender Collection on Official Forms (Joel et al. 2014) Study 2 
We also found that responses to the multiple-choice gender identity question predicted 
the experience of discomfort when selecting identity-denying gender options on official forms, 
but this pattern only held for transgender people (presumably because cisgender people do not 
generally have this experience). More generally, all transgender people and non-binary/agender 
people had great discomfort that any gender information is collected on official forms. In 
addition to the risk of identity denial, “official” connotes legal documents carrying a risk of 
financial, housing, employment, or health care discrimination against these gender minorities if 
their response is deemed unsuitable by the entity evaluating it.  
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Interestingly, while transgender women and non-transgender non-binary/agender people 
had the most frequent discomfort when checking the identity-denying box “M” on official forms, 
transgender non-binary/agender people and transgender men still had more discomfort than 
cisgender men and women or men and women who did not know whether they were transgender. 
The simplest explanation for this unexpected pattern is a combination of double-barreled survey 
wording and sample characteristics. In the original question “In the past 12 months, have you 
been bothered by having to check the box [‘F’ for female/ ‘M’ for male] on official forms (e.g. 
driver’s license, passport)?” we cannot tell with certainty whether a response indicates how 
often a person feels discomfort when an event occurs, or how often the event occurs in the first 
place. Because the sample of transgender non-binary/agender people disproportionately 
consisted of people assigned female at birth (N = 3 AMAB vs. N = 26 AFAB), while the non-
transgender non-binary/agender people were roughly evenly split (N= 4 AMAB vs. N = 5 
AFAB), the transgender non-binary/agender people were less likely to be placed in the position 
of needing to check the box “M” in the first place. This presumably caused the unexpected low 
frequency of transgender non-binary/agender people experiencing discomfort when checking the 
box “M” on official forms.   
However, for transgender men, this explanation seems insufficient. Instead, it may be that 
transgender men do feel more uncomfortable indicating their membership in the category “men,” 
even though it is identity affirming. This interpretation is supported by a variety of qualitative 
comments from trans men across the two surveys. For example, Study 1 included space for free-
text comments following the Leach et al. scales, and several participants left comments about an 
ambivalent relationship to the category man: 
“Given the prevalence of misogyny and all kinds of sexism across our society and the 
ways that the idea of "man" is constructed in opposition to "woman" in part for the 
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purpose of subjugating women, it's difficult to have an uncomplicated relationship to the 
identity "man". That said, for all intents and purposes, I live as a man, and feel far more 
uncomfortable identifying as anything else, given that I am a recipient of male privilege. I 
do feel a certain bond to gay maleness in particular, and to a lesser extent to gender-
nonconforming maleness.” 
 
“My idea of man is very traditional and hard for me to resonate with due to the toxic 
masculinity.” 
 
“I have desired to be in this male box my entire life, but I have always had to fight for it, 
I feel comfortable with these questions but also somewhat guilty since I am the only one 
that thinks this is the box I belong in, I feel like all the people born into this box don't 
want me there.” 
 
This suggests that transgender men may often have a less positive view of masculinity than cis 
men, whether due to personal experiences with misogyny, or a greater understanding of 
intersectionality of identities.  
 Overall, the evidence from identity denial partially supports our hypotheses. Responses to 
the multiple-choice gender identity question do predict discomfort when being mispronouned 
(for binary gender pronouns, but not for gender neutral ones). Likewise, they do predict 
discomfort when entering the wrong gender identity information on official forms (for 
transgender people).  
Generalizability 
Gender Centrality and Identification 
Gender centrality was much higher for transgender people than for cisgender people, 
regardless of gender identity, but did not differ by gender identity. This measure was only 
administered to the gender minority sample in Study 1, so the sample size of non-transgender 
people was quite small. Given the extreme difficulties many transgender people face in relation 
to their gender identity, it is unsurprising that gender identity would then be quite central to 
them.  
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Conversely, gender identification (Egan & Perry, 2001) was much higher for cisgender 
men and cisgender women than any other group (the others did not differ). This is presumably 
because items from this scale measure feeling similar to conventional members of one’s own 
group (rather than identification in the sense used by Leach et al. 2008).  While we did not 
specifically anticipate this outcome, it makes sense that gender minorities would feel different 
from other members of their gender, as the prototypical member of those categories is cisgender. 
In contrast, gender minorities by definition must go through a process of questioning their birth 
assignment to a binary gender category, presumably creating a feeling of dislocation. 
Emotions Toward Own Gender Group (Studies 1 and 2) 
In both Study 1 and Study 2, transgender people had higher levels of positive emotion 
toward their own gender groups than cisgender people or those who did not know whether they 
identified as transgender. In Study 1, women had higher levels of positive emotion toward their 
own gender groups than men, but did not differ from non-binary/agender people. In Study 2, 
non-binary/agender people had higher levels of positive emotion toward their own gender groups 
than men or women, and cisgender men had much lower positive emotions toward their gender 
group than transgender men or those who did not know whether they identified as transgender.  
In both Studies 1 and 2, nonbinary/agender people had the lowest levels of negative 
emotion toward their gender group, regardless of transgender status. Unclassified men and 
women had the highest levels of negative emotions toward their own gender group, and 
cisgender and transgender men and women did not differ. 
While it seems clear that transgender people and non-binary/agender people generally 
feel quite positively/not negatively toward their own gender groups, cisgender men generally had 
very low positive emotions and high negative emotions. Cisgender men may be less likely than 
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cisgender women or transgender people in general to include gender in their self-concepts 
because of their status as the default, privileged category, which may mean that being a man in 
and of itself does not produce the positivity that comes from membership in a 
marginalized/stigmatized group (e.g. Graham-Bailey et al., 2018).  Growing cultural attention to 
sexism, toxic masculinity, and rape culture may also lead many men to feel discomfort or 
ambivalence about a male identity, as suggested by some of the comments presented earlier in 
this chapter. For example, our data collection throughout 2016 was bookended by the circa-2014 
#notallmen/#yesallwomen furor (Zimmerman, 2014), and the more recent #metoo and #timesup 
movements (Langone, 2018). 
External Validity 
To determine whether the multiple-choice gender identity measure has external validity, 
we tested its ability to predict behaviors and outcomes that are conceptually related to gender 
identity, but that are not constitutive of it. That is, we expected men and women to be more 
likely to feel like, use the pronouns of, and wear clothing consistent with their genders, and both 
non-binary and agender people to be significantly less likely to feel like men or like women, 
more likely to feel like neither a man nor a woman, and more likely to use gender-neutral 
pronouns. These hypotheses were supported. 
Pronoun Use (Joel et al. 2014, Study 2) 
Men used male pronouns, women used female pronouns, and non-binary/agender people 
used gender-neutral pronouns to refer to themselves more often than the other two genders did 
supporting the ability of the multiple-choice gender identity question to predict pronoun usage. 
There were some differences in pronoun usage by transgender identity; transgender women were 
more likely to use male pronouns and less likely to use female pronouns for themselves 
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compared to cisgender women, but there was no such difference by transgender identity among 
men. This suggests that transgender men may present as men in more aspects of their lives than 
transgender women do (perhaps because of the increased risk of discrimination and violence 
experienced by transgender women). Transgender non-binary/agender people were more likely 
than non-transgender non-binary/agender people to use gender-neutral pronouns for themselves. 
Possibly, non-binary/agender people who have taken specific behavioral steps to publicly 
express their identities (such as pronoun usage) may be more likely to identify as transgender. 
Clothing Choices (Joel et al. 2014, Study 2) 
Men and women were each more likely to choose clothing associated with their gender 
than the other genders were, supporting the ability of the multiple-choice gender identity 
question to predict clothing choices. However, while men were unlikely to choose women’s 
clothing regardless of transgender status, cisgender women were more likely to choose women’s 
clothing than transgender women or those who did not know their transgender identity. 
Transgender non-binary/agender people were somewhat less likely to choose women’s clothing 
than those with other transgender identities, but overall, non-binary/agender did not exhibit a 
clear pattern of gendered clothing choices.  
Non-Binary Experiences Scale – Study 2. 
Non-binary/agender people endorsed non-binary experiences more frequently than men 
or women. Those who were unclassified also endorsed non-binary experiences more frequently 
than cisgender or transgender people.  
Conclusion 
In general, the results of these two studies support our hypothesis that the multiple-choice 
gender identity question (alongside the transgender identity question) would have adequate 
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substantive validity, generalizability, and external validity for use with transgender and cisgender 
populations, and for use with non-binary/agender people. Consistent with the bandwidth-fidelity 
tradeoff, this measure does a good job of predicting outcomes specifically related to gender 
identity (e.g. self-identification, self-investment in gender groups), but is a poorer predictor of 
more distantly related concepts (e.g. pronoun usage, clothing choices). However, this same 
tradeoff is present for the binary gender question (and all the other gender questions we tested). 
As described in chapters 1 and 2, a single question cannot capture precise information about all 
gender-related constructs. 
We also tested a measure of transgender identity alongside the multiple-choice gender 
identity question. Initially, we hoped to use these results to show that gender identity is the same 
construct in transgender and cisgender people, but this approach did not take into account that 
transgender identity intersects with gender identity in a way that influences the meaning of that 
identity (much as socioeconomic status, age, race, and sexual orientation do). For example, 
transgender people reported greater distress in response to identity denial than cisgender people, 
presumably because their identities are routinely invalidated in the course of daily life. As all 
people have multiple identities which influence one another, the question of whether gender 
identity is identical for cisgender and transgender people now seems easily answered; the 
subjective experience of gender identity differs for everyone. The construct of gender identity, 
however, is theoretical, and must be measured the same way across all participants in order to 
enable meaningful comparison. Transgender identity should be measured alongside gender 
identity when it is relevant to the topic of research, because it can intersect with gender identity 
in a way that may influence a variable of interest. However, it need not always be included, any 
more than age or SES are always included in every study. 
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Perhaps the greatest improvement the multiple-choice gender identity question offers 
over the binary gender question is its explicit inclusion of non-binary and agender identities. 
These results suggest that non-binary and agender identities predict unique patterns of self-
definition and self-investment in gender groups, emotions toward gender groups, and pronoun 
usage, distinct from those of men or women. Gender identity measures which include options for 
non-binary and agender people are not merely better-liked, but also produce more valid data by 
separating groups which systematically differ from the commonly recognized “man” and 
“woman.” 
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Summary of Chapters 3-5 
Chapters 3 through 5 present the results of two studies (four samples) designed to 
determine which of the previously recommended transgender and non-binary inclusive gender 
measures would be most appropriate for general use. To determine this, I assessed the simplicity 
of administration and analysis of each question (Chapter 3) and its level of acceptability to 
participants (Chapter 4), and identified the best-performing measure. I then provided evidence 
for the validity of that measure, the multiple-choice gender identity measure, in Chapter 5. 
Chapter 3: Simplicity of Inclusive Gender Identity and Transgender Status Measures 
Chapter 3 is concerned with how easy it is to aggregate data from each measure, and 
outlines detailed plans for coding and condensing the sometimes large amounts of information 
yielded by the various gender measures. That is, I aimed to identify the simplest measure 
which is still inclusive of transgender and non-binary people, and to clearly describe a plan 
for using the data which it produces. I also explored the content validity, general usability, and 
reliability of each measure. The consistency between different gender measures was generally 
quite high. Major differences between question types were logistical (e.g. ease of coding) rather 
than quantitative. From a standpoint of simplicity, I recommend the binary + other or multiple-
choice gender identity question, along with the transgender identity or transition history question 
(if transgender status is needed).  
Gender Identity Measures. 
The multiple-choice gender measure identified more diversity than the binary gender 
question, as was logically and theoretically anticipated. In Study 1, 34% of participants were 
classified as a gender other than man or woman by the multiple-choice question, and in Study 2, 
7% were (Study 2 had a greater proportion of undergraduate students than Study 1). 
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Correspondence between the binary + other question and the multiple-choice gender measure 
was quite high (85% Study 1, 95% Study 2), and correspondence between the free-text and 
multiple-choice gender question was similarly high (88% Study 1, 96% Study 2).  As this 
overlap between questions is substantial, it does not particularly recommend one question over 
another. 
 Interestingly, across both studies, responses to the free-text question could be 
meaningfully categorized (i.e. into men, women, non-binary, or agender responses) somewhat 
more often than responses to the multiple-choice question. This was true despite the fact that the 
multiple-choice question includes an option to write in a free-text response, which was coded 
and categorized by hand using the same coding scheme. For applications where gender identity 
is the primary interest and research support is available to code responses, the free-text question 
may be appropriate. However, the multiple-choice question is much less logistically difficult to 
analyze. The number of responses requiring hand-coding is much smaller, significantly reducing 
research investment necessary to interpret the data. In addition, the free-text question requires 
researchers to determine how to group participants’ responses (a constantly changing problem) 
rather than allowing them to group themselves. Ironically, this apparently maximally inclusive 
question in practice gives participants very little agency over how their data are ultimately 
interpreted by researchers.   
 While there was substantial overlap between the coding categories developed from 
participants’ free-text responses and the options available in the multiple-choice gender identity 
question, I identified several necessary alterations for content validity based on Study 1 results 
that were implemented in Study 2. Most notably, I changed the “genderqueer” response option to 
“non-binary” and added a response option for “agender.”  
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Pilot results from two alternative types of gender self-categorization measures suggest 
further directions for improving the content validity beyond the Study 2 gender identity 
measures. Contrary to Tate et al.’s hypothesis that non-binary people identify mostly as “both 
men and women” while agender people mostly identify as “neither men nor women,” I found 
that most non-binary and agender people identified as neither men nor women on a measure 
created by Joel et al. (2014). Another important dimension for future research concerns the 
effects of social recognition on identification with various gender identities. I adapted a biracial 
identity question created by Rockquemore and Arend (2002) to measure gender identity 
(especially among non-binary people).  I found great variability in the gender categories which 
participants perceive as available to them (e.g. the emergence of “non-binary” as an umbrella 
term between Study 1 and Study 2), the categories they feel others assign to them (e.g. being 
perceived as binary in daily life), and the strength of their identification with any of these 
available categories. Further research is needed to determine how non-binary and agender people 
conceptualize their identities. One thought-provoking approach to this question, Sexual 
Configurations Theory, was proposed by van Anders in 2015 and is still being explored. While 
this conceptualization is not yet suited to general use in surveys, it may yield insights that can 
eventually improve the content validity of more conventional gender measures. 
Transgender Status Measures. 
I also conducted a supplemental analysis of transgender status measures. Conceptually, 
transition history, transgender identity, and assigned sex at birth are different constructs, so I did 
not expect perfect correspondence between them. Nonetheless, when comparing across the three 
transgender status measures, 83% of participants were classified the same way (as Not 
Transgender, Transgender, or Unclassified), and most of the remaining participants were 
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classified the same way by two out of three methods. There was not perfect overlap between any 
of the methods. These results alone suggest that the measures are quite similar in the total 
proportion of participants they identify as transgender.  
However, the sex assigned at birth question is more complex to interpret than the other 
measures as it must be compared to a gender identity measure to generate transgender status. It 
also has an important usability concern with respect to non-binary and agender participants. In a 
typical coding scheme for this measure, all non-binary/agender people are either transgender (if 
transgender is defined as having any gender identity different from sex assigned at birth), or no 
non-binary or agender people are transgender (if transgender is defined to include only people 
with binary gender identities). In this case, sex assigned at birth provides no additional 
information about transgender status beyond what is obvious from gender identity. 
For general use, the transgender identity question and transition history question are 
equally easy to administer and analyze because they can be used as-is without the recoding 
which is necessary for the sex assigned at birth question. The transgender identity question has 
our final recommendation because it has greater face validity for concepts related to identity 
(which is of greater relevance for social psychology). 
Chapter 4: Acceptability and Identity Safety of Gender Measures 
Chapter 4 considered whether gender measures may act as cues to identity safety for 
transgender and non-binary participants, and how these cues may differ across various contexts 
in which researchers might use gender measures. My goal was to identify the gender measures 
that are most acceptable to participants of varying gender identities and transgender 
statuses, and that provide the greatest sense of identity safety across contexts. Considering 
these results alongside my recommendations for simplicity of analysis, I recommend that 
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researchers use the multiple-choice gender identity question for general purposes, alongside the 
transgender identity measure is information about transgender status is needed. 
What question do participants prefer? 
The short free-text question was best-liked and most identity safe regardless of the 
context in which it appeared, participant gender, or transgender status. The multiple-choice 
gender identity question was next most liked/identity safe, and the binary gender question was 
disliked and viewed as identity-unsafe. Both transgender and cisgender participants use inclusive 
gender questions to infer researchers’ views of gender minorities, and have improved perceptions 
of researchers and increased comfort with research when seeing inclusive questions. This 
suggests that using inclusive gender measures may help to increase participation and retention of 
participants, both transgender and cisgender. 
Which questions should researchers use? 
The short free-text question was best-liked and most identity-safe, but as described in 
Chapter 3, the complexity of analyzing its results make it unwieldy for general use. I recommend 
the multiple-choice gender question for most research purposes, as it is better liked by 
participants across contexts in both studies than the binary + other question. In Study 2, I 
experimentally demonstrated that participants who saw the multiple-choice question had higher 
expectations of belonging, higher comfort with research, and lower negative emotions toward 
researchers than those who saw the binary. In contrast, those who saw the binary + other 
question did not differ from those who saw the binary question on those measures.  
If information about transgender status is needed, I suggest using the multiple-choice + 
transgender identity question, as it was best-liked and most identity-safe among transgender and 
non-binary participants.  
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When considering all participants, the multiple-choice + assigned sex at birth and 
multiple-choice + transgender identity measures were rated approximately equally. However, the 
higher ratings of the transgender identity question among gender minorities coupled with the 
increased logistical simplicity of analyzing its results (especially for non-binary/agender people) 
means that it has my recommendation. However, for medical contexts where physical bodies are 
of greater relevance, the assigned sex at birth measure is still a viable option, unlike the multiple-
choice + transition history measure (which was so strongly disliked in Study 1 that I dropped it 
from Study 2). 
Chapter 5: Validating Inclusive Gender Identity Measures 
Chapter 5 presents evidence about the substantive validity, general usability, and external 
validity of the gender measure which had the best combination of simplicity of analysis and 
acceptability/identity safety for participants: the multiple-choice gender identity measure, 
alongside the transgender identity measure. Broadly, I wanted to provide empirical evidence 
that this gender measure captures the information it promises and is not measuring 
conceptually unrelated constructs. In general, this was true; the multiple-choice gender 
identity measure is a good predictor of constructs that are very closely related to gender identity 
(e.g. self-investment in gender groups) and a less precise predictor of more distantly related 
concepts (e.g. clothing choice). 
These analyses aimed to show that the multiple-choice gender measure predicts 
constructs closely related to/moderated by gender identity, such as self-investment and self-
definition in gender groups (substantive validity) as well as gender-identity related but more 
distant constructs (external validity), like pronoun usage and clothing choices. These hypotheses 
were generally well-supported.  
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I also hoped to show that gender identity is the same construct for transgender and non-
binary/agender participants as it is for cisgender and binary participants to demonstrate the 
general usability of the measure. That is, I expected participants across gender identities and 
transgender statuses to nonetheless show similar affiliation with their gender identity groups (as 
measured by gender centrality, gender identification, and emotions toward their gender group). 
This hypothesis was less well supported. Gender centrality and positive emotions toward one’s 
gender group were highest for transgender people, while gender identification was highest for 
cisgender men and women. On further consideration, these results seem to reflect the ways that 
transgender identity intersects with gender identity to influences the meaning of that identity; for 
example, considering the great barriers many transgender people face in achieving social 
recognition of their genders, it makes sense that those gender identities would have greater 
salience and centrality. This further underscores the importance of measuring transgender 
identity alongside gender identity when gender is a topic of central interest, because transgender 
identity can interact with gender identity in distinct ways. 
Conclusion 
The binary and binary + other gender measures and the transition history transgender status 
measure should not be used, because their very low level of acceptability and identity safety 
poses a risk to the recruitment and retention of participants (especially gender minorities). I 
recommend the multiple-choice gender identity measure for general use based on its high 
sensitivity and simple analytic requirements, high acceptability and identity safety across 
participants and contexts, and ability to successfully predict theoretically related constructs with 
a moderate level of precision. When a measure of transgender status is needed, I recommend the 
transgender identity measure on similar grounds. 
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Chapter 6: Effects of Gender Identity Measures on Attitudes toward Gender Minorities 
Until this point, I have considered how the use of various transgender-inclusive gender 
identity measures will affect researchers (in terms of each measure’s simplicity of use and 
validity) and gender minorities (in terms of the acceptability of each measure).  In this chapter, I 
consider the effects that transgender-inclusive gender identity measures may have on the general 
population’s attitudes and beliefs about gender minorities.  
Very few researchers have seriously considered the effects of particular gender question 
formats on the general population. The work which does exist has mostly asked whether 
questions about transgender identity might make cisgender people uncomfortable (much in the 
way that researchers wondered whether asking questions about sexual orientation might make 
heterosexual people uncomfortable). Although most cisgender participants seem to have no 
difficulty with or objection to the two-question method, a small minority of these participants 
may be uncomfortable or offended by questions which imply that sex and gender can be 
distinguished, that gender is not binary, and/or that transgender people exist (Conron et al., 2008; 
Redford & Van Wagenen, 2012; Balarajan et al., 2011; Lombardi et al., 2013).   
Borrowing from the literature on racial demographic questions, however, we may 
speculate that any new gender question which becomes widely adopted (and is thus viewed by 
large sections of the population) will have a different set of effects on society at large; that is, it 
will subtly influence the lay public’s views of gender. Lee, Wilton and Kwan (2014) find that 
demographic questions which require individuals to identify with only one ethnicity (“check 
one” as opposed to “check all that apply” questions) serve as a subtle cue to racial essentialism. 
This increased racial essentialism, in turn, led racial minorities (Asian-Americans) to show 
reduced interest in cultural diversity events, but also led European-Americans to be less 
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interested in intergroup contact with Asian-Americans. Lee et al. (2014) further conclude that 
essentialist cues generally lead participants to expect less intergroup contact.  
Generalizing from this study to the context of gender, we may therefore predict that 
gender demographic questions which require a forced choice between categories will cue 
essentialist beliefs. That is, after seeing a single-select gender identity question, essentialist 
views may become more salient (especially for people who already had relatively essentialist 
views), resulting in greater acceptance of inequality, increased prejudice, and decreased interest 
in intergroup contact.  
If these relationships are eventually demonstrated, various other social psychological 
findings about essentialism may be tested in the context of gender. For example, racial 
essentialism (conceiving of race as biologically based) leads both racial minorities and racial 
majorities to be more accepting of racial inequality and less interested in intergroup contact (e.g 
Williams & Eberhardt, 2008). Of greatest relevance, Ching and Xu (2017) found that 
experimentally increased bioessentialist beliefs (specifically that the gender binary is biological) 
also increased negative stereotyping of transgender people, and transprejudice. If forced-choice 
gender questions tend to cue (or even increase) gender essentialism to the same degree that 
forced-choice race questions increase racial essentialism, researchers’ choice of gender question 
formats may affect intergroup relations and the experience of prejudice directly. 
Encountering an inclusive gender identity measure may also produce reactance (Brehm, 
1966) to the extent that the measure is seen a threatening the values of a meaningful group to 
which participants belong (de Lemus, Bukowski, Spears, & Telga, 2015). People who already 
essentialize gender may perceive these inclusive gender identity measures as threatening to their 
values around gender. As suggested by the Sacred Value Protection Model (Tetlock et al., 2000), 
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for people who view the idea that gender is binary as a “sacred value,” merely considering a 
gender measure which undermines that value will produce a feeling of violation and subjective 
contamination (Haupert, 2015). This threat may manifest in moral outrage toward and 
denigration of the perceived source of the moral threat (e.g. gender minorities, the researchers) 
and a reaffirmation of the threatened moral values (e.g. the gender binary, normative gender 
roles).  
Building on the design used by Lee et al. (2014) to study the effects of racial 
demographic questions on racial essentialism, we designed an experiment to determine the effect 
of differently-worded gender demographic questions on gender essentialism and prejudice 
toward gender minorities (among other outcomes). In line with the findings of Lee et al. (2014), 
we hypothesize that for participants with gender essentialist views, seeing single-select gender 
identity measures (relative to seeing questions that permit participants to choose more than one 
option) will cue essentialism and/or produce reactance, resulting in more negative attitudes 
toward gender minorities. We also tentatively hypothesize that single-select gender identity 
measures may increase participants' endorsement of gender essentialist beliefs. 
Method 
Study 2 - Pilot Test of Novel Gender Essentialism Scale 
Haslam, Rothschild, and Ernst (2000) defined essentialism as a belief that a members of a 
social category share an underlying natural, innate “essence.” We wanted to measure these 
beliefs about gender, but found that the only available published measure of gender essentialism, 
the Gender Theory Questionnaire (Coleman & Hong, 2008) only assessed participant’s beliefs 
about the extent and origin of gender differences (i.e. whether they are social or biological). 
While those concepts are related to essentialism as defined by Haslam et al. (2000), several other 
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concepts are not assessed, including Discreteness, Uniformity, Necessity, and Exclusivity. To 
ensure that we assessed the full range of essentialism-related concepts and to increase our ability 
to compare gender essentialism to other forms of essentialism, we created our own measure by 
adapting and adding to the Race Conceptions Scale developed by Williams and Eberhardt 
(2008). This measure corresponds much more closely to the nine elements of essentialism 
initially proposed by Haslam et al. (2000).  
The following scale was included in Study 2, which was conducted in Fall 2016 (see 
Chapters 3-5 for details about participants and the remainder of the methods). Items are grouped 
here by the element of essentialism (Haslam et al., 2000) which they are measuring, but were 
randomized when presented to participants. Participants indicated their level of agreement with 
each of the following 28 items on a 7 point Likert scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly 
agree). Items with an asterisk were reverse-coded. 
Discreteness (2 items) 
 Men and women are not fundamentally different.* 
 It’s easy to tell what gender someone is by looking at them. 
 
Uniformity (3 items) 
 People who are of different genders may look quite similar to each other.* 
 Generally speaking, [two men/two women] will always look more similar to each 
other than a man and a woman ever would. 
 
Informativeness (3 items) 
 Knowing someone’s gender doesn’t tell you very much about them.* 
 Knowing someone’s gender tells you a lot about them. 
 I can make a lot of judgments about a person just by knowing their gender. 
 
Naturalness (2 items) 
 It's natural to notice a person's gender. 
 Young children probably learn about which people fall into which gender categories 
automatically, without much help from adults. 
 
Immutability (3 items) 
 A person’s gender is fixed at birth. 
 Whether a person is a man or a woman is pretty much set early on in childhood. 
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 A person’s gender can change over the course of their life.* 
 
Stability (6 items) 
 There’s agreement across cultures about which gender groups people fall into. 
 The political climate can dictate how someone’s gender is categorized.* 
 The same gender categories have pretty much always existed. 
 Gender categories haven’t always existed in the world.* 
 In 200 years, society will use basically the same gender categories. 
 How a person’s gender is defined depends on the social context.* 
 
Inherence (3 items) 
 Genders are innate, genetically-based tendencies. 
 It’s impossible to determine a person’s gender by examining their DNA.* 
 Gender is caused by biological factors. 
 
Necessity (4 items) 
 There is no defining characteristic that is necessary to be a [man/woman].* 
 [Men/Women] have a necessary or defining characteristic, without which they would 
not be [men/women]. 
 
Exclusivity (2 items) 
 It’s possible to be a full member of more than one gender.* 
 It's possible to be both a man and a woman.* 
 
A scree test showed a clear, sharp drop after the first factor, supporting our hypothesis 
that the scale is measuring a single factor. Scores had high reliability (α=.94) and were 
aggregated into a single composite score (M = 3.8, SD = 1.1).  
Study 3 – How Gender Identity Measures Affect Prejudice Toward Gender Minorities 
Participants were randomly assigned to answer one of four gender questions (some with 
single-select options, and some with multiple-select options and/or free text boxes) followed by 
my novel measure of gender essentialism. They then completed several previously validated 
scales in two blocks with measures presented in randomized order within each block. The first 
block contained the Homophobia Scale (Wright, Adams, and Bernat, 1999), Rosenberg Self-
Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965), Genderism and Transphobia Scale (Nagoshi et al., 2008), 
Transphobia Scale (Hill & Willoughby, 2005), Ambivalent Sexism Scale (Glick and Fiske, 
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1996), and the Implicit Person Theory Scale (Dweck et al., 1995) in a random order. The second 
block contained the Gender Theory Questionnaire, (Coleman & Hong, 2008), Right-Wing 
Authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1981), General Essentialism Scale (Bastian & Haslam, 2006), the 
Social Desirability Short Form (Strahan & Gerbasi, 1972), and the Need for Closure Short Form 
(Roets & Ban Hiel, 2011). Finally, participants completed standard demographic questions and 
were debriefed about the purpose of the study. 
Participants. 
In the spring of 2017, I recruited a convenience sample of undergraduate psychology majors 
from the psychology department participant pool at a large public university in the Midwest 
United States.  There was a 94% completion rate; 468 participants consented and 442 completed 
the entire survey. Participants received course credit for participating.  
Ages ranged from 16-39 (M = 19.6, SD = 1.94). With respect to gender identity, participants 
(N = 440) were 36% men (N = 159), 63% women (N = 276), 0.4% genderfluid (N=2), and 0.2% 
each non-binary, do not know, and choose not to answer (each N =1). With respect to 
racial/ethnic identity, participants (N=440) were 8% Black (N=36), 0.4% Pacific Islander (N=2), 
2.9% Indian Subcontinent (N=13), 0.9% Middle Eastern (N=4), 13.6% East Asian (N=60), 1.5% 
Southeast Asian (N=7), 73.4% White (N=323), 4.5% Latinx (N=20), and 1.1% Native American 
(N=5).20 One participant wrote in another racial identity (“Armenian”).  Politically, participants  
(N = 437) were 43.2% Democrat (N = 189), 23.3% Republican (N = 102),  27.2% Independent 
(N = 119), and 6.1% Other party (N = 27). Examples of participants write-in responses were 
“None,” “I don’t think I have any party thoughts,” “I’m foreign, from a socialist country, would 
choose democrat,” “Libertarian,” and “Justice Democrat.” 
                                                 
20 Participants could select more than one race/ethnicity, so percentages sum to more than 100%. 
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Materials. 
 Gender Demographic Questions. 
 Participants were randomly assigned to answer one of four gender questions. For the 
binary and binary + other questions, the first two response options were presented in a random 
order, and for the multiple-choice questions the first three response options were randomized. 
The binary question (Figure 1) was included as a baseline, as it is both the most 
commonly used gender question and one that does not challenge the dominant cultural 
conception of gender as binary.  
 
Figure 1. Single-select binary gender identity question. 
 
The single-select binary + other question (Figure 2) was included for comparison to the 
baseline binary gender question. It acknowledges the possibility of genders other than man and 
woman, but because it does not name these possibilities and instead literally “others” them, I 
expect that participants’ levels of gender essentialism will not differ between the binary question 
and the binary + other question. 
 
Figure 2. Single-select binary + other gender identity question. 
 
In contrast, the single-select multiple-choice gender question (Figure 3) both 
acknowledges the existence of multiple genders and names them explicitly. However, it still 
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forces participants to select only one of these options, reinforcing the essentialist idea that these 
gender identities are mutually exclusive. If naming genders other than man and woman is 
sufficient to reduce essentialism, the essentialism of participants who see this question should 
differ from those who see the binary and binary + other questions. However, if allowing the 
selection of multiple genders is necessary to reduce essentialism, participants who see this 
question should have essentialism scores similar to those who saw the binary or binary + other 
questions. 
 
Figure 3. Single-select multiple-choice gender identity question. 
 
Finally, the multi-select multiple-choice gender question (Figure 4) was included to test 
the hypothesis that allowing the selection of more than one gender undermines the essentialist 
idea that gender identities are mutually exclusive. If this is so, participants who see this gender 
question should have lower essentialism scores than participants who see any of the other three 
gender questions. 
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Figure 4. Multi-select multiple-choice gender identity question. 
 
Moderator Variables. 
 
Novel Gender Essentialism Measure. 
I revised my novel gender essentialism measure to include only the 19 items with the 
highest item-score correlation in the Fall 2016 surveys. All items used a 7-point Likert scale (1 = 
Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree). Reverse-coded items are marked with an asterisk. 
1. Generally speaking, two men will always look more similar to each other than a 
man and a woman ever would.  
2. Generally speaking, two women will always look more similar to each other than 
a man and a woman ever would.  
3. People who are of different genders may look quite similar to each other.*  
4. Knowing someone’s gender tells you a lot about them.  
5. It's natural to notice a person's gender. 
6. The same gender categories have pretty much always existed. 
7. Gender categories haven’t always existed in the world. * 
8. It’s easy to tell what gender someone is by looking at them. 
9. Whether a person is a man or a woman is pretty much set early on in childhood. 
10. A person’s gender can change over the course of their life. * 
11. A person’s gender is fixed at birth. 
12. There’s agreement across cultures about which gender groups people fall into. 
13. Gender is caused by biological factors. 
14. Women have a necessary or defining characteristic, without which they would not 
be women. 
15. There is no defining characteristic that is necessary to be a woman. * 
16. Men have a necessary or defining characteristic, without which they would not be 
men. 
17. There is no defining characteristic that is necessary to be a man. * 
18. Men and women are not fundamentally different. * 
19. It’s possible to be a full member of more than one gender. * 
 
The scree plot showed a clear, sharp drop after the first factor, supporting the hypothesis 
that the scale is unidimensional. Therefore, we aggregated these 19 items into a single composite 
score (α = .88, M = 4.2, SD = 0.96). 
Gender Theory Questionnaire (Coleman & Hong, 2008). 
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Participants indicated their agreement with each of 11 items measuring gender 
essentialism on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly disagree). Example 
items include “When men and women differ in some way, it is likely that the difference is due to 
biological factors.” and “It is hard if not impossible to change the innate dispositions of a 
person’s gender.” Although a scree test suggested that this scale has two factors, we averaged all 
item scores into a single composite score (α = .77, M = 3.9, SD = .83) as suggested by the 
authors. Higher scores represent greater gender essentialism. 
Outcome Variables. 
Genderism and Transphobia Scale (Nagoshi et al., 2008). 
Participants indicated their agreement with each of nine items measuring negative 
attitudes toward transgender people on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly 
disagree). Example items include “I don’t like it when someone is flirting with me, and I can’t 
tell if they are a man or a woman.” and “I think there is something wrong with a person who says 
that they are neither a man nor a woman.” I averaged item scores into a single composite score (α 
= .91, M = 3.4, SD = 1.3); higher scores indicate more negative attitudes toward transgender 
people. 
Transphobia Scale (Hill & Willoughby, 2005). 
Participants indicated their agreement with each of 32 items measuring negative attitudes 
toward transgender people on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly 
disagree). Example items include “Sex change operations are morally wrong.” and “Feminine 
men make me feel uncomfortable.” Although Hill and Willoughby divide their scale into three 
subscales, the scree plot showed strong evidence of unidimensionality, so I averaged item scores 
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into a single composite score (α = .97, M = 2.6, SD = 1.1); higher scores indicate more negative 
attitudes toward transgender people. 
Additional Variables. 
We included seven other scales in this survey as part of a project to validate the novel 
gender essentialism scale. These were the Homophobia Scale (Wright, Adams, and Bernat, 
1999), Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965), Social Desirability Short Form (Strahan 
& Gerbasi, 1972), Need for Closure Short Form (Roets & Ban Hiel, 2011), General Essentialism 
Scale (Bastian & Haslam, 2006), Right-Wing Authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1981).  Ambivalent 
Sexism Scale (Glick and Fiske, 1996), and Implicit Person Theory Scale (Dweck et al., 1995). At 
the end of the survey, participants completed six demographic questions about gender identity, 
sexual orientation, race/ethnicity, age, political affiliation, and religion. A brief description of 
each of these variables is in Appendix D. We do not report further analyses for these measures. 
Results 
In line with Lee et al. (2014), we predicted that seeing single-select gender identity 
measures (relative to seeing questions that permit participants to choose more than one option) 
would cue essentialism and/or produce reactance, resulting in more negative attitudes toward 
gender minorities and possibly increasing participants' endorsement of gender essentialist beliefs. 
Regressions by Gender Demographic Question Condition 
I ran multiple regressions predicting Transphobia (Hill & Willoughby, 2005) and 
Genderism and Transphobia (Nagoshi et al., 2008) from gender demographic question condition 
(Binary, Binary + Other, Single-Select Multiple-Choice, or Multi-Select Multiple-Choice), with 
the Binary question as the comparison group. Neither the regression for Transphobia (F (3, 412) 
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= .45, p = 0.71) nor the regression for Genderism and Transphobia (F (3, 436) = 0.56, p = 0.63) 
was significant. 
I also ran multiple regressions predicting the novel gender essentialism measure 
(Haupert, 2016) and the Gender Theory Questionnaire (Coleman and Hong, 2008) from gender 
demographic question condition (Binary, Binary + Other, Single-Select Multiple-Choice, or 
Multi-Select Multiple-Choice), with the Binary question as the comparison group. Neither the 
regression for novel gender essentialism (F (3, 419) = 1.91, p = 0.12) nor the regression for the 
Gender Theory Questionnaire (F (3, 427) = 1.07, p = 0.36) was significant. 
Thus, exposure to different versions of the gender identity question did not have 
statistically reliable direct effects on either transphobia or gender essentialism (two somewhat 
different measures of each). 
Interaction Analyses 
We also conducted analyses predicting transphobia from a combination of gender 
question condition, novel gender essentialism (Haupert, 2016), and the Gender Theory 
Questionnaire (Coleman & Hong, 2008). These analyses correspond to the findings of Lee et al. 
(2014), who found effects of question type only among participants who were already high in 
essentialism. 
Gender Question Condition and Gender Essentialism (Haupert, 2016). 
There was no significant interaction of novel gender essentialism and gender question 
condition for Transphobia (F (3, 382) = 0.63, p = 0.59) or Genderism and Transphobia (F (3, 
407) = 0.21, p = 0.88). There was a main effect of novel gender essentialism on Transphobia (F 
(1, 385) = 165.05, p <.001); higher novel gender essentialism predicted higher Transphobia (t = 
12.8, p <.001). Likewise, there was a main effect of novel gender essentialism on Genderism and 
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Transphobia (F (1, 410) = 415.58, p <.001); higher scores on the novel gender essentialism 
predicted higher Genderism and Transphobia (t = 20.38, p <.001). 
Gender Question Condition and Gender Theory Questionnaire (Coleman & Hong, 
2008). 
There was no significant interaction of Gender Theory Questionnaire and gender question 
condition for Transphobia (F (3, 394) = 1.06, p = 0.36) or Genderism and Transphobia (F (3, 
418) = 0.34, p = 0.79).  
There was a main effect of Gender Theory Questionnaire on Transphobia (F (1, 397) = 
135.96, p <.001); higher Gender Theory Questionnaire predicted higher Transphobia (t = 11.6, p 
<.001). Likewise, there was a main effect of Gender Theory Questionnaire on Genderism and 
Transphobia (F (1, 421) = 248.73, p <.001); higher scores on the Gender Theory Questionnaire 
predicted higher Genderism and Transphobia (t = 15.77, p <.001). 
Discussion 
Our initial hypotheses were not supported. None of the gender question conditions 
directly affected gender essentialism or transphobia, and there was no interaction between gender 
question condition and gender essentialism on the measures of transphobia. Thus, our study did 
not find effects of question condition either overall or specifically among the participants who 
scored highest on gender essentialism.  
These results are not consistent with those reported by Lee, Wilton, and Kwan (2014) in 
their research on racial demographic questions. Our outcome variables differed from theirs, in 
that we assessed gender essentialism and transphobia directly, while they measured implicit 
person theory and interest in intergroup contact. They prioritized unobtrusive measurement and 
concealment of their research goals, while we prioritized comprehensive measurement. It seems 
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unlikely that Lee et al.’s relatively unobtrusive measurement approach accounts for our differing 
results; given our inclusion of a wide variety of other types of measures in the survey and the 
ubiquity of gender identity questions in surveys, it seems unlikely that participants were engaged 
in hypothesis-guessing. 
An alternative explanation is that single-select gender identity questions are simply not as 
strong a cue to gender essentialism as single-select race demographic questions are to racial 
essentialism. Indeed, the vast majority of gender identity questions that people encounter in daily 
life are single-select (see Chapter 2), such that many participants may not even notice them. 
However, the results of my Study 2, especially those reported in Chapter 4, show that merely 
seeing a binary gender identity question does produce a significant effect on perceptions of 
researchers, suggesting that participants have at least some awareness of the type of gender 
identity question they see.  
Another explanation for our failure to obtain results paralleling Lee, Wilton, and Kwan 
(2014) in the context of gender demographic questions is that gender may already be a 
chronically accessible construct for the vast majority of people in a way that race is not for white 
people. Thus, the relative effect of any particular cue to gender essentialism might be reduced 
(e.g. Bargh, Lombardi, & Higgins, 1988). 
Future research could include manipulation checks for attention to the wording of each 
measure and evaluation of each measure to examine the possibility that an effect would emerge 
with more attentive participants (although given that Lee, Wilton, and Kwan (2014) propose that 
this effect is based on a subtle cue to racial essentialism, such a change to the experimental 
design would undermine the generalizability of the results to a non-experimental setting). 
Researchers could also attempt to unobtrusively measure and control for the chronic accessibility 
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of gender constructs to each participant (although if gender is a chronically accessible construct 
for most people, this may have limited effect on the results). Finally, reducing the number of 
measures included in each study would reduce survey fatigue and might increase the chances of 
detecting a small effect.  
With respect to our goal of recommending a gender identity measure for general use, 
however, these results suggest that any effect of gender identity question type on gender 
essentialism or transphobia is likely to be quite limited in practice, and so that concern should 
not be a deciding factor when choosing what method to use. 
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Chapter 7: Including the Gender Spectrum in Measures of Sexual Orientation 
Males do not represent two discrete populations, heterosexual and homosexual. The 
world is not to be divided into sheep and goats. Not all things are black nor all things 
white. It is a fundamental of taxonomy that nature rarely deals with discrete categories. 
Only the human mind invents categories and tries to force facts into separated pigeon-
holes. The living world is a continuum in each and every one of its aspects. The sooner 
we learn this concerning human sexual behavior, the sooner we shall reach a sound 
understanding of the realities of sex. (Kinsey, 1948, p. 639) 
 
While classifications of sexual orientation have existed since at least the time of Plato 
(Reeve, 2006), scientific interest in sexual orientation dates back only to 1860 and the work of 
Karl Ulrichs, whose classification scheme roughly mapped on to the 
heterosexual/bisexual/homosexual distinction still widely used today (Sell, 1997). This is not 
coincidental; according to Sell (1997), Ulrichs’ views influenced nearly all the early researchers 
of sexual orientation, including Kraft-Ebbing and Hirschfield, who through Freud and Jung 
spread these ideas to the rest of the psychological community. Writing nearly a century after 
Ulrichs, Alfred Kinsey’s great contribution to the scientific view of sexual orientation was to 
describe it as a continuum ranging from heterosexual to homosexual rather than a set of discrete 
categories, operationalized in his famous Kinsey Scale. Yet despite his assertion that “the living 
world is a continuum in each and every one of its aspects” (p. 639, emphasis added), Kinsey’s 
work on sexual orientation (like that of Ulrichs and even Plato before him) reinforced the 
traditional Western view of gender as a set of two discrete categories.  
Indeed, the assumption that the world is divided into men and women is the premise from 
which all modern measures of sexual orientation begin. To indicate my position on the Kinsey 
Scale, for example, I must first be able to identify my own gender as male or female, after which 
I must identify the proportions of men and women among my preferred partners. That genders 
other than male and female might exist, or that the single term “gender” might conceal a 
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constellation of constructs ranging from chromosomes to clothing style, does not feature in the 
Kinsey Scale. Even more complex multidimensional sexual orientation measures such as Shively 
and DeCecco’s sexual orientation scale (1977) or Klein’s Sexual Orientation Grid (1985) make 
no mention of either the ill-defined construct of gender or the assumption that gender is binary in 
their critiques of the Kinsey Scale. Nor have new conceptualizations or measures of sexual 
orientation been forthcoming in the decades since the 1980s (though for notable exceptions see 
e.g. Diamond, 2003 and van Anders, 2015). On the contrary, Vrangalova and Savin-Williams 
(2012) note that the three categories of heterosexual, bisexual, and homosexual “have become so 
culturally and politically entrenched in contemporary societies that they have achieved the status 
of ‘natural kinds,’ that is, naturally occurring rather than socially constructed distinctions” (p. 
85). Clearly, scientists and society alike have settled on a sexual orientation measure, one with 
the gender binary at its core. 
Yet for several decades now, researchers from a variety of disciplines have slowly 
problematized the view of gender as a dichotomy between male and female. As early as 1955, 
John Money and his colleagues were distinguishing between sex (biological factors) and gender 
(social factors), and by 1972, they described chromosomal, gonadal, and hormonal sexes as well 
as gender identities and roles (Muehlenhard & Peterson, 2011). Subsequent research on intersex 
conditions (e.g. Fausto-Sterling, 2000; Consortium, 2006) has made clear that chromosomes, 
gonads, hormones, genitals, and secondary sex characteristics can each take multiple forms, and 
while certain combinations are more common, the form of any one cannot perfectly predict the 
forms of the others. Likewise, many transgender theorists have critiqued the view of gender 
identities and roles as binary and categorical (e.g. Bornstein, 1996; Butler, 2006; Califia, 1997), a 
view which is supported by recent theory and empirical research in psychology (Tate et al., 
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2014; Joel et al., 2014). Converging evidence would seem to suggest that gender is vastly more 
complex than the man/woman dichotomy that underlies standard sexual orientation measures, 
but researchers have yet to fully acknowledge, much less address, this essential problem with the 
construct. 
Who is Harmed by the Status Quo? 
Retaining the standard sexual orientation question is detrimental to people with 
marginalized sexual and gender identities and impedes progress toward a scientific 
understanding of sexuality and its relationship to gender.  In particular, the experiences of people 
with non-binary gender identities cannot be fit into the standard categories, while those of 
transgender people are reshaped to better fit the standard model (and often inconsistently at that). 
This systematic inattention to these most marginalized groups has already negatively affected 
their health and social outcomes, and is likely to continue to do so until researchers alter their 
practices to include (or perhaps even focus on) these communities. From a methodological 
standpoint, too, imprecise definitions and systematic inattention to data which contradict 
commonly-held views are antithetical to the scientific method and the pursuit of greater 
understanding about the world around us. Taken together, these are compelling reasons to revise 
our measures of sexual orientation and think broadly about new ways to conceptualize these 
constructs. 
Transgender people with binary gender identities.  
 Researchers attempting to collect and report the sexual orientations of transgender 
people were among the first scientists to be confronted with the ambiguity of traditional sexual 
orientation measures. Among the most immediate questions to be answered was this: how should 
a person’s sexual orientation be reported when their assigned sex and gender identity differ? 
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Sadly, instead of using this opportunity to rethink the assumptions underlying sexual orientation 
measures, early psychologists simply defined away the problem, choosing to bend transgender 
participants’ experiences to fit the standard heterosexual/homosexual model rather than 
acknowledging their embodiment of the model’s limitations. For example, in the field of clinical 
psychology/psychiatry, “nearly all investigators have referenced the sexual orientation of 
transsexuals to birth sex” (Lawrence, 2010, p. 515) in preference to transgender people’s self-
definitions, presentations, or even their genitals and hormonal makeup. Such an approach cannot 
even be called bio-essentialist. Far from asserting a particular scientifically-based location or 
criteria for gender, the decision to privilege “birth sex” merely reifies the (culturally constructed) 
gender binary by means of an appeal to the equally culturally constructed concept of sex 
assigned at birth. 
In a similar move to de-emphasize the disruptive potential of considering transgender 
experiences, the Institute of Medicine’s recent report on the health of LGBT individuals (2011) 
states that “whether a sexual act or romantic attraction is characterized as homosexual or 
heterosexual depends on the biological sex of the individuals involved, relative to each other” (p. 
27, emphasis added).  On the next pages, the authors “clarify” their previous definition by stating 
that “sexual orientation refers to an enduring pattern of sexual or romantic activity with men, 
women, transgender persons, or some combination of these groups” and acknowledging that 
some people may “have a specific attraction toward transgender persons” (p. 28, emphasis 
added). This wording casts transgender people as possible objects of desire while denying their 
existence as agents capable of desiring. Thus, even as trans identities are erased by describing 
biological sex as the only appropriate site by which to determine the “homosexuality” or 
“heterosexuality” of an act, trans identities are recognized as possible targets of desire.  
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 Setting aside this simultaneous erasure and eroticization of trans identities, as well as the 
authors’ assumption that transgender people cannot be men or women, their statements do 
nonetheless suggest a recognition that gender is not a unitary construct and that genders other 
than male and female can exist. While this realization could have led to a critique of commonly-
held ideas about sexual orientation, the authors chose instead to work within the existing 
gendered framework for sexual orientation, opting to simplify the picture of sexual orientation 
rather than acknowledging its probable complexity.  
Yet this dogged adherence to traditional views of sexual orientation fails to simplify the 
situation – rather, it renders suspect any data collected using such measures, as we have no 
satisfying definition of the criteria used to assess sexual orientation and no guarantee that the 
researchers and participants were using the same criteria. For example, consider a transgender 
woman who has sex with women. If the researchers ask her for her sex assigned at birth, she may 
report “woman,” even if her original birth certificate stated otherwise (e.g. Balarajan et al., 
2011). If the researchers ask her for her sexual orientation, she will likely report that she is a 
lesbian, which the researchers may or may not “translate” into an assumption of heterosexuality 
under their assigned-sex-based model.  Even if the researchers ask her whether she has sex with 
men or women, she may (quite reasonably) report the gender identities of her partners rather than 
their sex assigned at birth, but researchers may assume that her partners are cisgender. 
This approach to research with transgender people betrays a deep-seated distrust of 
transgender people’s lived, self-reported experience, a belief that their identities are not merely 
non-normative but also non-real. For scholars to hold such prejudices against their participants is 
unconscionable on ethical grounds alone, but it also renders their data next to useless. Given all 
of the definitional uncertainties described previously, interpreting other researchers’ data on 
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transgender people’s sexual orientations is difficult if not impossible. Social science, and indeed 
society at large, lacks a consistent, strictly applied operational definition of gender on which to 
anchor sexual orientation, and without such a definition, researchers cannot hope to conduct 
meta-analyses or even draw simple conclusions from one another’s work.  
People with non-binary gender identities. 
As we have seen from the experiences of binary-identified transgender people, it can be 
difficult to fit sexual desires, attractions, and behaviors into a researcher-approved sexual 
orientation category even among people who identify as men and women. These difficulties are 
only compounded further for people with non-binary gender identities and people who are 
attracted to people with non-binary genders. Current measures define sexual orientation in the 
relationship between your gender and the gender(s) of your partners, which makes a certain 
amount of sense in a world with two and only two genders; if the researchers know your gender 
and your sexual orientation, they know what gender(s) your partners will have.  
If we acknowledge the existence of more than two genders, however, knowing your 
gender and your sexual orientation won’t always let researchers know what gender(s) your 
partners will have. A heterosexual genderqueer person may be attracted to (any one of) men, 
women, agender people, bigender people, etc., while a bisexual person of any gender may be 
attracted to any combination of two or more genders. This imprecision means that many non-
binary individuals (and their partners) will be unable to fully convey their sexual identities to 
researchers, while leaving researchers unaware that they are missing any information.  
Furthermore, the intelligibility of these categories seems to depend entirely on how 
literally non-binary people are willing to interpret the labels. Even the theoretically 
straightforward case where a person is attracted other people of their own gender seems complex 
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for participants in practice.  For example, consider the perspective of this participant quoted in 
Galupo et al. (2014): 
“As a person who is gender queer and who prefers the same in partners, I have a hard 
time figuring out if I am homosexual or not! It depends on the solidity of your gender 
category which I don’t have” (p. 441).  
 
This quote points to two important considerations. One is that participants are generally 
motivated to give researchers the information they’re asking for, and will consider the context of 
the entire survey in order to do so (Schwartz, 1999). Common sexual orientation questions thus 
put non-binary participants in an awkward situation, unable to answer in a way that serves their 
needs (represents their self-identity) or their perceptions of the researcher’s needs (to accurately 
categorize them).  The second, related point is that individuals with non-binary gender identities 
are likely to interpret sexual orientation questions in the context of the type and quality of gender 
questions included in the survey (see Chapter 4 for evidence about identity threat from question 
wordings). As the person above indicates, the choice of sexual orientation category for a non-
binary person depends in large part on the solidity they perceive in the researchers’ conceptions 
of gender.  A researcher who asks a very clear, non-binary inclusive gender question may be 
perceived as having more “solid” gender categories, which may prompt participants like the one 
above to identify themselves differently than they otherwise would.  
These considerations become particularly relevant as minority-inclusive gender questions 
are used more frequently; while gender questions can signal an awareness of non-binary gender 
identities, sexual orientation questions have not kept pace. Even surveys conducted by and for 
transgender and gender non-conforming people have been reluctant to rethink the status quo of 
sexual orientation measures. For example, the National Transgender Discrimination Survey, the 
largest and most comprehensive studies of transgender experiences to date, included four 
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separate, innovative questions assessing various aspects of gender identity and presentation and 
was in nearly all respects highly inclusive of gender minorities (Grant et al., 2011). Yet they 
included only a single question assessing sexual orientation, and that question still adheres 
closely to the norm despite adding “queer” and “asexual” categories and a free-text box. Even 
looking back on this after the fact, the authors of this report argued that “there were very few true 
‘others’ that didn’t approximate the concepts that were listed” (p. 201) and contended that the 
free-text option should be dropped. 
 
Figure 1. Sexual orientation question from the National Transgender Discrimination 
Survey (Grant et al., 2011). 
 
Of course, sexual orientation was not the primary research interest for these authors, and 
they were dealing with significant constraints on survey length, participant interest, and 
resources for coding responses. Yet these obstacles exist for the vast majority of social science 
researchers, and it is somewhat disappointing that even a team of researchers (many of whom are 
themselves transgender) focused solely on the experiences of transgender people would not 
attempt to adjust this particular question to better capture the experiences of people with non-
binary genders.  
No doubt some will argue that labels like “queer” are inclusive of people with non-binary 
genders, which to a limited extent is true. However useful the word may be from a political and 
social standpoint, the term “queer” is too broad and too difficult to operationally define to be 
particularly useful for most empirical research, as it is used differently by different people and 
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can encompass nearly all non-heterosexual identities. Thus, the term “queer” may serve as little 
more than a glorified “other” box, concealing an array of different experiences which might 
provide insight into a variety of research problems. For that matter, participants who select the 
“other” box are also likely to have sexual identities which break the mold, and there may be quite 
a lot of them. In a recent review of data from several nationally representative U.S. samples, 
Carpenter (2013) reports that between 0.2% and 4.0% of the population selects the “Other” or 
“Not Sure” option on sexual orientation questions if one is provided. In comparison, he finds that 
between 1% and 2.3% of the general population identifies as gay or lesbian.   
In addition to their relative uselessness to researchers, survey options like “other” and 
“queer” may be emotionally fraught for some participants, discouraging their use. Participants in 
a UK cognitive interview about the design of minority-inclusive gender questions argued that the 
term “other” has “connotations of being strange and is offensive” (Balarajan et al. 2011, p. 42), a 
sentiment which is probably shared by US participants indicating their sexual orientations. Those 
over 35 are more likely to regard the word “queer” as a homophobic slur than a reclaimed term 
of pride and self-definition. In one notable example, a 66-year-old gay man complained to the 
Colorado Attorney General after seeing the word used in the (voluntary) demographic section of 
a Colorado College job application (Cotton, 2013). 
As we see here, researchers can create a cycle of invisibility merely by using the current 
sexual orientation framework, even with minor adjustments like the addition of options like 
“other,” “queer,” and/or “please specify” options. Although non-binary people cannot express 
their sexual identities in the current framework, the question structure gives them few ways to 
indicate their dissatisfaction. As described previously, the “other” and “queer” catch-alls are little 
help to researchers, and the inclusion of free-text boxes is unlikely to solve the problem either. 
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So long as the coders who analyze these data conceptualize sexual orientation as 
heterosexual/bisexual/homosexual, even responses which clearly deviate from the expected 
pattern will be interpreted through its lens and repackaged as “approximating” the recognized 
categories. Researchers using the standard sexual orientation measures will have no evidence 
that anyone is dissatisfied, and without evidence of a problem, future researchers will imitate 
past researchers. 
Despite this tendency to perpetuate invisibility, some researchers have asked more 
nuanced questions about participants’ perceptions of standard sexual orientation questions, and 
their data corroborate many of these more theoretical objections to their use. Galupo et al. (2014) 
conducted an online survey of 285 convenience-sampled participants who identified as sexual 
minorities (i.e. nonheterosexual people). Participants completed both the Kinsey Scale and the 
Klein Sexual Orientation Grid and gave free-text responses to the following question: “In what 
ways did this scale capture or fail to capture your sexuality?” Thematic analyses revealed several 
main themes in these free-text responses, including the idea that sexual orientation is about self-
identification rather than behavior21; that sexual orientations and identities are influenced by 
sociocultural factors; and that identities can be fluid.  
Most importantly for our purposes, several transgender participants and participants with 
non-binary genders commented that sexual orientation measures do not fully capture their sexual 
identities, both because they are based in a gender binary and because they cannot account for 
fluidity in gender and sexual identities. They further noted feeling uncertainty about defining 
sexual orientation on the basis of sex; as one participant said; 
                                                 
21 This point is frequently acknowledged by researchers creating more modern sexual orientation measures, but is 
not always preserved when results of those measures are used (e.g. in health care settings). 
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“this scale asks me to talk about the sex characteristics of the people I am attracted to, not 
their gender identity or presentation, which is much more of a factor in my own attraction 
than sex characteristics” (p. 449).  
 
It seems that, when given the chance to express their opinions about standard sexual orientation 
questions, many people (especially transgender people or those with non-binary gender 
identities) find the current sexual orientation questions painfully limiting and inadequate. 
Partners of transgender people and/or those with non-binary gender identities. 
 Because sexual orientation is an inherently relational construct, sexual orientation 
measures that misrepresent and overlook transgender and non-binary people will do the same to 
their partners. Partners of people with non-binary gender identities have no way to express this 
on current sexual orientation measures, while the partners of binary-identified transgender people 
cannot be sure that researchers will correctly or consistently identify their partners’ gender. In 
either case, the limitations of current sexual orientation measure may result in a 
miscategorization of their sexual orientations by proxy. As one queer trans man quoted in 
Garofalo (2014) wondered, 
“Is my partner ‘really gay’ as some have argued he’s not, because he’s with a female-
bodied transman? Am I incidentally hetero if I’m with a pre-transition transguy who’s 
physically female?” (p. 449).  
This quote points to yet another concerning consequence of the psychological tradition of 
classifying transgender people’s sexual orientations on the basis of sex assigned at birth. 
Conceptualizing sexual orientation in this way reifies the fear among cisgender men that being 
attracted to or having sex with a transgender woman means they’re “actually gay”; after all, 
that’s exactly how most psychologists and the Institute of Medicine currently classify such 
activities. As fears of identity misclassification (being misperceived as homosexual) seem to 
underlie both homophobia and transphobia in cisgender men (Nagoshi et al., 2008), this 
particular classification scheme exacerbates the already high risk of discrimination and violence 
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transgender women regularly face (Grant et al., 2011). Even when not contributing to outright 
violence against gender minorities, researchers who use standard sexual orientation measures 
prevent their participants from expressing desire for transgender and non-binary people, which 
perpetuates the simultaneous invisibility and intense stigmatization of these desires.  
What are the Practical Problems with Current Sexual Orientation Measures? 
By misinterpreting and ignoring the sexual identities and experiences of transgender and 
non-binary people, current sexual orientation measures may compromise the health and social 
outcomes of gender minorities. This happens most frequently when clinicians, practitioners, or 
researchers use sexual orientation as a proxy for other information of interest (e.g. fertility, STI 
risk) without acknowledging or accounting for the error this introduces. If researchers interpret 
participants’ responses in ways that are inconsistent with the participants’ lived experiences, 
researchers risk drawing factually inaccurate conclusions from their data (as well as alienating 
and marginalizing their patients/participants). This inaccurate data may in turn be used to support 
inappropriate care for individuals as well as counterproductive health and social policies, 
harming gender minorities and society more generally. In the following section, I will explore 
one major area in which sexual orientation measures are inappropriately used with negative 
consequences for gender minorities: the provision of health care. 
 Several major medical and public health organizations recognize sexual and gender 
minorities as among the highest-risk, most marginalized populations from a public health 
standpoint (e.g. Institute of Medicine, 2011; Department of Health and Human Services, 2013; 
American Psychological Association, 2008), and all have identified inadequate demographic 
questions as a barrier to improving care. The scientific community has failed to consistently and 
accurately collect information about the most marginalized groups, despite the fact that the 
  
242 
 
members of these communities are most in need of research and intervention. When viewed from 
this perspective, the frequently-raised objection that more specific or complex sexual orientation 
questions might be inconvenient or uncomfortable for “the majority” of patients (i.e. cisgender 
heterosexual people; Redford & Van Wagenen, 2008) seems a small price to pay.  
 Sexual orientation information is perhaps most ubiquitously (and, I would argue, 
inappropriately) used in two primary health care circumstances; when providing contraceptives, 
and when preventing and treating sexually transmitted infections. In the following sections I 
explore the reasons why sexual orientation questions are inappropriate for these circumstances 
and suggest practical alternatives.  
Birth control and fertility. 
Although clinicians routinely rely on sexual orientation questions to determine which 
patients should receive birth control, sexual orientation is a poor proxy for fertility or the 
likelihood of pregnancy. Consider, for example, the number of potentially flawed assumptions 
being made by any clinician who offers a sexually-active heterosexual woman a prescription for 
birth control pills and assumes she must want to get pregnant when she turns it down (cf. 
Morrison & Dinkel, 2012). 
This presumes first that all women are cisgender and have the (functional) reproductive 
organs necessary to carry a pregnancy, which isn’t the case for some intersex women, trans 
women, or cis women with any of various medical conditions resulting in infertility. Of course, 
trans women may also want birth control if they are capable of impregnating a partner, and 
providers must be willing and able to offer condoms and vasectomies to these women rather than 
assuming that gender identity indicates the appropriate type of birth control. 
  
243 
 
Next, the clinician presumes that a heterosexual woman’s partner is always a cisgender 
man with the (functional) reproductive organs necessary to impregnate her.  As noted previously, 
trans women may wish to prevent themselves from impregnating a partner, while even 
heterosexual cis women capable of becoming pregnant may be partnered with infertile cis men or 
with trans men, or people with non-binary gender identities who do not have the necessary 
reproductive organs to impregnate them. Alternatively, they may partner with other cis women 
while still identifying as heterosexual (e.g. Vrangalova & Savin-Williams, 2012); in each of 
these cases, birth control would be unnecessary.    
Finally, the clinician assumes that all heterosexual women who say they are sexually 
active mean that they are engaging in types of sexual activity capable of making them pregnant. 
However, even fertile cisgender women who are sexually active with fertile cisgender men are 
not necessarily engaging in types of sex that can result in pregnancy. Recent research indicates a 
great deal of variability in perceptions of the meaning of the phrase “had sex.” For example, oral 
and anal sex as well as mutual masturbation seem to constitute “sexual activity” to a significant 
portion of the population (Sanders et al., 2010) but virtually never result in pregnancy. 
Conversely, 10.9% of respondents felt that penile-vaginal intercourse did not constitute “having 
sex” if it was not accompanied by ejaculation, and 5.2% felt that penile-vaginal intercourse was 
not “having sex” even if it did include ejaculation (Sanders et al., 2010), despite the potential risk 
of pregnancy with these sexual activities. 
Given the degree of inaccuracy introduced by each of the previous assumptions, 
clinicians who use sexual orientation as a proxy for birth control needs are doing a great 
disservice to their patients.  Simply asking patients whether they would like to learn about birth 
control options as a starting point would likely be equally effective, regardless of their gender, 
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fertility status, sexual orientation, sexual partners, or sexual activities. In addition, such questions 
might be more likely to result in educating cisgender men and people who plan to have types of 
sex that may cause pregnancy but haven’t done so yet. Using this more inclusive initial question 
gives patients the agency to describe their own contraceptive needs proactively, rather than 
passively reacting to a series of assumptions from their medical provider. After the conversation 
is started, medical practitioners can follow up with more specific questions (e.g. Are you 
interested in hormonal or barrier or surgical methods? How long-lasting do you want the 
contraceptive technique to be?) as they usually would.  
Sexually transmitted infections. 
 In addition to contraception counseling, medical practitioners and public health workers 
frequently use sexual orientation (and to a lesser extent the nominally-better-defined relationship 
between one’s gender and the gender of one’s sexual partners) as a proxy for a person’s risk of 
contracting a sexually transmitted infection (STI). However, these questions virtually never 
operationally define the “sex” or “gender” used to anchor their assessment of sexual orientation 
or sexual behavior. They also fail to take into consideration the potential differences in definition 
used by practitioners and their patients; much like psychologists and their trans patients, public 
health workers may think “sex” means sex assigned at birth, while their respondents are more 
likely to think “sex” means current physical status and/or gender identity. When assessing STI 
risk, these differences are crucially important. 
Blood donation policies are one example. Even after recent proposed reforms take effect, 
men who have had sex with men (MSM) in the past year will still be considered ineligible to 
donate blood. While this deferral is controversial (and even opposed by the Red Cross), the FDA 
argues that the policy reflects appropriate caution considering the high rates of HIV among MSM 
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(FDA, 2015). This assessment, although crude, seems to have more grounding in evidence; the 
FDA reports that 61% of all new HIV infections in the United States in 2010 were among men 
who have sex with men, although these people make up only about 2% of the population (FDA, 
2015). However, the prevalence of HIV among transgender women (28%) may be as high as that 
among even the most marginalized group of men who have sex with men (young urban black 
men), yet no blood donation screening questions even attempt to identify transgender women 
(Ard & Makadon, 2012).  
While the FDA may regard transgender women as “men” by virtue of their sex assigned 
at birth, they certainly do not define themselves as such; trans women are therefore unlikely to 
indicate that they are “men who have sex with men” when asked during donor screening. By 
failing to operationally define “sex” or “gender” for in their donor regulations (or making any 
other provisions for identifying gender minorities), the FDA hypocritically permits a readily 
identifiable high-risk population (transgender women) to donate blood. Of course, an ideal 
deferral policy would be based as closely as possible on information about the actual risk 
behavior of interest (e.g. penile-anal intercourse, multiple sex partners, coerced sex), rather than 
using a person’s gender as a proxy. Unfortunately, the FDA is unlikely to revise its position until 
research yields evidence of the efficacy of alternate screening questions, and the inconsistency 
with which it applies its own policies in the meantime is deeply concerning. Equally concerning 
is the lack of research attention being directed toward better understanding the sexual lives of 
non-heterosexuals and transgender people (IoM, 2011; Ard & Makadon, 2012), who are surely 
among the most marginalized and at-risk populations of Americans from a public health 
standpoint.  
Necessary Features of an Inclusive Sexual Orientation Measure 
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In a first attempt to address this long-standing problem, we designed a set of sexual 
orientation questions designed to be inclusive of transgender and non-binary identities as well as 
asexual identities. Following previous research on the usability of standard sexual orientation 
questions for transgender, non-binary, and asexual individuals (e.g. Bogaert, 2013; Galupo et al., 
2014; Garofalo, 2014; van Anders, 2015), we identified the following features as necessary for 
an inclusive sexual orientation measure: 
1. Gender must not be viewed as binary. 
As a bare minimum requirement, an inclusive sexual orientation question must provide a way 
for participants to indicate an attraction to or behavior with transgender people and/or non-binary 
people. Commonly used sexual orientation measures like the Kinsey Scale (Kinsey, Pomeroy, & 
Martin, 1948) and the Klein Grid (Klein, 1985) are anchored by binary gender categories (i.e. 
men and women), and are thus inherently non-inclusive of transgender and non-binary identities. 
In addition, they generally provide no integrated way to indicate a lack of attraction to or 
behavior with anyone, making them non-inclusive for asexual identities. These are not merely 
issues for inclusion, but also for data validity (see Chapter 1). 
2. Participants’ genders must be measured separately from genders they are attracted 
to.  
Sexual identity categories like “heterosexual,” “homosexual,” and “bisexual” are 
fundamentally statements about the relationship between one’s own gender and the genders of 
one’s partners, and are predicated on the assumption that there are only two genders. As such, 
they lose clarity and meaning when they encounter non-binary identities. For example, as 
discussed earlier, it is conceptually unclear whether a man who is attracted to women and 
genderqueer people should label himself “heterosexual” (as he is attracted to people of genders 
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other than his own) or “bisexual” (as he is attracted to people of more than one gender), and 
equally unclear what sexual identity labels (if any) are appropriate for non-binary people.  
Researchers and participants also disagree (among themselves and with each other) about 
whether assigned sex at birth or gender identity serve as the conceptual underpinning of gender 
in sexual orientation. That is, when assigned sex and gender identity differ, which should one 
reference when describing one’s sexual orientation? In clinical psychology “nearly all 
investigators have referenced the sexual orientation of transsexuals to birth sex” (Lawrence, 
2010, p. 515), and the Institute of Medicine (2011) argues that “whether a sexual act or romantic 
attraction is characterized as homosexual or heterosexual depends on the biological sex of the 
individuals involved, relative to each other” (p. 27, emphasis added). However, previous 
research with transgender people and their partners makes clear that many of them declare their 
sexual identities on the basis of gender identity instead (e.g. Balarajan et al., 2011; Galupo, 
2014). 
 Both of these factors introduce a great deal of noise into the meaning of sexual identity 
labels, and make predicting the target genders of a participants’ attractions and behaviors from 
their sexual identities an extremely confusing prospect. The binary assumptions inherent in 
common sexual orientation questions are also a source of great dissatisfaction for participants 
who have relationships with trans and non-binary people or who are trans or non-binary 
themselves (Galupo, 2014), potentially undermining their engagement/participation in health 
care and research settings which use these questions (Meier & Labuski, 2013). 
3. Participants must be able to indicate attraction to multiple genders, one, or none in 
an integrated way. 
 
As described in the previous paragraphs, categorical identity-based measures make it 
impossible to tell which genders a person is attracted to once the assumption of binary genders 
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has been lifted. Likewise, measures like the Kinsey Scale do not provide an integrated way to 
indicate attraction to genders other than “men” and “women” or a lack of attraction to anyone. 
To reduce social desirability effects, an inclusive measure must provide for all of these 
possibilities without implying that one scenario is “typical.” 
4. The components of sexual orientation (identity, attraction, and behavior) must be 
measured separately. 
 
There is general consensus among sexuality researchers that sexual orientation is a 
multidimensional construct. While researchers may differ in the exact constructs and definitions 
they use, a distinction between identity, attraction, and behavior is very common (e.g. Rosario & 
Schrimshaw, 2014; Bancroft, 2009). Researchers of bisexuality (e.g. Klein, 1985; Weinberg, 
Williams, & Pryor, 1994) and asexuality (e.g. Bogaert, 2013) have also observed that people 
may have different sexual and romantic attractions. Therefore, to remain up-to-date with modern 
conceptions of sexual orientation and appropriately capture the nuance of participants’ 
experiences, these constructs should be measured separately.  
General Method 
Overview 
While a variety of measures have the capacity to meet the requirements for transgender, 
non-binary, and asexual-inclusive sexual orientation questions we have just described, we chose 
to focus on sexual orientation questions suitable for inclusion in standard demographic sections 
of surveys and screening forms. Rather than using a Likert-type scale as done in the Kinsey 
Scale, we opted for a multi-select model. Participants were shown a multi-select list of genders, 
as well as a “Nobody” option and a write-in choice, and asked to indicate which genders of 
people they were attracted to or had ever had sex/romantic relationships with. They were asked 
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about their sexual attraction, sexual behavior, romantic attraction, and romantic behavior 
separately.  
We then pilot-tested these questions with undergraduate students for three semesters to 
determine their usability as well as their divergence from a standard single-item identity-based 
sexual orientation measure. We hypothesized that most participants would be able and willing to 
answer the questions, that identity, romantic attraction, sexual attraction, romantic behavior, and 
sexual behavior would emerge as distinct (but related) constructs, and that participants with a 
variety of sexual identities would report attraction to and behavior with transgender and non-
binary people.  
Participants 
Participants were undergraduate students at a large Midwestern university. Our questions 
were included in the mass testing survey conducted each semester, which contains demographic 
questions and pre-screening measures for various experiments being conducted in the 
psychology department. At the start of each semester, all students in several introductory-level 
psychology classes are strongly encouraged to complete the survey, and they receive course 
credit for doing so.  
Materials 
Binary gender question and traditional sexual orientation question. 
A binary gender question (What is your gender? Male/Female) and a traditional sexual 
orientation question (What is your sexual orientation? Heterosexual/Straight; 
Homosexual/Gay/Lesbian; Bisexual/Pansexual; Other (Asexual, Questioning)) were included as 
part of the standard demographics in every mass testing survey. 
 Other gender questions. 
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As part of another study we were conducting, participants were asked up to four 
transgender inclusive gender questions, including a pair of questions about gender identity and 
sex assigned at birth, and a series of questions about the strength of their identification with 
various gender identities. For the sake of space, we have not yet considered the sexual 
orientation questions in light of participants’ responses to these other gender questions, but we 
plan to do so in future. However, it is possible that the presence of these questions immediately 
before our new sexual orientation questions shaped participant responding. 
 New sexual orientation questions. 
 As described in the introduction, we designed a series of four questions to assess two 
major dimensions of sexual orientation with relevance to gender - attraction and behavior. We 
further subdivided these dimensions into sexual and romantic forms.  These questions were as 
follows: 
 What genders of people are you sexually attracted to? 
 What genders of people are you romantically attracted to? 
 What genders of people have you had any kind of sex with? 
 What genders of people have you had romantic relationships with? 
All four questions had the same basic response options (participants could select multiple): 
 Cisgender men 
 Cisgender women 
 Transgender men 
 Transgender women 
 Genderqueer people or people with other non-binary genders 
 I am not (romantically/sexually) attracted to anyone. / I have not had (any kind of 
sex/romantic relationships) with anyone. 
 Other [free text box] 
Procedure 
All survey questions were included in the mass testing survey each semester, and 
presented alongside a variety of measures being collected for other psychology experiments. The 
  
251 
 
mass testing survey was administered through Qualtrics, and participants completed it online at a 
time and location of their choice. The binary gender and traditional sexual orientation questions 
were always asked before the trans-inclusive gender questions and the new sexual orientation 
questions, but the number and kind of questions presented in between differed from semester to 
semester.  
Hypotheses and Plan for Analysis 
 To reduce participants’ responses to the new sexual orientation questions, we created 20 
new categories to represent common response patterns. These were as follows: 
 Participants who selected no options (1 category) 
 Participants who selected only one option (7 categories, one for each choice) 
 Participants who selected cisgender men and one other choice (6 categories, one for each 
combination) 
 Participants who selected cisgender women and one other choice (5 categories, one for 
each combination) 
  Participants who selected three or more choices (1 category) 
Participants were placed into one of the twenty categories for each of the four new sexual 
orientation questions. As a comparison point, we categorized participants according to their 
responses to the binary gender and traditional sexual orientation question, yielding eight possible 
categories (heterosexual man, heterosexual woman, gay man, lesbian woman, bisexual man, 
bisexual woman, other man, other woman). 
We defined and tested our hypotheses as follows.  
Hypothesis 1: Participants will be able and willing to answer these new questions. 
 First, we expected that most participants would answer the questions rather than leaving 
them completely blank. Participants who had missing data in otherwise complete surveys (i.e. 
who viewed all the new sexual orientation questions but did not answer them) were categorized 
as unwilling to answer these questions.  
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 Next, we expected that most participants would not feel the need to write in responses in 
the provided “Other” option, as we hoped that our response options already covered most 
possibilities that participants would want to report. We also recognized that participants might 
use the free text box to express dissatisfaction with the design or wording of the question. 
Whatever the cause, we considered use of the “Other” option to be another indicator of 
participants’ unwillingness and/or inability to answer the new questions. 
 Finally, we expected that the majority of participants’ responses to these new questions 
would resemble their answers to the traditional sexual orientation question. While we argue that 
identity, attraction, and behavior are different constructs (i.e. they are theoretically distinct, and 
do not always occur in any particular combination), previous research and theory still suggests 
that these constructs are consistent for a majority of people, in part because people often base 
their identities on their own attractions and behavior.  If responses to our new sexual orientation 
questions diverged too dramatically from responses to the traditional sexual orientation question 
(for example, if most heterosexual men indicated sexual attraction to cisgender men), we would 
have reason to doubt the validity of our new questions.  
 Hypothesis 2: Sexual identity is a distinct construct from attraction and behavior. 
 Following previous research (cf. Rosario & Schrimshaw, 2014), we expect that sexual 
identity as measured by the traditional sexual orientation question is a distinct construct from 
sexual attraction and behavior. Thus, we predict that for some participants, their reported sexual 
attractions and behaviors will differ from what might be expected based on their sexual identity. 
However, as described in Hypothesis 1, this does not mean that we expect all participants to 
show different responses to the traditional sexual orientation question and the new ones. Because 
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the concept of “difference” between these constructs can be defined in a variety of ways, we 
tested this hypothesis in two ways.  
 We first used a liberal definition of “difference,” working from the strong version of 
assumptions we imagined researchers might make about participants based on their sexual 
identities. For our liberal definition, we presumed that sexual identity implied the following: 
 Heterosexual identity implies sexual attraction and behavior with cisgender men or 
nobody (for women) or cisgender women or nobody only (for men). 
  Gay/lesbian identity implies sexual attraction and behavior with cisgender men or 
nobody (for men) or cisgender women or nobody (for women). 
 Bisexual/pansexual identity implies sexual attraction and behavior with cisgender men 
and/or women or nobody.  
We did not make specific predictions about the attractions or behaviors of people who selected 
the “Other” option, as we thought most researchers would likewise not make assumptions about 
the attractions or behaviors of this category. 
 Next, we used a conservative definition of “difference,” using a weaker version of the 
assumptions we imagined researchers would make. For our conservative definition, we presumed 
the following: 
 Heterosexual identity implies no sexual attraction or behavior with cisgender women (for 
women) or cisgender men (for men). 
  Gay/lesbian identity implies no sexual attraction or behavior with cisgender women (for 
men) or cisgender men (for women). 
We did not make specific predictions about the attractions or behaviors of people who identified 
as bisexual/pansexual or who selected the “Other” option.  
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Hypotheses 3 and 4:  Attraction and behavior are distinct constructs, and they each 
have distinct romantic and sexual forms. 
 
We expected that in a substantial proportion of cases, participants’ responses to the 
attraction and behavior questions would differ from each other, and that their responses to the 
romantic and sexual questions would also differ. As with Hypothesis 2, we tested this hypothesis 
with two different definitions of “difference.”  
We first used a liberal definition of difference. If participants were grouped into different 
categories for ANY of the four new sexual orientation questions, their answers were considered 
“not consistent.” We next used a more conservative definition of difference. We omitted 
inconsistencies because of the “Nobody” category, reasoning that at least some researchers who 
use the sexual orientation question would be aware that people do not always act on their 
attractions. We also noted that many of those who selected “Other” simply added more detail 
about their preferences for an already-listed gender, rather than listing another gender. Thus, we 
did not consider responses “inconsistent” if the only difference between categories came from 
selecting “Nobody” or from writing in an explanation.  
Hypothesis 5: Sexual orientation is not exclusively toward cisgender people or 
people with binary genders. 
 
We expected to find that some proportion of participants are sexually and/or romantically 
attracted to transgender and non-binary people.  Likewise, we expected that some proportion of 
participants would have sexual and/or romantic relationships with transgender and non-binary 
people. We regarded this hypothesis as supported if any participants indicated sexual or romantic 
attractions or behaviors with transgender men, transgender women, or non-binary people.  
Hypothesis 6: Sexual/romantic attraction and behavior with transgender/non-
binary people will occur across sexual identities. 
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 We expected that people with a variety of sexual identities would experience 
sexual/romantic attraction and sexual/romantic behavior with transgender and non-binary people.  
As described in the introduction (e.g. Lawrence, 2010; Galupo, 2014), researchers and 
participants vary in their categorizations of people who are attracted to binary transgender 
people. Some argue that assigned sex at birth is the relevant category (such that e.g. cis men 
attracted to trans women are homosexual), while others, including most trans people, argue that 
gender identity is the relevant category of comparison (such that e.g. cis men attracted to trans 
women are heterosexual). In addition, while terms like “pansexual” are generally interpreted as 
signaling attraction to/behavior with people with non-binary gender identities, we expected that 
at least some people who experience such attraction and behavior would use other identity terms 
(e.g. using “heterosexual” to mean “attraction to any gender other than my own”). 
Thus, due to a lack of cultural consensus around the identity implications of attraction to and 
behavior with binary and non-binary trans people, we expected to see these attractions and 
behavior among people from a variety of identity categories.  
Study 1: Fall 2014 
The participants, materials, and procedure in the Fall 2014 semester were identical to 
those described in the general method, with one exception. Due to a programming error, the 
question “What genders of people are you sexually attracted to?” had the response option “I am 
not romantically attracted to anyone.” and the question “What genders of people have you have 
romantic relationships with?” had the response option “I have not had any kind of sex with 
anyone.” A total of 2850 participants completed the entire survey. According to the binary 
gender and traditional sexual orientation question, the sample was 38% heterosexual men, 56% 
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heterosexual women, 0.6% lesbian women, 1.1% gay men, 0.7% bisexual men, 1.5% bisexual 
women, 0.2% “other” men, and 0.6% “other” women.  
Results and Discussion 
 
 Hypothesis 1.  
 Hypothesis 1 was generally supported; most participants seemed able and willing to 
answer the questions. Only 20 responses of 2850 (0.7%) were missing, which compares 
favorably to the 49 missing responses (1.7%) on the binary gender question. Some participants 
(between 2.8% and 3.6% depending on the question) did feel the need to write in responses, 
suggesting that the usability of the question can still be improved. We also noted that a small 
minority of participants (generally 2-3) selected the “Nobody” option and another option on each 
question, which does not make sense and suggests that some participants may have difficulty 
understanding the questions. Overall, though, most participants’ responses to the new sexual 
orientation question were congruent with their responses to the traditional sexual orientation 
question (see Hypothesis 2 for more detail), suggesting that most participants understood the 
questions and were able to answer them. 
 Hypothesis 2.  
 Hypothesis 2 was supported, consistent with previous research. Using a liberal 
interpretation of their sexual identities, the sexual attractions of 9.8% of participants were 
misclassified, and the sexual behavior of 6.5% was misclassified. Even with an extremely 
conservative interpretation of their sexual identities, the sexual attractions of 0.9% of participants 
were misclassified, and the sexual behavior of 0.3% was misclassified. 
Table 1. Inconsistent responses on sexual identity and sexual attraction/behavior – Fall 2014. 
 Liberal definition Conservative definition 
Attraction Behavior Attraction Behavior 
N % N % N % N % 
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All participants 279 9.8 185 6.5 25 0.9 10 0.3 
Heterosexual Men 99 3.5 75 2.6 9 0.3 4 0.1 
Heterosexual Women 151 5.3 84 2.9 11 0.4 2 0.1 
Gay Men 5 0.2 10 0.4 - - 1 <0.1 
Lesbian Women 8 0.3 9 0.3 5 0.2 3 0.1 
Bisexual Men 5 0.2 4 0.1  
Bisexual Women 11 0.4 3 0.1 
 
 Hypotheses 3 and 4.  
Hypotheses 3 and 4 were supported in a general sense. Between 30.5 % and 7.2% of 
participants had inconsistent responses on at least one of the four new sexual orientation 
questions (depending on definition), and there were participants with inconsistent answers across 
the four most plausible combinations of sexual and romantic attraction and behavior. However, 
the numbers of people with inconsistent responses dropped dramatically between the liberal and 
conservative definition, suggesting that most (though not all) of this inconsistency derives from 
people who have sexual/romantic attractions but have not acted on them.  
Table 2. Inconsistent responses on sexual/romantic attraction/behavior – Fall 2014. 
 Liberal 
definition 
Conservative 
definition 
N % N % 
Any inconsistent responses 868 30.5 206 7.2 
Romantic and Sexual Attraction Inconsistent 208 7.2 140 4.9 
Romantic and Sexual Behavior Inconsistent 500 17.5 80 2.8 
Romantic Attraction and Behavior Inconsistent 368 12.9 100 3.5 
Sexual Attraction and Behavior Inconsistent 792 27.8 149 5.2 
 
Hypothesis 5.  
Hypothesis 5 was supported; 3.6% of participants reported sexual/romantic attraction 
toward or sexual/romantic behavior with trans or non-binary people. Attraction (2.6%) was more 
common than behavior (1.3%), and proportions of attraction and behavior were roughly 
equivalent between trans men, trans women, and non-binary people. 
Table 3. Sexual/romantic attraction/behavior with non-cisgender people – Fall 2014. 
 Any non-cis Trans men Trans women Non-binary 
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N % N % N % N % 
Any attraction/behavior 103 3.6 54 1.9 58 2.0 55 1.9 
Romantic attraction 73 2.6 40 1.4 43 1.5 42 1.5 
Sexual attraction 73 2.6 30 1.1 42 1.5 33 1.2 
Romantic behavior 36 1.3 10 0.4 15 0.5 16 0.6 
Sexual behavior 40 1.4 15 0.5 16 0.6 20 0.7 
 
 Hypothesis 6. 
 Hypothesis 6 was supported; a small percentage of participants from almost all sexual 
identities reported sexual or romantic attraction or behavior with a trans or non-binary person. 
However, this was clearly more common among GLB participants (especially those who 
identified as bisexual/pansexual) than among heterosexuals, considering the much larger 
proportion of heterosexual people in the sample and the population. There was also no clear 
relationship between sexual identity and relative frequency of attraction or behavior with trans 
men, trans women, or non-binary people. That is, people from each identity category appeared to 
be attracted to/having relationships with trans people with a variety of gender identities and 
assigned sexes.  
Table 4. Any sexual/romantic attraction/behavior with non-cis people by sexual identity – Fall 
2014. 
 Any non-cis Trans men Trans women Non-binary 
N % N % N % N % 
Heterosexual men 45 1.6 17 0.6 29 1.0 16 0.6 
Heterosexual women 22 0.8 13 0.5 6 0.2 10 0.4 
Gay men 5 0.2 3 0.1 1 <0.1 3 0.1 
Lesbian women 3 0.1 2 0.1 2 0.1 2 0.1 
Bisexual men 6 0.2 5 0.2 4 0.1 5 0.2 
Bisexual women 15 0.5 11 0.4 11 0.4 14 0.5 
“Other” men - - - - - - - - 
“Other” women 5 0.2 3 0.1 4 0.1 4 0.1 
 
Study 2: Spring 2015 
 
The participants, materials, and procedure in the Spring 2015 semester were identical to 
those described in the general method. A total of 643 participants completed the entire survey. 
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According to the binary gender and traditional sexual orientation question, the sample was 26% 
heterosexual men, 68% heterosexual women, 0.2% lesbian women, 0.9% gay men, 0.8% 
bisexual men, 2.2% bisexual women, 0.3% “other” men, and 0.5% “other” women. 
Results and Discussion 
 
Hypothesis 1. 
 
Hypothesis 1 was less strongly supported than for Fall 2014, but most participants still 
seemed able and willing to answer the questions. The rate of missing responses was much higher 
(73 responses of 643, or 11.4%), while only 9 participants (1.4%) did not respond to the binary 
gender question. However, fewer participants (between 0.6% and 2.2% depending on the 
question) wrote in responses. Again, a small minority of participants selected the “Nobody” 
option and another option on each question. Most participants’ responses to the new sexual 
orientation question were congruent with their responses to the traditional sexual orientation 
question (see Hypothesis 2 for more detail). We tentatively concluded that most participants 
understood the questions, but we do not have an explanation for the dramatic increase in missing 
responses apart from variability in the other questions included in Mass Testing that semester.  
Hypothesis 2.  
Again, hypothesis 2 was supported. Using a liberal interpretation of their sexual 
identities, sexual attraction was misclassified for 6.7% of participants, and sexual behavior for 
2.8%. With the conservative interpretation of their sexual identities, sexual attraction was 
misclassified for 0.6% of participants, and sexual behavior for 0.6%.  
Table 5. Inconsistent responses on sexual identity and sexual attraction/behavior – Spring 2015. 
 Liberal definition Conservative definition 
Attraction Behavior Attraction Behavior 
N % N % N % N % 
All participants 43 6.7 18 2.8 4 0.6 4 0.6 
Heterosexual Men 6 0.9 2 0.3 1 0.2 - - 
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Heterosexual Women 25 3.9 12 1.9 3 0.5 2 0.3 
Gay Men 1 0.2 2 0.3 1 0.2 2 0.3 
Lesbian Women - - - - - - - - 
Bisexual Men 4 0.6 2 0.3  
Bisexual Women 7 1.1 - - 
 
Hypotheses 3 and 4.  
Hypotheses 3 and 4 were generally supported. Between 27.7% and 5.9% of participants 
had inconsistent responses on at least one of the four new sexual orientation questions, and there 
were participants with inconsistent answers across the four most plausible combinations of 
sexual and romantic attraction and behavior. As for Fall 2014, the numbers of people with 
inconsistent responses dropped dramatically between the liberal and conservative definition. 
Table 6. Inconsistent responses on new sexual orientation questions – Spring 2015. 
 Liberal 
definition 
Conservative 
definition 
N % N % 
Any inconsistent responses 178 27.7 38 5.9 
Romantic and Sexual Attraction Inconsistent 40 6.2 26 4.0 
Romantic and Sexual Behavior Inconsistent 113 17.6 15 2.3 
Romantic Attraction and Behavior Inconsistent 72 11.1 19 2.9 
Sexual Attraction and Behavior Inconsistent 163 25.3 32 4.9 
 
Hypothesis 5.  
 
Hypothesis 5 was supported; 3.7% of participants reported sexual/romantic attraction 
toward or sexual/romantic behavior with trans or non-binary people. Attraction (2.3-3.3%) was 
more common than behavior (0.5-0.6%). Proportions of attraction and behavior were roughly 
equivalent between trans men, trans women, and non-binary people, although no participants 
reported any romantic or sexual behavior with trans women. However, this might be due to a 
much smaller sample in Spring 2015. 
Table 7. Sexual/romantic attraction/behavior with non-cisgender people – Spring 2015 data. 
 Any non-cis Trans men Trans women Non-binary 
N % N % N % N % 
Any attraction/behavior 24 3.7 17 2.6 14 2.2 13 2.0 
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Romantic attraction 15 2.3 10 1.6 10 1.6 11 1.7 
Sexual attraction 21 3.3 13 2.0 11 1.7 11 1.7 
Romantic behavior 4 0.6 3 0.5 - - 1 0.2 
Sexual behavior 3 0.5 2 0.3 - - 1 0.2 
 
Hypothesis 6.  
Hypothesis 6 was somewhat supported, although less obviously than in Fall 2014. Given 
the extremely small numbers of LGB people in the Spring 2014 sample (only 31 non-
heterosexuals), several sexual identities were not represented among participants who reported 
sexual or romantic attraction or behavior with a trans or non-binary person. Again, this was more 
common among bisexual/pansexual people than among heterosexuals, and people from each 
identity category appeared to be attracted to/having relationships with trans people with a variety 
of gender identities and assigned sexes.  
Table 8. Any sexual/romantic attraction/behavior with non-cis people by sexual identity – Spring 
2015. 
 Any non-cis Trans men Trans women Non-binary 
N % N % N % N % 
Heterosexual men 3 0.5 1 0.2 2 0.3 1 0.2 
Heterosexual women 7 1.0 5 0.7 3 0.5 2 0.3 
Gay men - - - - - - - - 
Lesbian women - - - - - - - - 
Bisexual men 4 0.6 3 0.5 - - 2 0.3 
Bisexual women 8 1.2 7 1.0 7 1.0 7 1.0 
“Other” men - - - - - - - - 
“Other” women 2 0.3 1 0.2 2 0.3 - - 
 
Study 3: Fall 2015 
 
The participants, materials, and procedure in the Fall 2015 semester were identical to 
those described in the general method. A total of 1818 participants completed the entire survey. 
According to the binary gender and traditional sexual orientation question, the sample was 38% 
heterosexual men, 55% heterosexual women, 0.3% lesbian women, 1.5% gay men, 1.2% 
bisexual men, 2.8% bisexual women, 0.1% “other” men, and 0.6% “other” women. 
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Results and Discussion 
 
Hypothesis 1. 
Hypothesis 1 was supported; most participants still seemed able and willing to answer the 
questions. There were 25 missing responses (1.4%), which is similar to Fall 2014, much lower 
than for Spring 2015, and roughly equivalent to the number who did not respond to the binary 
gender question (23, or 1.3%). Between 2.8% and 3.6% of participants wrote in responses, 
similar to the proportion for the previous two semesters, and again, a small minority of 
participants selected the “Nobody” option and another option on each question. Most 
participants’ responses to the new sexual orientation question were congruent with their 
responses to the traditional sexual orientation question (see Hypothesis 2 for more detail). We 
concluded that most participants understood the questions. 
Hypothesis 2.  
Hypothesis 2 was supported. Using a liberal interpretation of their sexual identities, 
sexual attraction was misclassified for 9.6% of participants, and sexual behavior for 6.5%. With 
the conservative interpretation of their sexual identities, sexual attraction was misclassified for 
0.6% of participants, and sexual behavior for 0.4%.  
Table 9. Inconsistent responses on sexual identity and sexual attraction/behavior – Fall 2015. 
 Liberal definition Conservative definition 
Attraction Behavior Attraction Behavior 
N % N % N % N % 
All participants 174 9.6 118 6.5 10 0.6 8 0.4 
Heterosexual Men 53 2.9 39 2.1 3 0.2 5 0.3 
Heterosexual Women 76 4.2 61 3.4 6 0.3 2 0.1 
Gay Men 5 0.3 6 0.3 1 0.1 1 0.1 
Lesbian Women 1 0.1 2 0.1 - - - - 
Bisexual Men 9 0.5 6 0.3  
Bisexual Women 30 1.7 4 0.2 
 
Hypotheses 3 and 4. 
 
  
263 
 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 were generally supported. Between 28.4% and 9.9% of participants 
had inconsistent responses on at least one of the four new sexual orientation questions, and there 
were participants with inconsistent answers across the four most plausible combinations of 
sexual and romantic attraction and behavior. As for the previous two semesters, the numbers of 
people with inconsistent responses dropped dramatically between the liberal and conservative 
definition. 
Table 10. Inconsistent responses on new sexual orientation questions – Fall 2015 data. 
 Liberal 
definition 
Conservative 
definition 
N % N % 
Any inconsistent responses 516 28.4 181 9.9 
Romantic and Sexual Attraction Inconsistent 157 8.6 114 6.3 
Romantic and Sexual Behavior Inconsistent 331 18.2 91 5.0 
Romantic Attraction and Behavior Inconsistent 234 12.8 98 5.4 
Sexual Attraction and Behavior Inconsistent 438 24.0 136 7.5 
 
Hypothesis 5.  
Hypothesis 5 was supported; 6.1% of participants reported sexual/romantic attraction 
toward or sexual/romantic behavior with trans or non-binary people. Attraction (3.9-4.3%) was 
more common than behavior (1.6-1.8%). As before, proportions of attraction and behavior were 
roughly equivalent between trans men, trans women, and non-binary people. 
Table 11. Sexual/romantic attraction/behavior with non-cisgender people – Fall 2015. 
 Any non-cis Trans men Trans women Non-binary 
N % N % N % N % 
Any attraction/behavior 111 6.1 76 4.2 58 3.2 58 3.2 
Romantic attraction 70 3.9 54 3.0 34 1.9 42 2.3 
Sexual attraction 78 4.3 50 2.8 36 2.0 39 2.1 
Romantic behavior 33 1.8 10 0.6 10 0.6 17 0.9 
Sexual behavior 29 1.6 9 0.5 4 0.2 17 0.9 
 
Hypothesis 6.  
Hypothesis 6 was supported. Participants from almost all sexual identities reported sexual 
or romantic attraction or behavior with a trans or non-binary person. Again, this was more 
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common among bisexual/pansexual people than among heterosexuals, and people from each 
identity category appeared to be attracted to/having relationships with trans people with a variety 
of gender identities and assigned sexes.  
Table 12. Any sexual/romantic attraction/behavior with non-cis people by sexual identity - Fall 
2015. 
 Any non-cis Trans men Trans women Non-binary 
N % N % N % N % 
Heterosexual men 31 1.7 11 0.6 16 0.9 11 0.6 
Heterosexual women 24 1.3 18 1.0 9 0.5 6 0.3 
Gay men 1 0.1 4 0.2 1 0.1 1 0.1 
Lesbian women 5 0.2 - - - - 2 0.1 
Bisexual men 10 0.6 8 0.4 5 0.3 5 0.3 
Bisexual women 29 1.6 27 1.5 20 1.1 25 1.4 
“Other” men 1 0.1 1 0.1 1 0.1 - - 
“Other” women 7 0.3 5 0.3 4 0.2 6 0.3 
 
General Discussion 
Summary 
 In three large samples totaling over 5000 participants, we found consistent support for all 
of our hypotheses.  This provides preliminary evidence that sexual orientation questions asking 
about sexual and romantic attraction and behavior toward a variety of genders are practical and 
provide information that is missed and/or muddled by current identity-only measures. We found 
that most participants were able to answer the questions, as demonstrated by small numbers of 
write-in responses and overall similarity between responses to the traditional sexual orientation 
question and the new ones. Although one sample had an 11% missing response rate, the other 
two samples had very small rates of missing data, suggesting that participants are willing to 
provide this information.   
Across samples, the constructs of attraction and behavior were consistently distinct from 
identity. While most participants’ identities were predictably related to the genders to whom they 
were attracted and with whom they engaged in relationships, a significant minority (3-6%) 
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showed inconsistency in this regard even when using a very conservative standard. For 
perspective, the number of people whose sexual attractions or behaviors included a cisgender 
person of a gender normally considered “excluded” by their identity (e.g. heterosexual men with 
cisgender men) was equivalent to or larger than the number of lesbian women (around 0.5%). As 
expected from previous research (e.g. Rosario & Schrimshaw, 2014), attraction and behavior 
were distinct from each other. Like previous asexuality and bisexuality researchers (e.g. 
Weinberg et al., 1994; Bogaert, 2013), we also found evidence that the sexual and romantic 
dimensions of these constructs differed. 
Of central importance, 3-6 percent of participants indicated that they experienced sexual 
or romantic attraction or behavior with trans people. These participants had a variety of sexual 
identities, and experienced attraction and/or behavior with trans men, trans women, and non-
binary people and roughly equivalent rates. This suggests that measuring sexual attraction to and 
behavior with transgender people and those with non-binary identities is immediately feasible, 
and that these experiences are relatively common (similar to holding an LGB identity).  
Current Recommendations 
 For anyone looking to immediately implement an inclusive sexual orientation measure, 
we wanted to offer some concrete recommendations based on our findings from this research and 
our other studies on transgender-inclusive gender demographic questions.  
 First, we recommend including a sexual identity question. If resources for coding 
responses are not a concern, this could be a free-text question. Alternatively, a multiple-choice 
question would also be feasible. We recommend the following measure, adapted from one used 
by the National Transgender Discrimination Survey (Grant et al., 2011), for further testing: 
What term(s) do you usually use to describe your sexual identity? Please select all that apply. 
 Asexual  Aromantic 
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 Bisexual 
 Gay 
 Heterosexual 
 Lesbian 
 Pansexual 
 Queer 
 Additional term(s) not listed [free 
text box] 
 Do not know 
 Choose not to answer 
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Next, we recommend adapting our attraction and behavior questions to include 
definitions for “cisgender,” “transgender,” and “non-binary.” If desired, researchers could also 
specify a time period and/or ask participants how stable/fluid they perceive their identity to be 
(as sexualities can change over time; e.g. Diamond, 2008). We also suggest making the 
“Nobody” option exclusive (such that participants cannot select it and other options), changing 
the wording of the “Other” option to “Another gender not listed” (as the wording is less othering; 
cf. Balarajan et al., 2011), changing the “Genderqueer” option to “Non-binary people (e.g. 
genderqueer people),” and including “Do not know” and “Choose not to answer” options.  The 
revised set of measures might look like this (only the example for sexual attraction is shown): 
Definition of terms: Non-binary refers to a person whose gender identity is something other than 
man or woman. Cisgender refers to a person whose gender identity is the same as the sex 
assigned to them at birth, while transgender refers to a person whose gender identity is different 
from the sex assigned to them at birth. For example, a cisgender man is a person who was 
assigned male at birth and who identifies as a man, and a transgender man is a person who was 
assigned female at birth and who identifies as a man.  
 
In the past year, what genders of people have you been sexually attracted to? Select all that 
apply. 
 Cisgender men 
 Transgender men 
 Cisgender women 
 Transgender women 
 Non-binary people (e.g. genderqueer people) 
 Another gender not listed [free text] 
 I have not been sexually attracted to anyone in the past year.  
 I do not know. 
 I choose not to answer. 
Limitations 
 
 The research presented here has several limitations. It relies on a convenience sample of 
undergraduate students, who presumably have a relatively narrow range of ages and sexual 
experiences, and the results may not generalize well to other populations. We also have very 
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small numbers of participants in some identity categories, and a large number of missing 
responses, so these results should be treated as exploratory and suggestive. This research should 
be replicated with more diverse samples, and if possible, future researchers should ask about 
attraction and behavior in different time periods and/or follow participants longitudinally to gain 
a better understanding of the patterns and extent of sexual fluidity. As we did not explicitly 
define the terms we used, it is possible that participants interpreted them differently than we did. 
Defining terms is one way to reduce this concern (as described in the previous section), but 
cognitive testing and/or focus groups with a diverse group of participants would also give us 
more confidence in our results. More importantly, qualitative research might help us identify yet 
more unmet needs and new ways of conceptualizing sexuality.  
We are also well aware that the measures presented here barely scratch the surface of 
what is needed to make sexuality research truly inclusive, and understand that incorporating 
currently marginalized sexualities into mainstream theory and practice will take decades. For 
example, while van Anders (2015) provides an extensive summary of dozens of currently 
recognized problems with our conceptualization of sexualities and one possible integrated 
approach, it remains too unwieldy for use in survey contexts as yet. We have chosen to take an 
incremental approach to creating more inclusive sexual orientation questions in the hopes of 
fostering more rapid (if smaller) improvements to the status quo. Thus, we fully expect this 
measure to be supplanted by an improved model in the near future. 
Future Research Directions 
One particularly promising direction for future research might include more extensive use 
of branching survey logic. For example, participants could be asked whether they experience 
sexual attraction at all, and whether they experience attraction based on gender, with only those 
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who agree proceeding to a question where they indicate which genders they are attracted to. 
Similar designs could be used to ask what aspects of gender participants find attractive 
(identities, bodies, etc.)  Branching logic would enable clarification of otherwise ambiguous 
responses such as “I don’t know,”  for instance by asking whether the participant does not 
understand some aspect of the question, or understands the question but does not know how to 
translate their own experience into the categories provided by the question, potentially increasing 
the amount of useable data (Cain, 2012). With more complex designs, participants who indicate 
particularly interesting patterns of responses on the attraction and behavior questions (for 
example, those with inconsistent responses) could be asked follow-up questions to clarify the 
meaning of their answers. Future researchers might also want to use branching logic to ask more 
detailed questions about the nature of participants’ attractions to and sexual behaviors with 
transgender people, as these questions could be displayed only when applicable. For example, it 
would be interesting to know whether participants’ transgender partners already identified as 
such at the time of the attraction/relationship/sexual encounter, and whether/how the participants 
changed their sexual identities as a result of these interactions. 
Alongside this work on question design, researchers who are interested in sexuality per se 
should begin to confront the limitations and imprecision of standard measures and 
conceptualizations of sexual orientation, and begin an empirical investigation of the relationships 
between the constellation of dimensions that influence gender and desire. 
 First, researchers must specify the relevant qualities of the agent who does the desiring 
and the target who is desired. If we believe that a person’s gender influences their own desires, 
and determines who will desire them, which precise aspect(s) of gender are relevant? When 
people conceive of themselves as gendered beings, their private identities, social identities, 
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physical presentations, and physical bodies each seem to exert their own influence (Galupo et al., 
2014; Tate et al., 2014), and this list is likely far from exhaustive. What roles might each of these 
components of gender play in shaping the ways people desire? As yet, we have almost no 
empirical knowledge on the subject. We might next wonder where the relevant desire is located. 
While many people conceive of their sexual identities as originating within the self (Galupo et 
al., 2014), the construct of sexual orientation is inherently relational, emerging from the 
relationship between one person’s identity and another’s. Which components of sexual identity 
can properly be described as self-defined, and which are socially or relationally defined? How 
and when do these definitions emerge? Are they stable or fluid over time? These questions also 
have yet to be answered.  
 A growing number of researchers are even returning to the question of what we mean by 
desire in the first place. Even comparatively early sexual orientation researchers (e.g. Klein, 
1985) drew distinctions between sexual behavior, sexual attraction, sexual fantasy, emotional 
preference, and social preference, but these different constructs have largely been excluded from 
the public imagination in favor of an increased focus on a single, unifying sexual orientation.  
Asexuality activists have called for researchers to renew our attention to these distinctions, 
suggesting that people may have different sexual and romantic orientations and that these 
distinctions are significant and worthy of study (e.g. Bogaert, 2013). Although researchers are 
beginning to consider these questions, progress is slow.  
 Finally, queer theorists and scholars of bisexuality (and other non-monosexual identities) 
have been willing to question not just the ways in which sexual orientation conceptualizes 
gender, but the idea that gender is the central locus of desire in the first place. If researchers step 
back from the assumption that desire is always and exclusively oriented by gender, what other 
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dimensions of desire might we uncover? Consider the identities being constructed within kink 
and BDSM communities around power (Dominant/submissive roles) and sensation (top/bottom, 
sadist/masochist, giving/receiving sensation; e.g. Faccio et al., 2014; Hebert & Weaver, 2015). 
Might these dimensions be conceptualized in similar ways to gendered desires? These other 
potential dimensions of desire have received very little in the way of scholarly attention, but it’s 
possible that by considering multiple aspects of sexual desire, attraction, and behavior we can 
gain a better understanding of what motivates people to behave the way they do, and perhaps 
eventually predict behavior with some accuracy. 
Conclusion 
Despite decades of research from multiple disciplines which complicates binary views of 
gender, the construct of sexual orientation and measures for assessing it continue to rely on the 
inaccurate assumption that there exist two mutually exclusive, exhaustive, readily definable 
gender categories. As a result of this systematic failure to incorporate new insights into practice, 
researchers systematically misclassify and outright erase the experiences of transgender people, 
people with non-binary gender identities, and their partners. This exclusion results in lower-
quality health care for members of some of the most marginalized communities (e.g. trans 
women) and may exacerbate their feelings of stigma. Furthermore, research and practice that 
relies on sexual orientation as a proxy for other, more specific information does a disservice to 
marginalized communities and diminishes the accuracy and generalizability of data, hampering 
progress toward a scientific understanding of the relationship between gender and sexuality. To 
address these problems, clinicians and other practitioners who need quick data should replace 
sexual orientation questions with more targeted questions that more appropriately operationalize 
the construct of interest.   
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Sexual orientation questions which include transgender, non-binary, and asexual people 
are greatly needed. We created a set of inclusive questions about sexual and romantic attraction 
and behavior and tested them with three large undergraduate samples. Participants were able to 
answer the questions, and their responses matched established theory suggesting that sexual 
identity, attraction, and behavior are separate constructs. A substantial minority also indicated 
that they experienced attraction to or behavior with transgender or non-binary people. We offer a 
revised version of our measure for immediate use by future researchers, and detail several 
promising new directions for the design of inclusive sexual orientation questions (particularly 
through the use of branching survey logic).  
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Appendix A 
Summary of Materials for Study 1 and Study 2 
Study 1 – Spring 2016 (no randomization). 
Scales in italics were only included in the gender minority sample 
 Informed consent 
 One randomly assigned context manipulation  
o Healthcare/Psych/Dating Website 
 One randomly assigned gender question 
o Binary + Other, Multiple-Choice, Multiple-Choice + Sex Assigned at Birth, 
Multiple-Choice + Transgender Identity 
 Gender salience 
 Free text comments about gender question 
 Identity threat dependent variables 
 Perceptions of researchers 
 Attitudes toward researchers 
 Emotions toward researchers 
 Gender salience, safety, and motivation to be perceived accurately by context (Dating 
Website, Clinic Intake, Psych Experiment) 
 Perceptions of each gender question 
o Binary, Binary + Other, Multiple- Choice, Multiple-Choice + Sex Assigned at 
Birth, Multiple-Choice + Transgender Identity, Multiple-Choice + Transition 
History, Short Free-Text Box, Long Free-Text Box 
 Ranking of gender questions 
o Binary, Binary + Other, Multiple- Choice, Multiple-Choice + Sex Assigned at 
Birth, Multiple-Choice + Transgender Identity, Multiple-Choice + Transition 
History, Short Free-Text Box, Long Free-Text Box 
 Gender Centrality (adapted from Leach et al., 2008) 
 Single-Item Social Identification Scales (adapted from Postmes et al., 2013) 
 Gender self-categorization (Joel et al., 2014) 
 Multi-Component Social Identity Scale (adapted from Leach et al., 2008) 
 Emotions toward gender groups 
o Others with same identity, trans men, trans women, cisgender women, cisgender 
men, gender non-conforming people, people with non-binary gender identities. 
Free-text box for comments about these questions. 
 Demographics 
o Age 
o Race/ethnicity 
o Area from 
o Personal SES 
o Highest level of education 
o Anything else you would like us to know about you? 
 Thank you and raffle link 
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Study 2 – Fall 2016.  
 Informed consent 
 One randomly assigned gender question 
o Binary, Binary + Other, Multiple- Choice, Multiple-Choice + Sex Assigned at 
Birth, Multiple-Choice + Transgender Identity, Short Free-Text Box 
 Free text comments  
 Immediate DVs (randomized order in section and within scales) 
o Evaluation of question 
o Authenticity (Kraus, Chen, and Keltner, 2011) 
o Collective Self-Esteem (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992) 
 Secondary DVs (randomized order in section and within scales, each scale preceded by a 
reminder of the question randomly assigned at the beginning of study) 
o Expectations of belonging and respect 
o Perceptions of researcher knowledge/concern about transgender people 
o Comfort with/investment in research 
o Emotions toward researchers 
 Perceptions of gender questions (randomized order within section) 
o Binary, Binary + Other, Multiple- Choice, Multiple-Choice + Sex Assigned at 
Birth, Multiple-Choice + Transgender Identity, Short Free-Text Box 
 Rankings of gender questions by context (randomized order of contexts in section and of 
gender questions within each context) 
o Clinic Intake, Dating Website, Psych Experiment, Job Application 
o Binary, Binary + Other, Multiple- Choice, Multiple-Choice + Sex Assigned at 
Birth, Multiple-Choice + Transgender Identity, Short Free-Text Box, No gender 
question asked 
 Supplemental Questions (randomized order in section and within scales) 
o Gender self-categorization (Joel et al., 2014) 
o Gender self-categorization (adapted from Rockquemore & Arend, 2002) 
o Non-binary experiences 
o Emotions toward own gender group 
o Gender Identification (Egan & Perry, 2001) 
o Transgender Congruence Scale (Kozee et al., 2012) 
o Gender Identity Reflection and Rumination scale (Bauerband & Galupo, 2014) 
o Gender essentialism 
o Multi-Gender Identity Questionnaire (Joel et al., 2014) 
 Demographic Questions (randomized within section) 
o Political Affiliation, Choice for president in 2016 
o Age, Race/ethnicity, Highest level of education 
 Thank you and raffle link 
 
  
  
295 
 
Coding Scheme for Free-Text Gender Questions in Spring 2016 and Fall 2016 Surveys 
Gender Identity 
1. Participant identifies with a non-binary identity: the participant lists words like 
androgynous, bigender, demiboy/demigirl, non-binary, genderfluid, genderqueer, 
genderfucker, neutrois, queer, or a mixture of these with other gender categories. 
Preference is given for non-binary identities in descriptions such as “genderqueer 
woman” or “agender non-binary.” 
2. The participant identifies as agender: the participant identifies as agender or has no 
gender (none). If the participant lists “agender” with other genders, preference is given to 
“agender”. * Preference is given for agender in descriptions such as “agender 
woman.” 
3. Participant identifies as a man: the participant lists words like man, male, masculine, boy, 
transman, AMAB/DMAB, cis-male, or cis-man; there are not other secondary gender 
categories like in “genderfluid man” or “masculine genderqueer”.  
4. Participant identifies as a woman: the participant lists words like woman, female, femme, 
girl, transwoman, AFAB/DFAB, cis-woman, or cis-female; there are not secondary 
gender categories like in “genderfluid woman” or “nonbinary woman”. 
5. Participant does not know their gender: the participant writes in “I don’t know” or “not 
sure” into a category. Unknown can also go into this category.  
6. Participant rejects the construct of gender: the participant says “gender is made up”, “no 
thanks”, does not identify with gender roles, or does not have a gender identity (this is 
different from saying ‘agender’). This can also apply to people who say that their gender 
is irrelevant. * 
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7. Participant does not provide enough information to determine a gender: There is not 
enough information provided to determine a gender category, descriptions such as 
human, weariness, cyborg (or other inanimate objects, unless they’re an internet meme), 
me, gendermeh, gender non-conforming (without any other gender category), anything 
that doesn’t seem like it fits into other categories. 
* A person who is agender has no gender – a person who has no gender identity is rejecting 
the concept of identifying with any gender that they know of.  
Trans Status 
1. The participant is definitely cis (cis-woman, AFAB/DFAB woman). 
2. The participant is binary trans (trans-woman, trans-man, male-bodied woman). 
3. The participant is non-binary (any non-binary identity, non-binary man). 
4. The participant’s trans status is uncertain (researcher cannot tell if the person is trans with 
provided information – woman, man). 
5. The participant refused to say if they are trans (I refuse to say, it doesn’t matter). 
Gender Nonconforming 
 Yes – the participant says they are gender non-conforming or do not perform gender 
in a stereotypical manner. 
 No – the participant does not mention being gender non-conforming. 
 
 
 
Body mentioned? 
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 Yes – the participant mentions their body or genitals without being asked; say 
their assigned sex at birth (AMAB, AFAB, DMAB, DFAB), say _____-bodied, or 
mention physical transition (transsexual).  
 No – the participant does not mention their body. 
Gender expression mentioned? 
 Yes – the participant mentions a specific gender expression (androgynous, 
femme, butch, masculine-presenting, or queer-presenting), says “I look like 
______”, or “I am seen as _______”).   
 No – the participant does not mention a specific gender expression.  
Age-based gender identity? 
 Yes – the participant says they are a boy/girl rather than a man/woman, or 
mentions in comments that they are definitely a man/woman but not a boy/girl. 
 No – the participant does not make any comments about the age. 
Multiple genders? 
 Yes – the participant lists multiple genders in the category (genderqueer woman, 
agender non-binary, queer transman). 
 No – the participant only lists one gender, possibly with a modifier (trans-woman, 
gender non-conforming man). 
Changing or fluid gender? 
 Yes – the participant mentions being genderfluid or that their gender changes. 
 No – the participant does not mention fluid or changing gender. 
Less conventional gender? 
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 Yes – the participant lists an unconventional non-binary gender (i.e. cyborg, me, 
gendermeh, etc.).  
 No – the participant uses a listed gender descriptor in the man, woman, agender, 
or non-binary category. 
Transphobic/Homophobic 
 Yes – The participant writes in transphobic/homophobic commentary, slurs, or 
terms commonly associated with transphobic or homophobic memes (e.g. 
doodookin, attack helicopter).  
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Appendix B 
 
Table B1 
 
T-tests for Significant Interactions of Context and Transgender Identity on Dependent Variables 
(Study 1) 
  
Mean 
Mean difference 
from reference SE t p 
Perceptions of Researchers’ Knowledge/Caring 
 (Intercept) 4.80  0.14 32.66 <.001 
 Dating Context  -0.59 0.19 -3.05 .002 
 Experimental Context  -0.14 0.19 -0.73 ns 
 Transgender  0.02 0.20 0.13 ns 
 Dating Context * Transgender  0.77 0.29 2.64 .008 
 Experiment Context * Transgender  0.55 0.29 1.90 ns 
ns p >.05 
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Table B2 
 
T-tests for Significant Main Effects of Context on Dependent Variables (Study 1).  
  
Mean 
Mean difference 
from reference SE t p 
Identity Safety 
 
Clinic Intake 5.32  0.09 55.53 <.001 
Dating Website  -0.68 0.13 -5.16 <.001 
Psychology Experiment  0.24 0.13 1.84 ns 
Perceptions of Researchers’ Knowledge/Caring 
  
Clinic Intake 4.74  0.10 47.40 <.001 
Dating Website  -0.29 0.13 -2.11 .034 
Psychology Experiment  0.11 0.13 0.85 ns 
ns p >.05 
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Table B3 
 
T-tests for Significant Main Effects of Transgender Identity on Dependent Variables (Study 1).  
  
Mean 
Mean difference 
from reference SE t p 
Identity Safety 
 
Not transgender 5.69  0.08 64.39 <.001 
Transgender  -0.80 0.11 -6.86 <.001 
Unclassified  -0.63 0.33 -1.90 ns 
Perceptions of Researchers’ Knowledge/Caring 
 
Not transgender 5.02  0.08 56.08 <.001 
Transgender  -0.48 0.11 -4.073 <.001 
Unclassified  -0.50 0.33 -1.50 ns 
Attitudes Toward Researchers 
 
Not transgender 2.70  0.08 30.75 <.001 
Transgender  0.35 0.11 3.00 .002 
Unclassified  0.39 0.32 1.22 ns 
Positive Emotions Toward Researchers 
 Not transgender 3.25  0.11 28.59 <.001 
Transgender  0.39 0.15 2.62 .008 
Unclassified  0.09 0.42 0.21 ns 
ns p >.05 
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Table B4 
 
T-tests for Significant Interactions of Question Condition and Transgender Identity on 
Dependent Variables (Study 2) 
  
Mean 
Mean difference 
from reference SE t p 
Comfort with Research 
 
Intercept 4.72  0.10 43.80 <.001 
Binary + Other  0.07 0.15 0.49 ns 
Multiple-Choice  0.35 0.15 2.24 .02 
MC + Sex Assigned at Birth  0.43 0.16 2.67 .007 
MC + Transgender Identity  0.41 0.16 2.58 .01 
Short Free Text  0.49 0.17 2.90 .003 
Transgender  -1.82 0.39 -4.66 <.001 
Unclassified  -0.50 0.71 -0.71 ns 
Binary + Other * Transgender  1.99 0.48 4.15 <.001 
Multiple-Choice * Transgender  2.27 0.57 3.94 <.001 
MC + Sex Assigned at Birth * 
Transgender 
 1.77 0.55 3.19 .001 
MC + Transgender Identity * 
Transgender 
 1.97 0.51 3.82 <.001 
Short Free Text * Transgender  2.04 0.49 4.11 <.001 
Binary + Other * Unclassified  -0.37 0.84 -0.44 ns 
Multiple-Choice * Unclassified  0.24 0.81 0.30 ns 
MC + Sex Assigned at Birth * 
Unclassified 
 -0.71 1.00 -0.71 ns 
MC + Transgender Identity * 
Unclassified 
 -1.29 0.92 -1.41 ns 
Short Free Text * Unclassified  -1.04 0.92 -1.13 ns 
ns p >.05 
Note: Reference categories are the binary question and cisgender participants.   
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Table B5 
 
T-tests for Significant Main Effects of Question Conditions on Dependent Variables (Study 2) 
ns p >.05 
  
Mean 
Mean difference 
from reference SE t p 
Expectation of Belonging/Respect 
 Binary 5.04  0.13 37.49 <.001 
Binary + Other  0.27 0.18 1.43 ns 
Multiple-Choice  0.85 0.19 4.41 <.001 
MC + Sex Assigned at Birth  0.68 0.19 3.46 <.001 
MC + Transgender Identity  0.69 0.19 3.62 <.001 
Short Free Text  0.54 0.20 2.67 .007 
Comfort with Research 
 Binary 4.54  0.10 42.16 <.001 
Binary + Other  0.24 0.15 1.62 ns 
Multiple-Choice  0.47 0.15 3.07 .002 
MC + Sex Assigned at Birth  0.54 0.15 3.38 <.001 
MC + Transgender Identity  0.55 0.15 3.63 <.001 
Short Free Text  0.66 0.16 4.09 <.001 
Perceptions of Researchers 
 Binary 3.46  0.11 30.58 <.001 
Binary + Other  0.79 0.15 5.04 <.001 
Multiple-Choice  1.57 0.16 9.69 <.001 
MC + Sex Assigned at Birth  1.65 0.16 9.88 <.001 
MC + Transgender Identity  1.50 0.16 9.36 <.001 
Short Free Text  1.40 0.17 8.21 <.001 
Positive Emotions Toward Researchers 
 Binary 2.55  0.16 15.14 <.001 
Binary + Other  0.41 0.23 1.73 ns 
Multiple-Choice  1.23 0.24 5.09 <.001 
MC + Sex Assigned at Birth  1.36 0.24 5.48 <.001 
MC + Transgender Identity  0.74 0.23 3.10 .002 
Short Free Text  1.12 0.25 4.39 <.001 
Negative Emotions Toward Researchers 
 Binary 2.58  0.13 19.306 <.001 
Binary + Other  -0.54 0.18 -2.94 .003 
Multiple-Choice  -0.57 0.19 -2.98 .002 
MC + Sex Assigned at Birth  -0.72 0.19 -3.70 <.001 
MC + Transgender Identity  -0.74 0.18 -3.95 <.001 
Short Free Text  -0.45 0.20 -2.22 .026 
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Table B6 
T-tests for Significant Main Effects of Transgender Identity on Dependent Variables (Study 2). 
  
Mean 
Mean difference 
from reference SE t p 
Evaluation of Question 
 
Not transgender 4.44  0.03 134.46 <.001 
Transgender  -0.59 0.10 -5.96 <.001 
Unclassified  -0.62 0.15 -4.13 <.001 
Authenticity 
 
Not transgender 5.32  0.05 104.64 <.001 
Transgender  -0.97 0.15 -6.31 <.001 
Unclassified  -1.27 0.23 -5.44 <.001 
CSES (Private Subscale) 
 
Not transgender 5.75  0.04 142.05 <.001 
Transgender  -0.29 0.12 -2.40 .016 
Unclassified  -1.30 0.18 -6.98 <.001 
CSES (Public Subscale) 
 
Not transgender 5.04  0.05 91.42 <.001 
Transgender  -1.54 0.16 -9.33 <.001 
Unclassified  -1.24 0.25 -4.83 <.001 
Expectation of Belonging/Respect 
 
Not transgender 5.77  0.05 100.05 <.001 
Transgender  -1.05 0.17 -6.08 <.001 
Unclassified  -1.24 0.26 -4.70 <.001 
Comfort with Research 
 
Not transgender 5.02  0.04 107.87 <.001 
Transgender  -0.17 0.14 -1.28 ns 
Unclassified  -0.83 0.22 -3.73 <.001 
Perceptions of Researchers 
 
Not transgender 4.59  0.05 82.43 <.001 
Transgender  0.19 0.16 1.16 ns 
Unclassified  -0.30 0.25 -1.18 ns 
Positive Emotions Toward Researchers 
 Not transgender 3.23  0.07 42.32 <.001 
Transgender  0.66 0.23 2.84 .004 
Unclassified  0.50 0.34 1.44 ns 
Negative Emotions Toward Researchers 
 Not transgender 2.02  0.05 34.24 <.001 
Transgender  0.14 0.17 0.81 ns 
Unclassified  0.62 0.27 2.26 .024 
ns p >.05 
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Table B7 
T-tests for Significant Main Effects of Gender Identity on Evaluations of Gender Questions 
(Study 1) 
ns p >.05 
  
  Mean Mean difference 
from reference 
SE t p 
Binary 
 Man 5.68  0.13 43.01 <.001 
Woman  -0.40 0.18 -2.12 .03 
Nonbinary/Agender  -3.90 0.18 -20.67 <.001 
Binary + Other 
 Man 5.92  0.12 47.08 <.001 
Woman  -0.18 0.17 -1.06 ns 
Nonbinary/Agender  -0.96 0.17 -5.40 <.001 
Multiple-Choice 
 Man 5.98  0.11 51.65 <.001 
Woman  -0.10 0.16 -0.66 ns 
Nonbinary/Agender  -0.47 0.16 -2.85 .004 
Multiple-Choice + Assigned Sex at Birth 
 Man 5.96  0.11 50.57 <.001 
Woman  0.15 0.16 0.91 ns 
Nonbinary/Agender  -0.85 0.16 -5.069 <.001 
Multiple-Choice + Transgender Identity 
 Man 5.90  0.11 50.91 <.001 
Woman  0.13 0.16 0.81 ns 
Nonbinary/Agender  -0.41 0.16 -2.48 .01 
Multiple-Choice + Transition History 
 Man 5.84  0.13 44.26 <.001 
Woman  -0.08 0.18 -0.47 ns 
Nonbinary/Agender  -1.29 0.18 -6.87 <.001 
Short Free-Text 
 Man 6.33  0.09 65.67 <.001 
Woman  0.03 0.13 0.26 ns 
Nonbinary/Agender  -0.46 0.13 -3.40 <.001 
Long Free-Text 
 Man 6.37  0.09 69.73 <.001 
Woman  0.10 0.13 0.77 ns 
Nonbinary/Agender  0.02 0.13 0.17 ns 
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Table B8 
  
T-tests for Significant Main Effects of Transgender Identity on Perceptions of Gender Questions 
(Study 1) 
ns p >.05 
 
  
  Mean Mean difference 
from reference 
SE t p 
Binary 
 Not transgender 5.98  0.12 48.66 <.001 
Transgender  -3.33 0.16 -20.37 <.001 
Unclassified  -2.33 0.35 -6.62 <.001 
Binary + Other 
 Not transgender 6.17  0.10 59.27 <.001 
Transgender  -1.19 0.13 -8.64 <.001 
Unclassified  -2.12 0.30 -7.00 <.001 
Multiple-Choice 
 Not transgender 6.23  0.09 64.10 <.001 
Transgender  -0.85 0.12 -6.57 <.001 
Unclassified  -1.73 0.28 -6.10 <.001 
Multiple-Choice + Assigned Sex at Birth 
 Not transgender 6.48  0.09 67.66 <.001 
Transgender  -1.43 0.12 -11.24 <.001 
Unclassified  -1.88 0.27 -6.73 <.001 
Multiple-Choice + Transgender Identity 
 Not transgender 6.30  0.09 66.12 <.001 
Transgender  -0.82 0.12 -6.49 <.001 
Unclassified  -2.33 0.27 -8.40 <.001 
Multiple-Choice + Transition History 
 Not transgender 6.26  0.10 58.02 <.001 
Transgender  -1.61 0.14 -11.23 <.001 
Unclassified  -2.28 0.31 -7.25 <.001 
Short Free-Text 
 Not transgender 6.47  0.08 79.18 <.001 
Transgender  -0.51 0.10 -4.71 <.001 
Unclassified  -1.15 0.23 -4.84 <.001 
Long Free-Text 
 Not transgender 6.53  0.07 83.26 <.001 
Transgender  -0.18 0.10 -1.73 ns 
Unclassified  -1.15 0.23 -4.95 <.001 
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Table B9 
 
T-tests for Significant Interactions of Gender Identity and Transgender Identity on Rankings of 
Gender Questions (Study 1) 
  
Mean 
Mean difference 
from reference SE t p 
Multiple-Choice + Assigned Sex at Birth 
 
(Intercept) 4.19  0.19 21.35 <.001 
Woman  -0.02 0.28 -0.10 ns 
Non-binary/Agender  -3.19 1.78 -1.79 ns 
Transgender  1.02 0.35 2.89 .004 
Unclassified  -1.03 0.74 -1.37 ns 
Woman * Transgender  -0.69 0.49 -1.40 ns 
Non-binary/Agender * Transgender  2.91 1.81 1.60 ns 
Woman * Unclassified  3.06 1.10 2.76 .006 
Non-binary/Agender * Unclassified  4.78 2.11 2.26 .024 
Short Free-Text 
 
(Intercept) 4.24  0.24 17.66 <.001 
Woman  -0.13 0.34 -0.37 ns 
Non-binary/Agender  1.75 2.17 0.80 ns 
Transgender  -1.99 0.43 -4.60 <.001 
Unclassified  1.41 0.91 1.55 ns 
Woman * Transgender  1.25 0.60 2.07 .038 
Non-binary/Agender * Transgender  -1.15 2.21 -0.52 ns 
Woman * Unclassified  -3.73 1.35 -2.75 .006 
Non-binary/Agender * Unclassified  -4.66 2.58 -1.80 ns 
Long Free-Text 
 
(Intercept) 4.49  0.29 15.28 <.001 
Woman  -0.29 0.42 -0.71 ns 
Non-binary/Agender  3.50 2.66 1.31 ns 
Transgender  -0.88 0.53 -1.66 ns 
Unclassified  2.67 1.11 2.38 .017 
Woman * Transgender  -0.08 0.73 -0.11 ns 
Non-binary/Agender * Transgender  -4.50 2.70 -1.66 ns 
Woman * Unclassified  -5.66 1.65 -3.42 <.001 
Non-binary/Agender * Unclassified  -9.17 3.16 -2.89 .003 
Note. Higher numbers indicate lower ranking (i.e. 8 is the lowest possible ranking, and 1 is the 
highest). 
ns p >.05 
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Table B10 
  
T-tests for Significant Main Effects of Gender Identity on Rankings of Gender Questions (Study 
1).  
Note. Higher numbers indicate lower ranking (i.e. 8 is the lowest possible ranking, and 1 is the 
highest). 
ns p >.05 
 
 
  
  
Mean 
Mean difference 
from reference SE t p 
Binary 
 Man 5.14  0.21 23.73 <.001 
Woman  0.81 0.30 2.64 .008 
Nonbinary/Agender  2.54 0.30 8.41 <.001 
Binary + Other 
 Man 4.14  0.18 22.59 <.001 
Woman  0.41 0.26 1.58 ns 
Nonbinary/Agender  1.18 0.25 4.65 <.001 
Multiple-Choice 
 Man 3.99  0.13 28.74 <.001 
Woman  -0.14 0.19 -0.75 ns 
Nonbinary/Agender  -0.57 0.19 -2.99 .001 
Multiple-Choice + Assigned Sex at Birth 
 Man 4.44  0.16 27.27 <.001 
Woman  -0.08 0.23 -0.37 ns 
Nonbinary/Agender  0.46 0.22 2.03 .04 
Multiple-Choice + Transgender Identity 
 Man 4.60  0.13 32.95 <.001 
Woman  -0.26 0.19 -1.34 ns 
Nonbinary/Agender  -0.86 0.19 -4.46 <.001 
Short Free-Text 
 Man 3.73  0.20 18.42 <.001 
Woman  0.04 0.28 0.16 ns 
Nonbinary/Agender  -0.86 0.28 -3.08 .002 
Long Free-Text 
 Man 4.36  0.24 17.90 <.001 
Woman  -0.61 0.34 -1.77 ns 
Nonbinary/Agender  -1.73 0.33 -5.12 <.001 
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Table B11 
  
T-tests for Significant Main Effects of Transgender Identity on Rankings of Gender Questions 
(Study 1)  
Note. Higher numbers indicate lower ranking (i.e. 8 is the lowest possible ranking, and 1 is the 
highest). 
ns p >.05 
  
  Mean Mean difference 
from reference 
SE t p 
Binary 
 Not transgender 5.07  0.18 28.00 <.001 
Transgender  2.28 0.23 9.76 <.001 
Unclassified  1.09 0.50 2.17 .030 
Binary + Other 
 Not transgender 4.11  0.15 26.05 <.001 
Transgender  1.12 0.20 5.49 <.001 
Unclassified  0.17 0.43 0.41 ns 
Multiple-Choice 
 Not transgender 3.99  0.12 32.52 <.001 
Transgender  -0.39 0.15 -2.51 .012 
Unclassified  -0.32 0.34 -0.96 ns 
Multiple-Choice + Assigned Sex at Birth 
 Not transgender 4.15  0.14 29.30 <.001 
Transgender  0.82 0.18 4.49 <.001 
Unclassified  -0.11 0.39 -0.28 ns 
Multiple-Choice + Transgender Identity 
 Not transgender 4.65  0.12 38.75 <.001 
Transgender  -0.87 0.15 -5.60 <.001 
Unclassified  0.04 0.33 0.15 ns 
Short Free-Text 
 Not transgender 4.16  0.17 24.37 <.001 
Transgender  -1.31 0.22 -5.96 <.001 
Unclassified  -0.41 0.47 -0.86 ns 
Long Free-Text 
 Not transgender 4.39  0.20 20.98 <.001 
Transgender  -1.61 0.27 -5.94 <.001 
Unclassified  -0.43 0.58 -0.75 ns 
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Table B12 
 
T-tests for Significant Main Effects of Gender Identity on Perceptions of Gender Questions 
(Study 2) 
ns p >.05 
 
  
  
Mean 
Mean difference 
from reference SE t p 
Binary 
 Man 4.41  0.05 79.52 <.001 
Woman  -0.20 0.07 -2.70 .007 
Nonbinary/Agender  -1.16 0.12 -9.00 <.001 
Binary + Other 
 Man 4.50  0.05 79.81 <.001 
Woman  -0.01 0.07 -0.13 ns 
Nonbinary/Agender  -1.25 0.13 -9.36 <.001 
Multiple-Choice 
 Man 4.53  0.05 89.37 <.001 
Woman  0.24 0.06 3.48 <.001 
Nonbinary/Agender  -0.53 0.11 -4.54 <.001 
MC + Assigned Sex at Birth 
 Man 4.42  0.05 79.02 <.001 
Woman  0.23 0.07 3.07 .002 
Nonbinary/Agender  -0.89 0.13 -6.88 <.001 
MC + Transgender Identity 
 Man 4.39  0.05 86.39 <.001 
Woman  0.22 0.06 3.28 .001 
Nonbinary/Agender  -0.35 0.11 -3.03 .002 
Short Free-Text 
 Man 4.67  0.05 90.74 <.001 
Woman  0.16 0.07 2.40 .016 
Nonbinary/Agender  -0.58 0.12 -4.88 <.001 
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Table B13 
 
T-tests for Significant Main Effects of Transgender Identity on Evaluations of Gender Questions 
(Study 2) 
ns p >.05 
 
  
  Mean 
Mean difference 
from reference SE t p 
Binary 
 Not transgender 4.32  0.03 109.70 <.001 
Transgender  -0.94 0.11 -7.97 <.001 
Unclassified  -0.41 0.18 -2.29 .021 
Binary + Other 
 Not transgender 4.50  0.03 113.37 <.001 
Transgender  -1.02 0.12 -8.50 <.001 
Unclassified  -0.51 0.18 -2.85 .004 
Multiple-Choice 
 Not transgender 4.67  0.03 131.14 <.001 
Transgender  -0.56 0.10 -5.29 <.001 
Unclassified  -0.39 0.16 -2.43 .015 
Multiple-Choice + Assigned Sex at Birth 
 Not transgender 4.57  0.03 118.21 <.001 
Transgender  -1.03 0.11 -8.91 <.001 
Unclassified  -0.26 0.17 -1.53 ns 
Multiple-Choice + Transgender Identity 
 Not transgender 4.53  0.03 127.12 <.001 
Transgender  -0.49 0.10 -4.56 <.001 
Unclassified  -0.59 0.16 -3.60 <.001 
Short Free-Text 
 Not transgender 4.78  0.03 134.83 <.001 
Transgender  -0.72 0.10 -6.76 <.001 
Unclassified  -0.41 0.16 -2.48 .013 
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Table B14 
 
T-tests for Significant Main Effects of Gender Identity on Rankings of Gender Questions in the 
Clinic Intake Context (Study 2) 
Note. Higher numbers indicate lower ranking (i.e. 7 is the lowest possible ranking, and 1 is the 
highest). 
ns p >.05 
 
  
  
Mean 
Mean difference 
from reference SE t p 
Binary 
 Man 4.90  0.13 36.66 <.001 
Woman  0.86 0.18 4.74 <.001 
Nonbinary/Agender  1.86 0.29 6.33 <.001 
Binary + Other 
 Man 3.70  0.11 31.78 <.001 
Woman  0.67 0.15 4.25 <.001 
Nonbinary/Agender  1.35 0.25 5.25 <.001 
Multiple-Choice 
 Man 3.59  0.09 36.97 <.001 
Woman  -0.36 0.13 -2.77 .005 
Nonbinary/Agender  -0.67 0.21 -3.14 .001 
Multiple-Choice + Transgender Identity 
 Man 4.02  0.11 34.62 <.001 
Woman  -0.43 0.15 -2.70 .006 
Nonbinary/Agender  -1.18 0.25 -4.61 <.001 
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Table B15 
 
T-tests for Significant Main Effects of Gender Identity on Rankings of Gender Questions in the 
Psychology Experiment Context (Study 2) 
Note. Higher numbers indicate lower ranking (i.e. 7 is the lowest possible ranking, and 1 is the 
highest). 
ns p >.05 
 
  
  
Mean 
Mean difference 
from reference SE t p 
Binary 
 Man 4.91  0.13 35.15 <.001 
Woman  0.81 0.18 4.30 <.001 
Nonbinary/Agender  1.88 0.30 6.21 <.001 
Binary + Other 
 Man 3.72  0.12 30.95 <.001 
Woman  0.71 0.16 4.39 <.001 
Nonbinary/Agender  1.09 0.26 4.18 <.001 
Multiple-Choice 
 Man 3.84  0.10 37.36 <.001 
Woman  -0.41 0.13 -2.98 .002 
Nonbinary/Agender  -0.94 0.22 -4.22 <.001 
Multiple-Choice + Transgender Identity 
 Man 3.81  0.12 31.04 <.001 
Woman  -0.42 0.16 -2.54 .011 
Nonbinary/Agender  -1.09 0.26 -4.0 <.001 
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Table B16 
 
T-tests for Significant Main Effects of Gender Identity on Rankings of Gender Questions in the 
Dating Website Context (Study 2) 
Note. Higher numbers indicate lower ranking (i.e. 7 is the lowest possible ranking, and 1 is the 
highest). 
ns p >.05 
 
  
  
Mean 
Mean difference 
from reference SE t p 
Binary 
 Man 4.33  0.14 30.84 <.001 
Woman  0.87 0.18 4.66 <.001 
Nonbinary/Agender  2.28 0.30 7.40 <.001 
Binary + Other 
 Man 3.29  0.11 28.58 <.001 
Woman  0.62 0.15 4.04 <.001 
Nonbinary/Agender  0.78 0.25 3.11 .001 
Multiple-Choice 
 Man 3.86  0.10 35.58 <.001 
Woman  -0.47 0.14 -3.25 .001 
Nonbinary/Agender  -1.33 0.23 -5.58 <.001 
Multiple-Choice + Assigned Sex at Birth 
 Man 3.94  0.13 28.80 <.001 
Woman  -0.39 0.18 -2.16 .031 
Nonbinary/Agender  1.05 0.30 3.52 <.001 
Multiple-Choice + Transgender Identity 
 Man 3.96  0.12 31.99 <.001 
Woman  -0.38 0.16 -2.33 .019 
Nonbinary/Agender  -0.53 0.27 -1.96 .050 
Short Free-Text 
 Man 3.09  0.12 24.14 <.001 
Woman  -0.46 0.17 -2.71 .006 
Nonbinary/Agender  -1.32 0.28 -4.69 <.001 
No Question Asked  
 Man 5.51  0.13 39.415 <.001 
Woman  0.22 0.18 1.18 ns 
Nonbinary/Agender  -0.94 0.30 -3.06 .002 
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Table B17 
 
T-tests for Significant Main Effects of Gender Identity on Rankings of Gender Questions in the 
Job Application Context (Study 2) 
Note. Higher numbers indicate lower ranking (i.e. 7 is the lowest possible ranking, and 1 is the 
highest). 
ns p >.05 
 
  
  
Mean 
Mean difference 
from reference SE t p 
Binary 
 Man 4.69  0.15 30.35 <.001 
Woman  0.57 0.20 2.79 .005 
Nonbinary/Agender  1.78 0.33 5.37 <.001 
Binary + Other 
 Man 3.29  0.12 26.96 <.001 
Woman  0.58 0.16 3.62 <.001 
Nonbinary/Agender  0.64 0.26 2.46 .014 
Multiple-Choice 
 Man 3.95  0.11 34.76 <.001 
Woman  -0.30 0.15 -2.02 .043 
Nonbinary/Agender  -0.97 0.24 -4.00 <.001 
Multiple-Choice + Assigned Sex at Birth 
 Man 4.35  0.12 35.10 <.001 
Woman  0.21 0.16 1.30 ns 
Nonbinary/Agender  1.16 0.26 4.37 <.001 
Short Free-Text 
 Man 3.34  0.12 26.97 <.001 
Woman  -0.50 0.16 -3.08 .002 
Nonbinary/Agender  -0.88 0.26 -3.33 <.001 
No Question Asked  
 Man 4.00  0.18 22.09 <.001 
Woman  -0.85 0.24 -3.55 <.001 
Nonbinary/Agender  -1.84 0.38 -4.75 <.001 
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Table B18 
 
T-tests for Significant Main Effects of Transgender Identity on Rankings of Gender Questions in 
the Clinic Intake Context (Study 2) 
Note. Higher numbers indicate lower ranking (i.e. 7 is the lowest possible ranking, and 1 is the 
highest). 
ns p >.05 
  
  
Mean 
Mean difference 
from reference SE t p 
Binary 
 Not transgender 5.38  0.09 56.11 <.001 
Transgender  1.11 0.27 4.07 <.001 
Unclassified  0.11 0.44 0.26 ns 
Binary + Other 
 Not transgender 4.07  0.08 49.03 <.001 
Transgender  0.62 0.23 2.64 .008 
Unclassified  0.97 0.38 2.50 .012 
Multiple-Choice 
 Not transgender 3.42  0.06 50.62 <.001 
Transgender  -0.40 0.19 -2.09 .036 
Unclassified  -0.82 0.31 -2.60 .009 
Multiple-Choice + Transgender Identity 
 Not transgender 3.80  0.08 46.57 <.001 
 Transgender  -0.78 0.23 -3.38 <.001 
 Unclassified  -0.30 0.38 -0.80 ns 
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Table B19 
 
T-tests for Significant Main Effects of Transgender Identity on Rankings of Gender Questions in 
the Psychology Experiment Context (Study 2) 
Note. Higher numbers indicate lower ranking (i.e. 7 is the lowest possible ranking, and 1 is the 
highest). 
ns p >.05 
 
 
  
  
Mean 
Mean difference 
from reference SE t p 
Binary 
 Not transgender 5.36  0.09 54.42 <.001 
Transgender  1.17 0.27 4.22 <.001 
Unclassified  0.33 0.44 0.76 ns 
Multiple-Choice + Transgender Identity 
 Not transgender 3.57  0.08 41.70 <.001 
 Transgender  -0.72 0.24 -2.97 .003 
 Unclassified  -0.07 0.38 -0.20 ns 
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Table B20 
 
T-tests for Significant Main Effects of Transgender Identity on Rankings of Gender Questions in 
the Dating Website Context (Study 2) 
Note. Higher numbers indicate lower ranking (i.e. 7 is the lowest possible ranking, and 1 is the 
highest). 
ns p >.05 
 
  
  Mean 
Mean difference 
from reference SE t p 
Binary 
 Not transgender 4.82  0.90 49.19 <.001 
Transgender  1.36 0.28 4.79 <.001 
Unclassified  0.99 0.50 1.96 .049 
Multiple-Choice 
 Not transgender 3.59  0.07 48.60 <.001 
Transgender  -1.03 0.21 -4.82 <.001 
Unclassified  -0.53 0.38 -1.41 ns 
Multiple-Choice + Assigned Sex at Birth 
 Not transgender 3.71  0.09 39.64 <.001 
Transgender  1.08 0.27 3.97 <.001 
Unclassified  0.53 0.48 1.09 ns 
Short Free-Text 
 Not transgender 2.82  0.08 31.75 <.001 
Transgender  -0.54 0.25 -2.12 .033 
Unclassified  -0.75 0.45 -1.66 ns 
No Question Asked  
 Not transgender 5.62  0.09 58.87 <.001 
Transgender  -0.82 0.27 -2.99 .002 
Unclassified  -0.50 0.49 -1.02 ns 
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Table B21 
 
T-tests for Significant Main Effects of Transgender Identity on Rankings of Gender Questions in 
the Job Application Context (Study 2) 
Note. Higher numbers indicate lower ranking (i.e. 7 is the lowest possible ranking, and 1 is the 
highest). 
ns p >.05 
  
  
Mean 
Mean difference 
from reference SE t p 
Binary 
 Not transgender 5.01  0.10 48.08 <.001 
Transgender  1.28 0.30 4.22 <.001 
Unclassified  0.87 0.48 1.79 ns 
Multiple-Choice 
 Not transgender 3.79  0.07 49.53 <.001 
Transgender  -0.72 0.22 -3.22 .001 
Unclassified  -0.58 0.35 -1.63 ns 
Multiple-Choice + Assigned Sex at Birth 
 Not transgender 4.44  0.08 53.01 <.001 
Transgender  1.12 0.24 4.58 <.001 
Unclassified  0.18 0.39 0.47 ns 
No Question Asked  
 Not transgender 3.58  0.12 29.31 <.001 
Transgender  -1.62 0.35 -4.54 <.001 
Unclassified  -0.63 0.57 -1.11 ns 
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Appendix C 
 
Table C1 
Cronbach’s Alpha, Means, and Standard Deviations for Emotions Toward Gender Groups 
(Studies 1 and 2). 
 Positive 
Emotions 
Negative 
Emotions 
Study Gender Group α M SD α M SD 
1 
People with the same gender identity as you .87 5.0 1.5 .93 2.4 1.4 
Transgender men .92 4.5 1.8 .93 2.0 1.2 
Transgender women .92 4.7 1.9 .93 1.9 1.2 
Cisgender men .91 4.1 1.7 .93 2.3 1.4 
Cisgender women .88 3.3 1.6 .93 2.9 1.7 
Gender non-conforming people .93 4.6 1.9 .96 1.9 1.2 
People with non-binary gender identities .94 4.6 2.0 .96 1.9 1.2 
2 People with the same gender identity as you .89 3.3 1.7 .92 2.1 1.3 
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Table C2 
Fixed-Effects ANOVAs for Interactions of Gender Identity and Transgender Identity on Identity 
as a Man (Multi-Dimensional Social Identity Scale, Leach et al. 2008) - Study 1. 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 2458.62 1 2458.62 1515.82 .000   
summgen3 30.17 2 15.09 9.30 .000 .05 [.02, .08] 
transid3 17.33 2 8.66 5.34 .005 .03 [.00, .06] 
summgen3 
x transid3 
19.50 4 4.88 3.01 .018 .03 [.00, .05] 
Error 624.46 385 1.62     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, respectively. 
 
Table C3 
 
Expected Means for Gender Identity and Transgender Identity on Identity as a Man (Multi-
Component Social Identity Scale, Leach et al. 2008) – Study 1. 
summgen3 transid3  emmean    SE  df lower.CL upper.CL 
 Man      Yes        4.27 0.209 385   3.8585     4.68 
 Woman    Yes        2.43 0.209 385   2.0202     2.84 
 Nonbin   Yes        3.00 0.115 385   2.7710     3.22 
 Man      No         5.03 0.129 385   4.7803     5.29 
 Woman    No         4.28 0.139 385   4.0053     4.55 
 Nonbin   No         2.57 1.274 385   0.0674     5.08 
 Man      DK/NA      4.32 0.481 385   3.3745     5.27 
 Woman    DK/NA      2.58 0.570 385   1.4552     3.69 
 Nonbin   DK/NA      3.15 0.735 385   1.7025     4.59 
Note. Summgen3: Condensed multiple-choice gender identity (Man = Man, Woman = Woman, Nonbin = Non-
binary or Agender). Transid3: Condensed transgender identity (Yes = Transgender, No = Cisgender, DK/NA = 
Don’t know or Choose not to answer). 
Table C4 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Gender Identity on Identity as a Man (Multi-Dimensional Social 
Identity Scale, Leach et al. 2008) - Study 1. 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 3246.67 1 3246.67 1727.68 .000   
summgen3 225.67 2 112.83 60.04 .000 .23 [.17, .29] 
Error 736.65 392 1.88     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, respectively. 
 
Table C5 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Transgender Identity on Identity as a Man (Multi-Dimensional Social 
Identity Scale, Leach et al. 2008) - Study 1. 
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Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 4027.18 1 4027.18 2176.71 .000   
transid3 246.64 2 123.32 66.65 .000 .23 [.18, .29] 
Error 808.50 437 1.85     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, respectively. 
 
 
  
  
323 
 
Table C6 
Fixed-Effects ANOVAs for Interactions of Gender Identity and Transgender Identity on Identity 
as a Woman (Multi-Dimensional Social Identity Scale, Leach et al. 2008) - Study 1. 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 1786.07 1 1786.07 1321.33 .000   
summgen3 66.23 2 33.12 24.50 .000 .11 [.06, .16] 
transid3 28.27 2 14.13 10.46 .000 .05 [.02, .09] 
summgen3 
x transid3 
16.58 4 4.14 3.07 .017 .03 [.00, .05] 
Error 528.52 391 1.35     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, respectively. 
 
Table C7 
 
Expected Means for Gender Identity and Transgender Identity on Identity as a Woman (Multi-
Component Social Identity Scale, Leach et al. 2008) – Study 1. 
summgen3 transid3  emmean    SE  df lower.CL upper.CL 
 Man      Yes        3.40 0.194 391     3.02     3.78 
 Woman    Yes        5.33 0.184 391     4.97     5.69 
 Nonbin   Yes        3.96 0.104 391     3.76     4.17 
 Man      No         4.43 0.122 391     4.19     4.67 
 Woman    No         5.62 0.121 391     5.39     5.86 
 Nonbin   No         4.00 1.163 391     1.71     6.29 
 Man      DK/NA      4.52 0.439 391     3.66     5.39 
 Woman    DK/NA      4.34 0.475 391     3.40     5.27 
 Nonbin   DK/NA      4.74 0.671 391     3.42     6.06 
Note. Summgen3: Condensed multiple-choice gender identity (Man = Man, Woman = Woman, Nonbin = Non-
binary or Agender). Transid3: Condensed transgender identity (Yes = Transgender, No = Cisgender, DK/NA = 
Don’t know or Choose not to answer). 
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Table C8 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Gender Identity on Identity as a Woman (Multi-Dimensional Social 
Identity Scale, Leach et al. 2008) - Study 1.  
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 2317.66 1 2317.66 1618.82 .000   
summgen3 183.48 2 91.74 64.08 .000 .24 [.18, .30] 
Error 569.82 398 1.43     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, respectively. 
 
Table C9 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Transgender Identity on Identity as a Woman (Multi-Dimensional 
Social Identity Scale, Leach et al. 2008) - Study 1.  
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 4684.26 1 4684.26 2853.06 .000   
transid3 91.58 2 45.79 27.89 .000 .11 [.07, .16] 
Error 727.33 443 1.64     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, respectively. 
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Table C10 
Expected Means for Gender Identity and Transgender Identity on Identification with Men 
(Single-Item Social Identification Scales, Postmes et al. 2013) – Study 1. 
summgen3 transid3  emmean    SE  df lower.CL upper.CL 
 Man      Yes        5.77 0.290 216    5.200     6.34 
 Woman    Yes        2.00 0.275 216    1.459     2.54 
 Nonbin   Yes        3.55 0.153 216    3.250     3.85 
 Man      No         6.44 0.572 216    5.318     7.57 
 Woman    No         3.50 0.606 216    2.305     4.70 
 Nonbin   No         5.00 1.715 216    1.620     8.38 
 Man      DK/NA    nonEst    NA  NA       NA       NA 
 Woman    DK/NA      1.00 0.990 216   -0.952     2.95 
 Nonbin   DK/NA      4.00 0.858 216    2.310     5.69 
Note. Summgen3: Condensed multiple-choice gender identity (Man = Man, Woman = Woman, Nonbin = Non-
binary or Agender). Transid3: Condensed transgender identity (Yes = Transgender, No = Cisgender, DK/NA = 
Don’t know or Choose not to answer). 
 
Table C11 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Gender Identity on Identification with Men (Single-Item Social 
Identification Scales, Postmes et al. 2013) – Study 1. 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 1536.36 1 1536.36 514.27 .000   
summgen3 332.58 2 166.29 55.66 .000 .33 [.25, .40] 
Error 663.21 222 2.99     
 
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
 
Table C12 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Transgender Identity on Identification with Men (Single-Item Social 
Identification Scales, Postmes et al. 2013) – Study 1. 
 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 441.80 1 441.80 105.61 .000   
transid3 24.19 2 12.10 2.89 .057 .02 [.00, .05] 
Error 1112.81 266 4.18     
 
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
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Table C13 
 
Expected Means for Gender Identity and Transgender Identity on Identification with  
Women (Single-Item Social Identification Scales, Postmes et al. 2013) – Study 1. 
summgen3 transid3  emmean    SE  df lower.CL upper.CL 
 Man      Yes        3.37 0.256 218     2.87     3.88 
 Woman    Yes        6.28 0.240 218     5.80     6.75 
 Nonbin   Yes        4.24 0.135 218     3.97     4.50 
 Man      No         3.56 0.505 218     2.56     4.55 
 Woman    No         6.50 0.536 218     5.44     7.56 
 Nonbin   No         5.00 1.515 218     2.01     7.99 
 Man      DK/NA    nonEst    NA  NA       NA       NA 
 Woman    DK/NA      5.67 0.875 218     3.94     7.39 
 Nonbin   DK/NA      5.25 0.758 218     3.76     6.74 
Note. Summgen3: Condensed multiple-choice gender identity (Man = Man, Woman = Woman, Nonbin = Non-
binary or Agender). Transid3: Condensed transgender identity (Yes = Transgender, No = Cisgender, DK/NA = 
Don’t know or Choose not to answer). 
 
Table C14 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Gender Identity on Identification with Women (Single-Item Social 
Identification Scales, Postmes et al. 2013) – Study 1. 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 511.36 1 511.36 223.71 .000   
summgen3 220.23 2 110.11 48.17 .000 .30 [.22, .37] 
Error 512.04 224 2.29     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
 
Table C15 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Transgender Identity on Identification with Women (Single-Item Social 
Identification Scales, Postmes et al. 2013) – Study 1. 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 441.80 1 441.80 134.52 .000   
transid3 2.69 2 1.34 0.41 .664 .00 [.00, .02] 
Error 880.17 268 3.28     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
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Table C16 
 
Expected Means for Gender Identity and Transgender Identity on Identification with  
Non-Binary People (Single-Item Social Identification Scales, Postmes et al. 2013) – Study 1. 
summgen3 transid3  emmean    SE  df lower.CL upper.CL 
 Man      Yes        5.00 0.226 217     4.55     5.45 
 Woman    Yes        4.74 0.214 217     4.32     5.17 
 Nonbin   Yes        6.61 0.119 217     6.38     6.85 
 Man      No         2.89 0.446 217     2.01     3.77 
 Woman    No         4.38 0.473 217     3.44     5.31 
 Nonbin   No         6.00 1.337 217     3.37     8.63 
 Man      DK/NA    nonEst    NA  NA       NA       NA 
 Woman    DK/NA      4.67 0.772 217     3.15     6.19 
 Nonbin   DK/NA      5.50 0.668 217     4.18     6.82 
Note. Summgen3: Condensed multiple-choice gender identity (Man = Man, Woman = Woman, Nonbin = Non-
binary or Agender). Transid3: Condensed transgender identity (Yes = Transgender, No = Cisgender, DK/NA = 
Don’t know or Choose not to answer). 
 
Table C17 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Gender Identity on Identification with Non-Binary People (Single-Item 
Social Identification Scales, Postmes et al. 2013) – Study 1. 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 918.20 1 918.20 480.75 .000   
summgen3 208.65 2 104.33 54.62 .000 .33 [.24, .40] 
Error 425.92 223 1.91     
 
Table C18 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Transgender Identity on Identification with Non-Binary People 
(Single-Item Social Identification Scales, Postmes et al. 2013) – Study 1. 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 259.20 1 259.20 114.38 .000   
transid3 128.15 2 64.08 28.28 .000 .17 [.11, .24] 
Error 605.05 267 2.27     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
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Table C19 
Expected Means for Gender Identity and Transgender Identity on Identification with  
Gender Non-Conforming People (Single-Item Social Identification Scales, Postmes et al. 2013) – 
Study 1. 
summgen3 transid3  emmean    SE  df lower.CL upper.CL 
 Man      Yes        5.37 0.216 218     4.95     5.80 
 Woman    Yes        5.33 0.205 218     4.93     5.74 
 Nonbin   Yes        6.50 0.113 218     6.27     6.72 
 Man      No         3.00 0.426 218     2.16     3.84 
 Woman    No         4.88 0.452 218     3.98     5.77 
 Nonbin   No         6.00 1.278 218     3.48     8.52 
 Man      DK/NA    nonEst    NA  NA       NA       NA 
 Woman    DK/NA      5.33 0.738 218     3.88     6.79 
 Nonbin   DK/NA      6.00 0.639 218     4.74     7.26 
 
Table C20 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Gender Identity on Identification with Gender Non-Conforming People 
(Single-Item Social Identification Scales, Postmes et al. 2013) – Study 1. 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 1050.57 1 1050.57 589.48 .000   
summgen3 109.46 2 54.73 30.71 .000 .22 [.14, .29] 
Error 399.21 224 1.78     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
 
Table C21 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Transgender Identity on Identification with Gender Non-Conforming 
People (Single-Item Social Identification Scales, Postmes et al. 2013) – Study 1. 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 281.25 1 281.25 154.15 .000   
transid3 107.71 2 53.85 29.52 .000 .18 [.11, .24] 
Error 488.97 268 1.82     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
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Table C22 
 
Expected Means for Gender Identity and Transgender Identity on Identification with  
Gender Minorities (Single-Item Social Identification Scales, Postmes et al. 2013) – Study 1. 
summgen3 transid3  emmean    SE  df lower.CL upper.CL 
 Man      Yes        6.03 0.203 218     5.63     6.43 
 Woman    Yes        5.87 0.192 218     5.49     6.25 
 Nonbin   Yes        6.28 0.106 218     6.07     6.49 
 Man      No         3.00 0.400 218     2.21     3.79 
 Woman    No         5.00 0.424 218     4.16     5.84 
 Nonbin   No         6.00 1.200 218     3.64     8.36 
 Man      DK/NA    nonEst    NA  NA       NA       NA 
 Woman    DK/NA      4.00 0.693 218     2.64     5.36 
 Nonbin   DK/NA      5.50 0.600 218     4.32     6.68 
 
Table C23 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Gender Identity on Identification with Gender Minorities (Single-Item 
Social Identification Scales, Postmes et al. 2013) – Study 1. 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 1287.36 1 1287.36 728.71 .000   
summgen3 30.74 2 15.37 8.70 .000 .07 [.02, .13] 
Error 395.72 224 1.77     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
 
Table C24 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Transgender Identity on Identification with Gender Minorities (Single-
Item Social Identification Scales, Postmes et al. 2013) – Study 1. 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 304.20 1 304.20 204.55 .000   
transid3 111.82 2 55.91 37.59 .000 .22 [.15, .28] 
Error 398.56 268 1.49     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
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Table C25 
Expected Means for Gender Identity and Transgender Identity on Identification with  
Transgender People (Single-Item Social Identification Scales, Postmes et al. 2013) – Study 1. 
summgen3 transid3  emmean    SE  df lower.CL upper.CL 
 Man      Yes        6.37 0.269 217    5.842     6.90 
 Woman    Yes        5.68 0.258 217    5.176     6.19 
 Nonbin   Yes        5.46 0.141 217    5.187     5.74 
 Man      No         3.22 0.530 217    2.178     4.27 
 Woman    No         3.75 0.562 217    2.642     4.86 
 Nonbin   No         6.00 1.590 217    2.867     9.13 
 Man      DK/NA    nonEst    NA  NA       NA       NA 
 Woman    DK/NA      2.67 0.918 217    0.858     4.48 
 Nonbin   DK/NA      4.75 0.795 217    3.183     6.32 
 
Table C26 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Gender Identity on Identification with Transgender People (Single-
Item Social Identification Scales, Postmes et al. 2013) – Study 1. 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 1443.27 1 1443.27 481.25 .000   
summgen3 6.85 2 3.42 1.14 .321 .01 [.00, .04] 
Error 668.78 223 3.00     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
 
Table C27 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Transgender Identity on Identification with Transgender People 
(Single-Item Social Identification Scales, Postmes et al. 2013) – Study 1. 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 231.20 1 231.20 93.25 .000   
transid3 138.45 2 69.22 27.92 .000 .17 [.11, .24] 
Error 661.98 267 2.48     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
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Table C28 
 
Expected Means for Gender Identity and Transgender Identity on Identification with  
Cisgender People (Single-Item Social Identification Scales, Postmes et al. 2013) – Study 1. 
summgen3 transid3 emmean    SE  df lower.CL upper.CL 
 Man      Yes        2.63 0.278 217    2.080     3.18 
 Woman    Yes        3.03 0.264 217    2.506     3.55 
 Nonbin   Yes        2.40 0.147 217    2.116     2.69 
 Man      No         4.67 0.549 217    3.584     5.75 
 Woman    No         6.00 0.582 217    4.852     7.15 
 Nonbin   No         3.00 1.647 217   -0.247     6.25 
 Man      DK/NA    nonEst    NA  NA       NA       NA 
 Woman    DK/NA      2.33 0.951 217    0.459     4.21 
 Nonbin   DK/NA      3.75 0.824 217    2.127     5.37 
 
Table C29 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Gender Identity on Identification with Cisgender People (Single-Item 
Social Identification Scales, Postmes et al. 2013) – Study 1. 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 408.09 1 408.09 132.09 .000   
summgen3 40.85 2 20.43 6.61 .002 .06 [.01, .11] 
Error 688.96 223 3.09     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
 
Table C30 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Transgender Identity on Identification with Cisgender People (Single-
Item Social Identification Scales, Postmes et al. 2013) – Study 1. 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 451.25 1 451.25 153.94 .000   
transid3 92.18 2 46.09 15.72 .000 .11 [.05, .16] 
Error 782.65 267 2.93     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
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Table C31 
Fixed-Effects ANOVAs for Gender Identity and Transgender Identity on Identity as a Man (Study 
2). 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 772.60 1 772.60 1723.62 .000   
summgen3 60.95 2 30.48 67.99 .000 .20 [.15, .25] 
transid3 1.38 2 0.69 1.54 .215 .01 [.00, .02] 
summgen3 
x transid3 
6.22 4 1.55 3.47 .008 .02 [.00, .04] 
Error 243.84 544 0.45     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
 
Table C32 
Expected Means for Gender Identity and Transgender Identity on Identity as a Man (Study 2). 
        summgen3 transid3 emmean     SE  df lower.CL upper.CL 
1            Man      Yes   4.03 0.2117 544     3.61     4.44 
2          Woman      Yes   1.68 0.2117 544     1.26     2.09 
3 Nonbin/Agender      Yes   2.45 0.1165 544     2.22     2.68 
4            Man       No   3.92 0.0454 544     3.83     4.01 
5          Woman       No   1.84 0.0422 544     1.76     1.92 
6 Nonbin/Agender       No   2.78 0.2232 544     2.34     3.22 
7            Man    DK/NA   3.14 0.2232 544     2.70     3.58 
8          Woman    DK/NA   2.29 0.2733 544     1.75     2.83 
9 Nonbin/Agender    DK/NA   2.29 0.2531 544     1.79     2.78 
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Table C33 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Gender Identity on Identity as a Man (Study 2). 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 2463.95 1 2463.95 5380.38 .000   
summgen3 533.09 2 266.55 582.04 .000 .68 [.64, .70] 
Error 253.71 554 0.46     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
 
 
Table C34 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Transgender Identity on Identity as a Man (Study 2). 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 1102.82 1 1102.82 786.25 .000   
transid3 1.61 2 0.80 0.57 .563 .00 [.00, .01] 
Error 789.69 563 1.40     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
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Table C35 
Fixed-Effects ANOVAs for Gender Identity and Transgender Identity on Identity as a Woman 
(Study 2). 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 843.59 1 843.59 1619.08 .000   
summgen3 63.92 2 31.96 61.34 .000 .19 [.14, .23] 
transid3 0.52 2 0.26 0.50 .606 .00 [.00, .01] 
summgen3 
x transid3 
5.96 4 1.49 2.86 .023 .02 [.00, .04] 
Error 281.36 540 0.52     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
 
Table C36 
Expected Means for Gender Identity and Transgender Identity on Identity as a Woman (Study 2). 
        summgen3 transid3 emmean     SE  df lower.CL upper.CL 
1            Man      Yes   1.82 0.2283 540     1.38     2.27 
2          Woman      Yes   4.27 0.2283 540     3.83     4.72 
3 Nonbin/Agender      Yes   2.62 0.1257 540     2.37     2.87 
4            Man       No   1.84 0.0495 540     1.74     1.94 
5          Woman       No   3.98 0.0455 540     3.89     4.07 
6 Nonbin/Agender       No   2.47 0.2406 540     2.00     2.94 
7            Man    DK/NA   2.33 0.2406 540     1.86     2.81 
8          Woman    DK/NA   3.29 0.2947 540     2.71     3.87 
9 Nonbin/Agender    DK/NA   2.86 0.2728 540     2.32     3.39 
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Table C37 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Gender Identity on Identity as a Woman (Study 2). 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 2618.07 1 2618.07 4964.03 .000   
summgen3 562.58 2 281.29 533.34 .000 .66 [.62, .69] 
Error 290.08 550 0.53     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
 
Table C38 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Transgender Identity on Identity as a Woman (Study 2). 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 1187.05 1 1187.05 770.88 .000   
transid3 4.34 2 2.17 1.41 .245 .01 [.00, .02] 
Error 860.78 559 1.54     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
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Table C39 
Fixed-Effects ANOVAs for Gender Identity and Transgender Identity on Identity as a Non-Binary 
Person (Study 2).  
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 452.38 1 452.38 1097.15 .000   
summgen3 51.13 2 25.57 62.01 .000 .19 [.14, .23] 
transid3 9.75 2 4.88 11.82 .000 .04 [.02, .07] 
summgen3 
x transid3 
1.70 4 0.42 1.03 .392 .01 [.00, .02] 
Error 222.65 540 0.41     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
 
 
Table C40 
Expected Means for Gender Identity and Transgender Identity on Identity as a Non-Binary 
Person (Study 2). 
        summgen3 transid3 emmean     SE  df lower.CL upper.CL 
1            Man      Yes   2.03 0.2031 540     1.63     2.43 
2          Woman      Yes   1.57 0.2031 540     1.17     1.97 
3 Nonbin/Agender      Yes   3.48 0.1101 540     3.26     3.70 
4            Man       No   1.26 0.0439 540     1.17     1.34 
5          Woman       No   1.30 0.0405 540     1.22     1.38 
6 Nonbin/Agender       No   2.74 0.2140 540     2.32     3.16 
7            Man    DK/NA   1.75 0.2270 540     1.30     2.20 
8          Woman    DK/NA   1.61 0.2621 540     1.10     2.13 
9 Nonbin/Agender    DK/NA   3.10 0.2427 540     2.62     3.57 
 
  
  
337 
 
Table C41 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Gender Identity on Identity as a Non-Binary Person (Study 2).  
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 1296.62 1 1296.62 2979.86 .000   
summgen3 190.04 2 95.02 218.37 .000 .44 [.39, .48] 
Error 239.32 550 0.44     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
 
Table C42 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Transgender Identity on Identity as a Non-Binary Person (Study 2).  
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 652.61 1 652.61 1222.39 .000   
transid3 126.95 2 63.48 118.89 .000 .30 [.25, .34] 
Error 298.44 559 0.53     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
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Table C43 
Fixed-Effects ANOVAs for Gender Identity and Transgender Identity on Frequency of Being 
Upset When Others Use Male Pronouns (He/Him) for You (Study 2). 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 221.64 1 221.64 198.39 .000   
summgen3 12.65 2 6.33 5.66 .004 .04 [.01, .07] 
transid3 10.75 2 5.38 4.81 .009 .03 [.00, .06] 
summgen3 
x transid3 
13.32 4 3.33 2.98 .019 .04 [.00, .07] 
Error 340.74 305 1.12     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
 
Table C44 
Expected Means for Gender Identity and Transgender Identity on Frequency of Being Upset 
When Others Use Male Pronouns (He/Him) for You (Study 2). 
       summgen3 transid3 emmean     SE  df lower.CL upper.CL 
1            Man      Yes   1.44 0.3523 305    0.751     2.14 
2          Woman      Yes   3.60 0.3342 305    2.942     4.26 
3 Nonbin/Agender      Yes   2.09 0.2253 305    1.647     2.53 
4            Man       No   1.22 0.0788 305    1.067     1.38 
5          Woman       No   1.92 0.1205 305    1.685     2.16 
6 Nonbin/Agender       No   1.80 0.4727 305    0.870     2.73 
7            Man    DK/NA   1.86 0.3995 305    1.071     2.64 
8          Woman    DK/NA   2.00 0.7474 305    0.529     3.47 
9 Nonbin/Agender    DK/NA   3.00 0.7474 305    1.529     4.47 
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Table C45 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Gender Identity on Frequency of Being Upset When Others Use Male 
Pronouns (He/Him) for You (Study 2). 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 651.26 1 651.26 535.16 .000   
summgen3 60.38 2 30.19 24.81 .000 .14 [.08, .19] 
Error 382.12 314 1.22     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
 
Table C46 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Transgender Identity on Frequency of Being Upset When Others Use 
Male Pronouns (He/Him) for You (Study 2). 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 325.97 1 325.97 259.20 .000   
transid3 31.38 2 15.69 12.48 .000 .07 [.03, .12] 
Error 401.18 319 1.26     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
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Table C47 
Fixed-Effects ANOVAs for Gender Identity and Transgender Identity on Frequency of Being 
Upset When Others Use Female Pronouns (She/Her) for You (Study 2). 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 401.78 1 401.78 466.56 .000   
summgen3 42.85 2 21.43 24.88 .000 .12 [.07, .17] 
transid3 12.45 2 6.22 7.23 .001 .04 [.01, .07] 
summgen3 
x transid3 
17.51 4 4.38 5.08 .001 .05 [.01, .08] 
Error 322.07 374 0.86     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
 
Table C48 
Expected Means for Gender Identity and Transgender Identity on Frequency of Being Upset 
When Others Use Female Pronouns (She/Her) for You (Study 2). 
       summgen3 transid3 emmean     SE  df lower.CL upper.CL 
1            Man      Yes   3.70 0.2935 374    3.123     4.28 
2          Woman      Yes   1.00 0.2935 374    0.423     1.58 
3 Nonbin/Agender      Yes   3.45 0.1615 374    3.137     3.77 
4            Man       No   1.99 0.0984 374    1.795     2.18 
5          Woman       No   1.13 0.0626 374    1.004     1.25 
6 Nonbin/Agender       No   2.83 0.3788 374    2.088     3.58 
7            Man    DK/NA   2.40 0.4150 374    1.584     3.22 
8          Woman    DK/NA   1.50 0.4640 374    0.588     2.41 
9 Nonbin/Agender    DK/NA   2.33 0.3788 374    1.588     3.08 
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Table C49 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Gender Identity on Frequency of Being Upset When Others Use 
Female Pronouns (She/Her) for You (Study 2). 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 1219.83 1 1219.83 1253.12 .000   
summgen3 210.04 2 105.02 107.89 .000 .36 [.30, .41] 
Error 372.83 383 0.97     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
 
Table C50 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Transgender Identity on Frequency of Being Upset When Others Use 
Female Pronouns (She/Her) for You (Study 2). 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 580.42 1 580.42 504.56 .000   
transid3 127.29 2 63.65 55.33 .000 .22 [.16, .27] 
Error 450.93 392 1.15     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
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Table C51 
Fixed-Effects ANOVAs for Gender Identity and Transgender Identity on Frequency of Being 
Upset When Others Use Gender Neutral Pronouns (They/Them) for You (Study 2). 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 149.94 1 149.94 177.63 .000   
summgen3 8.37 2 4.18 4.96 .008 .03 [.00, .07] 
transid3 0.73 2 0.36 0.43 .651 .00 [.00, .02] 
summgen3 
x transid3 
2.47 4 0.62 0.73 .571 .01 [.00, .02] 
Error 261.67 310 0.84     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
 
 
Table C52 
Expected Means for Gender Identity and Transgender Identity on Frequency of Being Upset 
When Others Use Gender Neutral Pronouns (They/Them) for You (Study 2). 
      summgen3 transid3 emmean     SE  df lower.CL upper.CL 
1            Man      Yes   2.13 0.3248 310    1.486     2.76 
2          Woman      Yes   1.22 0.3063 310    0.620     1.82 
3 Nonbin/Agender      Yes   1.10 0.1650 310    0.772     1.42 
4            Man       No   1.54 0.0842 310    1.372     1.70 
5          Woman       No   1.39 0.0809 310    1.228     1.55 
6 Nonbin/Agender       No   1.00 0.3248 310    0.361     1.64 
7            Man    DK/NA   1.83 0.3751 310    1.095     2.57 
8          Woman    DK/NA   1.33 0.5304 310    0.290     2.38 
9 Nonbin/Agender    DK/NA   1.17 0.3751 310    0.429     1.90 
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Table C53 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Gender Identity on Frequency of Being Upset When Others Use 
Gender Neutral Pronouns (They/Them) for You (Study 2). 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 459.58 1 459.58 549.13 .000   
summgen3 9.73 2 4.87 5.82 .003 .04 [.01, .07] 
Error 266.98 319 0.84     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
 
Table C54 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Transgender Identity on Frequency of Being Upset When Others Use 
Gender Neutral Pronouns (They/Them) for You (Study 2). 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 206.35 1 206.35 243.81 .000   
transid3 1.05 2 0.52 0.62 .537 .00 [.00, .02] 
Error 274.21 324 0.85     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
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Table C55 
Expected Means for Gender Identity and Transgender Identity on Frequency of Discomfort 
When Required to Check the “M” Box (Study 2).  
       summgen3 transid3 emmean     SE  df lower.CL upper.CL 
1            Man      Yes   2.38 0.2789 299    1.826     2.92 
2          Woman      Yes   4.00 0.3221 299    3.366     4.63 
3 Nonbin/Agender      Yes   2.00 0.2630 299    1.483     2.52 
4            Man       No   1.23 0.0563 299    1.119     1.34 
5          Woman       No   1.36 0.0911 299    1.181     1.54 
6 Nonbin/Agender       No   3.25 0.3944 299    2.474     4.03 
7            Man    DK/NA   1.75 0.2789 299    1.201     2.30 
8          Woman    DK/NA   2.00 0.7889 299    0.448     3.55 
9 Nonbin/Agender    DK/NA     NA     NA  NA       NA       NA 
 
Table C56 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Gender Identity on Frequency of Discomfort When Required to Check 
the “M” Box (Study 2). 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 364.33 1 364.33 447.92 .000   
summgen3 28.23 2 14.12 17.35 .000 .10 [.05, .15] 
Error 249.71 307 0.81     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
 
Table C57 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Transgender Identity on Frequency of Discomfort When Required to 
Check the “M” Box (Study 2). 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 255.92 1 255.92 337.34 .000   
transid3 51.98 2 25.99 34.26 .000 .18 [.12, .24] 
Error 235.18 310 0.76     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
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Table C58 
Fixed-Effects ANOVAs for Gender Identity and Transgender Identity on Frequency of 
Discomfort When Required to Check the “F” Box (Study 2).  
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 546.56 1 546.56 645.94 .000   
summgen3 85.45 2 42.73 50.49 .000 .22 [.16, .28] 
transid3 17.67 2 8.84 10.44 .000 .05 [.02, .09] 
summgen3 
x transid3 
28.08 4 7.02 8.30 .000 .08 [.04, .12] 
Error 303.77 359 0.85     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
 
 
Table C59 
Expected Means for Gender Identity and Transgender Identity on Frequency of Discomfort 
When Required to Check the “F” Box (Study 2).  
        summgen3 transid3 emmean     SE  df lower.CL upper.CL 
1            Man      Yes   4.12 0.3252 359    3.485     4.76 
2          Woman      Yes   1.80 0.4114 359    0.991     2.61 
3 Nonbin/Agender      Yes   4.10 0.1652 359    3.772     4.42 
4            Man       No   1.51 0.1116 359    1.295     1.73 
5          Woman       No   1.33 0.0604 359    1.209     1.45 
6 Nonbin/Agender       No   4.17 0.3755 359    3.428     4.91 
7            Man    DK/NA   1.86 0.3477 359    1.173     2.54 
8          Woman    DK/NA   1.25 0.4599 359    0.345     2.15 
9 Nonbin/Agender    DK/NA   4.14 0.3477 359    3.459     4.83 
 
  
346 
 
Table C60 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Gender Identity on Frequency of Discomfort When Required to Check 
the “F” Box (Study 2). 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 1410.09 1 1410.09 1426.43 .000   
summgen3 302.29 2 151.15 152.90 .000 .45 [.39, .50] 
Error 364.77 369 0.99     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
  
Table C61 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Transgender Identity on Frequency of Discomfort When Required to 
Check the “F” Box (Study 2).  
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 856.02 1 856.02 731.64 .000   
transid3 235.37 2 117.69 100.59 .000 .35 [.29, .40] 
Error 438.75 375 1.17     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
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Table C62 
 
Fixed-Effects ANOVAs for Gender Identity and Transgender Identity on Frequency of 
Discomfort When Any Gender Information is Requested (Study 2). 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 699.28 1 699.28 778.90 .000   
summgen3 51.94 2 25.97 28.93 .000 .11 [.06, .15] 
transid3 58.90 2 29.45 32.80 .000 .12 [.08, .16] 
summgen3 
x transid3 
19.89 4 4.97 5.54 .000 .04 [.01, .07] 
Error 437.22 487 0.90     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
 
Table C63 
 
Expected Means for Gender Identity and Transgender Identity on Frequency of Discomfort 
When Any Gender Information is Requested (Study 2). 
        summgen3 transid3 emmean     SE  df lower.CL upper.CL 
1            Man      Yes   3.45 0.2857 487    2.893     4.02 
2          Woman      Yes   3.75 0.3350 487    3.092     4.41 
3 Nonbin/Agender      Yes   3.97 0.1625 487    3.651     4.29 
4            Man       No   1.41 0.0706 487    1.267     1.54 
5          Woman       No   1.53 0.0618 487    1.406     1.65 
6 Nonbin/Agender       No   3.67 0.3158 487    3.046     4.29 
7            Man    DK/NA   1.62 0.3350 487    0.967     2.28 
8          Woman    DK/NA   1.75 0.4738 487    0.819     2.68 
9 Nonbin/Agender    DK/NA   3.71 0.3581 487    3.011     4.42 
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Table C64 
 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Gender Identity on Frequency of Discomfort When Any Gender 
Information is Requested (Study 2) 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 1734.30 1 1734.30 1634.67 .000   
summgen3 245.66 2 122.83 115.77 .000 .32 [.26, .37] 
Error 527.29 497 1.06     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
 
 
Table C65 
 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Transgender Identity on Frequency of Discomfort When Any Gender 
Information is Requested (Study 2). 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 994.65 1 994.65 938.73 .000   
transid3 276.36 2 138.18 130.41 .000 .34 [.29, .39] 
Error 535.08 505 1.06     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively.  
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Table C66 
Fixed-Effects ANOVAs for Interactions of Gender Identity and Transgender Identity on Positive 
Emotions Toward Own Gender Group (Study 1). 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 1492.58 1 1492.58 797.76 .000   
summgen3 52.40 2 26.20 14.00 .000 .07 [.03, .10] 
transid3 12.85 2 6.42 3.43 .033 .02 [.00, .04] 
summgen3 
x transid3 
2.60 4 0.65 0.35 .845 .00 [.00, .01] 
Error 750.25 401 1.87     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
 
Table C67 
Expected Means for Gender Identity and Transgender Identity on Positive Emotions toward 
Other People with the Same Gender as You (Study 1). 
summgen3 transid3 emmean    SE  df lower.CL upper.CL 
 Man      Yes        4.53 0.225 401     4.09     4.97 
 Woman    Yes        5.65 0.222 401     5.22     6.09 
 Nonbin   Yes        5.80 0.121 401     5.57     6.04 
 Man      No         3.92 0.139 401     3.65     4.20 
 Woman    No         4.97 0.142 401     4.69     5.25 
 Nonbin   No         4.00 1.368 401     1.31     6.69 
 Man      DK/NA      3.43 0.517 401     2.41     4.44 
 Woman    DK/NA      5.12 0.558 401     4.03     6.22 
 Nonbin   DK/NA      4.88 0.684 401     3.53     6.22 
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Table C68 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Gender Identity on Positive Emotions Toward Own Gender Group 
(Study 1). 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 2321.81 1 2321.81 1208.94 .000   
summgen3 207.93 2 103.97 54.13 .000 .21 [.15, .26] 
Error 783.58 408 1.92     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
 
 
Table C69 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Transgender Identity on Positive Emotions Toward Own Gender 
Group (Study 1).  
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 3782.14 1 3782.14 1790.39 .000   
transid3 133.32 2 66.66 31.56 .000 .12 [.08, .17] 
Error 956.95 453 2.11     
 
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
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Table C70 
Fixed-Effects ANOVAs for Interactions of Gender Identity and Transgender Identity on Negative 
Emotions Toward Own Gender Group (Study 1). 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 610.93 1 610.93 341.46 .000   
summgen3 2.68 2 1.34 0.75 .474 .00 [.00, .02] 
transid3 2.78 2 1.39 0.78 .461 .00 [.00, .02] 
summgen3 
x transid3 
7.37 4 1.84 1.03 .391 .01 [.00, .02] 
Error 715.67 400 1.79     
 
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
 
Table C71 
 
Expected Means for Gender Identity and Transgender Identity on Negative Emotions toward 
Other People with the Same Gender as You (Study 1). 
summgen3 transid3 emmean    SE  df lower.CL upper.CL 
 Man      Yes        2.75 0.220 400    2.321     3.19 
 Woman    Yes        2.28 0.217 400    1.854     2.71 
 Nonbin   Yes        2.09 0.119 400    1.854     2.32 
 Man      No         2.51 0.136 400    2.243     2.78 
 Woman    No         2.42 0.139 400    2.152     2.70 
 Nonbin   No         4.00 1.338 400    1.370     6.63 
 Man      DK/NA      3.00 0.506 400    2.006     3.99 
 Woman    DK/NA      3.31 0.546 400    2.232     4.38 
 Nonbin   DK/NA      2.21 0.669 400    0.894     3.52 
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Table C72 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Gender Identity on Negative Emotions Toward Own Gender Group 
(Study 1). 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 951.60 1 951.60 531.44 .000   
summgen3 17.41 2 8.71 4.86 .008 .02 [.00, .05] 
Error 728.78 407 1.79     
 
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
 
Table C73 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Transgender Identity on Negative Emotions Toward Own Gender 
Group (Study 1). 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 1169.23 1 1169.23 640.31 .000   
transid3 15.23 2 7.62 4.17 .016 .02 [.00, .04] 
Error 825.37 452 1.83     
 
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
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Table C74 
 
Fixed-Effects ANOVAs for Gender Identity and Transgender Identity on Positive Emotions 
toward Other People with the Same Gender as You (Study 2). 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 2462.09 1 2462.09 859.01 .000   
summgen3 41.78 2 20.89 7.29 .001 .03 [.01, .05] 
transid3 31.86 2 15.93 5.56 .004 .02 [.00, .04] 
summgen3 
x transid3 
28.86 4 7.21 2.52 .040 .02 [.00, .03] 
Error 1556.35 543 2.87     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
 
Table C75 
 
Expected Means for Gender Identity and Transgender Identity on Positive Emotions toward 
Other People with the Same Gender as You (Study 2). 
        summgen3 transid3 emmean    SE  df lower.CL upper.CL 
1            Man      Yes   5.40 0.535 543     4.35     6.45 
2          Woman      Yes   4.73 0.535 543     3.67     5.78 
3 Nonbin/Agender      Yes   5.99 0.290 543     5.42     6.56 
4            Man       No   3.40 0.115 543     3.17     3.62 
5          Woman       No   4.55 0.107 543     4.34     4.76 
6 Nonbin/Agender       No   4.97 0.564 543     3.86     6.08 
7            Man    DK/NA   4.50 0.564 543     3.39     5.61 
8          Woman    DK/NA   4.08 0.691 543     2.73     5.44 
9 Nonbin/Agender    DK/NA   6.58 0.691 543     5.23     7.94 
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Table C76 
 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Gender Identity on Positive Emotions toward Other People with the 
Same Gender as You (Study 2). 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 7063.86 1 7063.86 2401.17 .000   
summgen3 276.84 2 138.42 47.05 .000 .15 [.10, .19] 
Error 1626.84 553 2.94     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
 
Table C77 
 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Transgender Identity on Positive Emotions toward Other People with 
the Same Gender as You (Study 2). 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 3510.15 1 3510.15 1105.91 .000   
transid3 137.03 2 68.52 21.59 .000 .07 [.04, .11] 
Error 1783.78 562 3.17     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
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Table C78 
 
Fixed-Effects ANOVAs for Gender Identity and Transgender Identity on Negative Emotions 
toward Other People with the Same Gender as You (Study 2). 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 493.45 1 493.45 241.41 .000   
summgen3 30.69 2 15.35 7.51 .001 .03 [.01, .05] 
transid3 7.07 2 3.54 1.73 .178 .01 [.00, .02] 
summgen3 
x transid3 
10.11 4 2.53 1.24 .294 .01 [.00, .02] 
Error 1097.63 537 2.04     
 
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
 
Table C79 
 
Expected Means for Gender Identity and Transgender Identity on Negative Emotions toward 
Other People with the Same Gender as You (Study 2). 
        summgen3 transid3 emmean     SE  df lower.CL upper.CL 
1            Man      Yes   2.60 0.4521 537    1.712     3.49 
2          Woman      Yes   1.85 0.4521 537    0.962     2.74 
3 Nonbin/Agender      Yes   1.77 0.2452 537    1.288     2.25 
4            Man       No   2.33 0.0982 537    2.136     2.52 
5          Woman       No   2.22 0.0902 537    2.045     2.40 
6 Nonbin/Agender       No   1.31 0.5055 537    0.320     2.31 
7            Man    DK/NA   3.63 0.4766 537    2.693     4.57 
8          Woman    DK/NA   2.83 0.5837 537    1.687     3.98 
9 Nonbin/Agender    DK/NA   1.42 0.5837 537    0.270     2.56 
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Table C80 
 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Gender Identity on Negative Emotions toward Other People with the 
Same Gender as You (Study 2). 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 1409.09 1 1409.09 686.94 .000   
summgen3 22.17 2 11.09 5.40 .005 .02 [.00, .04] 
Error 1122.04 547 2.05     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
 
Table C81 
 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Transgender Identity on Negative Emotions toward Other People with 
the Same Gender as You (Study 2). 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 810.98 1 810.98 387.89 .000   
transid3 14.20 2 7.10 3.40 .034 .01 [.00, .03] 
Error 1162.46 556 2.09     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
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Table C82 
 
Expected Means for Gender Identity and Transgender Identity on Gender Centrality (Study 1). 
summgen3 transid3 emmean    SE  df lower.CL upper.CL 
 Man      Yes        5.94 0.197 218     5.55     6.33 
 Woman    Yes        6.19 0.187 218     5.82     6.56 
 Nonbin   Yes        5.97 0.104 218     5.76     6.17 
 Man      No         4.44 0.389 218     3.68     5.21 
 Woman    No         5.46 0.413 218     4.64     6.27 
 Nonbin   No         4.67 1.167 218     2.37     6.97 
 Man      DK/NA    nonEst    NA  NA       NA       NA 
 Woman    DK/NA      5.33 0.674 218     4.01     6.66 
 Nonbin   DK/NA      4.50 0.584 218     3.35     5.65 
 
 
Table C83 
 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Gender Identity on Gender Centrality (Study 1). 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 1397.82 1 1397.82 951.14 .000   
summgen3 3.79 2 1.90 1.29 .277 .01 [.00, .04] 
Error 329.20 224 1.47     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
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Table C84 
 
Fixed -Effects ANOVAs for Gender Identity and Transgender Identity on Gender Identification 
(Study 2). 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 1876.60 1 1876.60 1636.73 .000   
summgen3 5.47 2 2.73 2.39 .093 .01 [.00, .02] 
transid3 11.28 2 5.64 4.92 .008 .02 [.00, .04] 
summgen3 
x transid3 
21.23 4 5.31 4.63 .001 .03 [.01, .05] 
Error 628.31 548 1.15     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
 
Table C85 
 
Expected Means for Gender Identity and Transgender Identity on Gender Identification (Study 
2). 
       summgen3 transid3 emmean     SE  df lower.CL upper.CL 
1            Man      Yes   4.00 0.3229 548     3.37     4.63 
2          Woman      Yes   4.13 0.3386 548     3.47     4.80 
3 Nonbin/Agender      Yes   4.23 0.1864 548     3.86     4.59 
4            Man       No   5.31 0.0729 548     5.17     5.45 
5          Woman       No   5.17 0.0668 548     5.04     5.30 
6 Nonbin/Agender       No   3.50 0.3569 548     2.80     4.20 
7            Man    DK/NA   4.13 0.3569 548     3.43     4.83 
8          Woman    DK/NA   3.83 0.4371 548     2.97     4.69 
9 Nonbin/Agender    DK/NA   4.08 0.4371 548     3.22     4.94 
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Table C86 
 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Gender Identity on Gender Identification (Study 2). 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 7422.68 1 7422.68 5967.55 .000   
summgen3 51.18 2 25.59 20.57 .000 .07 [.04, .10] 
Error 694.06 558 1.24     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
 
Table C87 
 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Transgender Identity on Gender Identification (Study 2). 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 2913.94 1 2913.94 2477.78 .000   
transid3 82.43 2 41.22 35.04 .000 .11 [.07, .15] 
Error 666.81 567 1.18     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
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Table C88 
 
Fixed-Effects ANOVAs for Gender Identity and Transgender Identity on Use of Male Pronouns 
(He/Him) to Refer to Yourself (Study 2). 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 640.26 1 640.26 535.53 .000   
summgen3 94.22 2 47.11 39.40 .000 .13 [.08, .17] 
transid3 18.40 2 9.20 7.69 .001 .03 [.01, .05] 
summgen3 
x transid3 
24.57 4 6.14 5.14 .000 .04 [.01, .06] 
Error 656.36 549 1.20     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
 
Table C89 
 
Expected Means for Gender Identity and Transgender Identity on Use of Male Pronouns 
(He/Him) to Refer to Yourself (Study 2). 
        summgen3 transid3 emmean     SE  df lower.CL upper.CL 
1            Man      Yes   4.10 0.3458 549    3.421     4.78 
2          Woman      Yes   2.10 0.3458 549    1.421     2.78 
3 Nonbin/Agender      Yes   2.15 0.1903 549    1.778     2.53 
4            Man       No   4.21 0.0739 549    4.069     4.36 
5          Woman       No   1.14 0.0685 549    1.003     1.27 
6 Nonbin/Agender       No   3.11 0.3645 549    2.395     3.83 
7            Man    DK/NA   2.78 0.3645 549    2.062     3.49 
8          Woman    DK/NA   1.33 0.4464 549    0.457     2.21 
9 Nonbin/Agender    DK/NA   1.29 0.4133 549    0.474     2.10 
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Table C90 
 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Gender Identity on Use of Male Pronouns (He/Him) to Refer to 
Yourself (Study 2). 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 2054.33 1 2054.33 1643.11 .000   
summgen3 1138.89 2 569.45 455.46 .000 .62 [.58, .65] 
Error 698.90 559 1.25     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
 
Table C91 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Transgender Identity on Use of Male Pronouns (He/Him) to Refer to 
Yourself (Study 2). 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 862.70 1 862.70 265.26 .000   
transid3 6.57 2 3.29 1.01 .365 .00 [.00, .01] 
Error 1847.30 568 3.25     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
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Table C92 
Fixed-Effects ANOVAs for Gender Identity and Transgender Identity on Use of Female 
Pronouns (She/Her) to Refer to Yourself (Study 2). 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 784.58 1 784.58 693.29 .000   
summgen3 91.87 2 45.94 40.59 .000 .13 [.09, .17] 
transid3 0.72 2 0.36 0.32 .728 .00 [.00, .01] 
summgen3 
x transid3 
25.56 4 6.39 5.65 .000 .04 [.01, .06] 
Error 621.29 549 1.13     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
 
Table C93 
 
Expected Means for Gender Identity and Transgender Identity on Use of Female Pronouns 
(She/Her) to Refer to Yourself (Study 2). 
        summgen3 transid3 emmean     SE  df lower.CL upper.CL 
1            Man      Yes   1.90 0.3364 549    1.239     2.56 
2          Woman      Yes   3.50 0.3364 549    2.839     4.16 
3 Nonbin/Agender      Yes   2.45 0.1852 549    2.091     2.82 
4            Man       No   1.25 0.0719 549    1.105     1.39 
5          Woman       No   4.47 0.0666 549    4.340     4.60 
6 Nonbin/Agender       No   2.56 0.3546 549    1.859     3.25 
7            Man    DK/NA   1.56 0.3546 549    0.859     2.25 
8          Woman    DK/NA   3.33 0.4343 549    2.480     4.19 
9 Nonbin/Agender    DK/NA   3.57 0.4021 549    2.782     4.36 
 
  
  
363 
 
Table C94 
 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Gender Identity on Use of Female Pronouns (She/Her) to Refer to 
Yourself (Study 2). 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 2522.34 1 2522.34 2167.69 .000   
summgen3 1248.94 2 624.47 536.67 .000 .66 [.62, .69] 
Error 650.46 559 1.16     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
 
Table C95 
 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Transgender Identity on Use of Female Pronouns (She/Her) to Refer 
to Yourself (Study 2). 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 1106.07 1 1106.07 328.14 .000   
transid3 12.88 2 6.44 1.91 .149 .01 [.00, .02] 
Error 1914.58 568 3.37     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
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Table C96 
 
Fixed-Effects ANOVAs for Gender Identity and Transgender Identity on Use of Gender Neutral 
Pronouns (They/Them) to Refer to Yourself (Study 2). 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 503.90 1 503.90 522.00 .000   
summgen3 68.39 2 34.20 35.42 .000 .11 [.07, .15] 
transid3 6.41 2 3.21 3.32 .037 .01 [.00, .03] 
summgen3 
x transid3 
1.10 4 0.28 0.28 .888 .00 [.00, .00] 
Error 530.93 550 0.97     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
 
Table C97 
 
Expected Means for Gender Identity and Transgender Identity on Use of  
Gender Neutral Pronouns (They/Them) to Refer to Yourself (Study 2). 
      summgen3 transid3    emmean    SE  df lower.CL upper.CL 
1            Man      Yes   1.80 0.3107 550    1.190     2.41 
2          Woman      Yes   1.80 0.3107 550    1.190     2.41 
3 Nonbin/Agender      Yes   3.82 0.1710 550    3.482     4.15 
4            Man       No   1.44 0.0664 550    1.313     1.57 
5          Woman       No   1.37 0.0614 550    1.247     1.49 
6 Nonbin/Agender       No   3.11 0.3275 550    2.468     3.75 
7            Man    DK/NA   1.56 0.3275 550    0.912     2.20 
8          Woman    DK/NA   1.67 0.4011 550    0.879     2.45 
9 Nonbin/Agender    DK/NA   3.14 0.3714 550    2.413     3.87 
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Table C98 
 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Gender Identity on Use of Gender Neutral Pronouns (They/Them) to 
Refer to Yourself (Study 2). 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 1529.51 1 1529.51 1579.69 .000   
summgen3 225.96 2 112.98 116.69 .000 .29 [.24, .34] 
Error 542.21 560 0.97     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
 
Table C99 
 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Gender Identity on Use of Gender Neutral Pronouns (They/Them) to 
Refer to Yourself (Study 2). 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 752.54 1 752.54 673.96 .000   
transid3 138.08 2 69.04 61.83 .000 .18 [.13, .22] 
Error 635.34 569 1.12     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
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Table C100 
 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Gender Identity and Transgender Identity on Choosing Men’s 
Clothing (Study 2). 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 871.71 1 871.71 7432.08 .000   
summgen3 0.81 2 0.40 3.45 .032 .01 [.00, .03] 
transid3 0.05 2 0.02 0.21 .810 .00 [.00, .01] 
summgen3 
x transid3 
0.13 4 0.03 0.28 .891 .00 [.00, .00] 
Error 64.28 548 0.12     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
 
 
Table C101 
 
Expected Means for Gender Identity and Transgender Identity on Choosing Men’s Clothing 
(Study 2). 
        summgen3 transid3 emmean     SE  df lower.CL upper.CL 
1            Man      Yes   4.45 0.3026 548    3.856     5.04 
2          Woman      Yes   2.30 0.3026 548    1.706     2.89 
3 Nonbin/Agender      Yes   3.27 0.1666 548    2.945     3.60 
4            Man       No   4.49 0.0647 548    4.359     4.61 
5          Woman       No   1.75 0.0601 548    1.634     1.87 
6 Nonbin/Agender       No   3.67 0.3190 548    3.040     4.29 
7            Man    DK/NA   3.67 0.3190 548    3.040     4.29 
8          Woman    DK/NA   1.75 0.3907 548    0.983     2.52 
9 Nonbin/Agender    DK/NA   2.64 0.3617 548    1.932     3.35 
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Table C102 
 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Gender Identity on Choosing Men’s Clothing (Study 2). 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 3516.16 1 3516.16 3288.68 .000   
summgen3 760.45 2 380.23 355.63 .000 .56 [.52, .60] 
Error 597.67 559 1.07     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
 
Table C103 
 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Transgender Identity on Choosing Men’s Clothing (Study 2). 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 1588.27 1 1588.27 660.66 .000   
transid3 4.52 2 2.26 0.94 .391 .00 [.00, .01] 
Error 1365.51 568 2.40     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
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Table C104 
 
Fixed-Effects ANOVAs for Gender Identity and Transgender Identity on Choosing Women’s 
Clothing (Study 2). 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 1034.94 1 1034.94 1235.07 .000   
summgen3 80.30 2 40.15 47.91 .000 .15 [.10, .19] 
transid3 1.01 2 0.50 0.60 .547 .00 [.00, .01] 
summgen3 
x transid3 
32.09 4 8.02 9.57 .000 .06 [.03, .10] 
Error 461.72 551 0.84     
 
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
 
Table C105 
 
Expected Means for Gender Identity and Transgender Identity on Choosing Women’s Clothing 
(Study 2). 
        summgen3 transid3 emmean     SE  df lower.CL upper.CL 
1            Man      Yes   1.75 0.2895 551     1.18     2.32 
2          Woman      Yes   3.40 0.2895 551     2.83     3.97 
3 Nonbin/Agender      Yes   3.11 0.1594 551     2.79     3.42 
4            Man       No   1.27 0.0619 551     1.15     1.39 
5          Woman       No   4.40 0.0571 551     4.29     4.52 
6 Nonbin/Agender       No   2.78 0.3051 551     2.18     3.38 
7            Man    DK/NA   2.06 0.3051 551     1.46     2.65 
8          Woman    DK/NA   3.00 0.3737 551     2.27     3.73 
9 Nonbin/Agender    DK/NA   4.00 0.3460 551     3.32     4.68 
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Table C106 
 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Gender Identity on Choosing Women’s Clothing (Study 2). 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 2870.61 1 2870.61 3044.30 .000   
summgen3 1140.30 2 570.15 604.65 .000 .68 [.65, .71] 
Error 528.99 561 0.94     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
 
Table C107 
 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Transgender Identity on Choosing Women’s Clothing (Study 2). 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 1271.55 1 1271.55 428.27 .000   
transid3 0.63 2 0.32 0.11 .900 .00 [.00, .00] 
Error 1692.37 570 2.97     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
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Table C108 
 
Fixed-Effects ANOVAs for Interactions of Gender Identity and Transgender Identity on Non-
Binary Experiences Scale (Study 2). 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 554.62 1 554.62 533.90 .000   
summgen3 17.13 2 8.56 8.25 .000 .05 [.02, .10] 
transid3 7.94 2 3.97 3.82 .023 .03 [.00, .06] 
summgen3 
x transid3 
2.78 4 0.69 0.67 .613 .01 [.00, .02] 
Error 307.48 296 1.04     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
 
Table C109 
 
Expected Means for Gender Identity and Transgender Identity on Non-Binary Experiences Scale 
(Study 2). 
        summgen3 transid3 emmean     SE  df lower.CL upper.CL 
1            Man      Yes   2.43 0.5096 296     1.43     3.44 
2          Woman      Yes   2.94 0.4161 296     2.12     3.76 
3 Nonbin/Agender      Yes   4.25 0.2548 296     3.75     4.75 
4            Man       No   2.21 0.0884 296     2.04     2.39 
5          Woman       No   2.18 0.0904 296     2.00     2.35 
6 Nonbin/Agender       No   4.11 0.5096 296     3.10     5.11 
7            Man    DK/NA   3.70 0.3603 296     2.99     4.41 
8          Woman    DK/NA   3.45 0.4558 296     2.56     4.35 
9 Nonbin/Agender    DK/NA   4.24 0.7207 296     2.82     5.66 
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Table C110 
 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Gender Identity on Non-Binary Experiences Scale (Study 2). 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 1347.68 1 1347.68 1219.18 .000   
summgen3 83.58 2 41.79 37.81 .000 .20 [.13, .26] 
Error 336.04 304 1.11     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
 
Table C111 
 
Fixed-Effects ANOVA for Transgender Identity on Non-Binary Experiences Scale (Study 2). 
Predictor 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p partial η2 
partial η2  
90% CI 
[LL, UL] 
(Intercept) 937.35 1 937.35 849.05 .000   
transid3 80.76 2 40.38 36.58 .000 .19 [.13, .25] 
Error 340.03 308 1.10     
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, 
respectively. 
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Appendix D 
Additional Measures to Validate Novel Gender Essentialism Scale 
Homophobia Scale (Wright, Adams, and Bernat, 1999). 
Participants indicated their agreement with each of 25 items measuring negative attitudes 
toward homosexual people on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly 
disagree). Example items include “I avoid gay individuals” and “I feel that you cannot trust a 
person who is homosexual.” I averaged item scores into a single composite score (α = .95, M = 
2.3, SD = 1); higher scores indicate more homophobic attitudes. 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965). 
Participants indicated their agreement with each of 10 items measuring self-esteem on a 
7-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly disagree). Example items include “I 
certainly feel useless at times (reverse-coded)” and “I take a positive attitude toward myself.” I 
averaged item scores into a single composite score (α = .89, M = 4.8, SD = 1.1); higher scores 
indicate higher self-esteem. 
Social Desirability Short Form (Strahan & Gerbasi, 1972). 
Participants indicated whether each of 10 items were true or false (1 = true, 2 = false) of 
them. These items, such as “I'm always willing to admit it when I make a mistake.” and “I never 
resent being asked to return a favor,” measure the degree to which a participant’s responses are 
influenced by social desirability. I averaged item scores into a single composite score (α = .48, M 
= 1.3, SD = .19). 
Need for Closure Short Form (Roets & Ban Hiel, 2011). 
Participants indicated their agreement with each of 15 items measuring need for closure 
on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly disagree). Example items include 
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“I don't like situations that are uncertain” and “I dislike questions which could be answered in 
many different ways.”  I averaged item scores into a single composite score (α = .89, M = 4.4, 
SD = .90); higher scores indicate more need for closure. 
General Essentialism Scale (Bastian & Haslam, 2006).  
Participants indicated their agreement with each of 24 items measuring general 
essentialist views on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly disagree). 
Example items include “The kind of person someone is can be largely attributed to their genetic 
inheritance” and “Everyone is either a certain type of person or they are not.”  I averaged item 
scores into a single composite score (α = .81, M = 3.8, SD = .56); higher scores indicate more 
essentialist views. 
Ambivalent Sexism Scale (Glick and Fiske, 1996).  
Participants indicated their agreement with each of 12 items measuring hostile and 
benevolent sexism on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly disagree). Six 
items measure benevolent sexism (e.g. “Women should be cherished and protected by men.”) 
and six items measure hostile sexism (e.g. “Women seek to gain power by getting control over 
men.”). I averaged item scores into a single composite score for hostile sexism (α = .89, M = 3.2, 
SD = 1.3) and benevolent sexism (α = .82, M = 3.7, SD = 1.2). In each case, higher scores 
indicate more sexist attitudes. 
Implicit Person Theory Scale (Dweck et al., 1995). 
Participants indicated their agreement with each of three items measuring general entity 
vs. incremental theories about people on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = 
Strongly disagree). The items are “The kind of person someone is, is something very basic about 
them and it can't be changed very much,” “People can do things differently, but the important 
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parts of who they are can't really be changed,” and “Everyone is a certain kind of person and 
there is not much that can be done to really change that.” I averaged item scores into a single 
composite score (α = .87, M = 3.8, SD = 1.4); higher scores indicate a greater endorsement of an 
entity theory of people. 
Right-Wing Authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1981).  
Participants indicated their agreement with each of 15 items measuring right-wing 
authoritarianism on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly disagree). 
Example items include “A lot of our rules regarding sexual behavior are just customs which are 
not necessarily any better or holier than those which other people follow” and “What our country 
needs is the most is disciplined citizens, following national leaders in unity.”  I averaged item 
scores into a single composite score (α = .90, M = 4.6, SD = .98); higher scores indicate less 
right-wing authoritarianism. 
Demographics Questions 
What is your gender identity? [single-select] 
 Man 
 Woman 
 Non-binary (e.g. Genderqueer) [free text box] 
 Genderfluid 
 Agender 
 Another identity not listed (please specify) [free text box] 
 Do not know 
 Choose not to answer 
 
What is your sexual orientation? [single-select] 
 Straight (Heterosexual) 
 Gay/Lesbian (Homosexual) 
 Bisexual/Pansexual 
 Queer [free text box] 
 Asexual 
 Another identity not listed (please specify) [free text box] 
 Do not know 
 Choose not to answer 
  
375 
 
 
What is your race/ethnicity (please check all that apply)? 
 African American/Black 
 Pacific Islander (e.g. Hawaii, Guam, Samoa) 
 Indian Subcontinent (e.g. India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh) 
 Middle Eastern (e.g. Egypt, Turkey, U.A.E.) 
 East Asian (e.g. Japan, China, Korea) 
 Southeast Asian (e.g. Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Philippines) 
 White (e.g. European, Anglo, Caucasian) 
 Hispanic, Latino(a), Chicano(a) 
 Native American (e.g. Cherokee, Choctaw, Inuit, Navajo) 
 Another race or ethnicity not listed (please specify) [free text box] 
 
What is your age (in years)? [free text box] 
 
Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, an 
independent, or what? [single-select] 
 Democrat 
 Republican 
 Independent 
 Other party (please specify) [free text box] 
 
Do you consider yourself religious? If so, what is your religion? [single-select] 
 No, I do not consider myself religious. 
 Yes (please describe) [free text box] 
 
Debriefing Materials 
“Now that data collection is complete, we can give you complete information about the purpose 
of this study. Broadly, we are studying the effects of differently-worded gender demographic 
questions on gender essentialism, or the tendency to believe that members of a gender category 
(e.g. men) share a fixed, underlying “essence” which determines their identity, makes them 
fundamentally alike, and gives others important information about them. At the beginning of the 
study, you were randomly assigned to see one of several different types of gender demographic 
questions. We wanted to determine whether seeing gender demographic questions that allow for 
multiple selections would reduce participants' endorsement of gender essentialist beliefs relative 
to questions that only permit participants to choose one option. This effect has been observed for 
racial demographic questions (Lee et al., 2014), and we hoped to replicate it for gender 
demographic questions. In addition to the measures of primary interest, we also included 
measures of several other constructs that have previously been shown to correlate with gender 
essentialism. We expected these measures to relate to gender essentialism as has been found in 
previous studies. Thank you for your participation! Please do not share any details about this 
study with your peers who might take this study until the end of the semester - awareness of the 
real purpose of our study could invalidate our results.” 
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